Opinion
No. 1:98CV205-S-A
May 2, 2000
OPINION
In this case, plaintiff originally alleged that the defendant, Don Moore, unconstitutionally assaulted him and that the co-defendant, Sheriff Jimmy Taylor, was liable for Moore's actions, for his refusing to allow him to press charges against Moore, and for denial of medical treatment after the altercation with Moore. In due course, the magistrate judge conducted a Spears hearing. At that time, plaintiff stated: "[T]hey didn't take me to the hospital. I complained all that day. They didn't take me to the hospital at all until the next day . . . . after I cried and hollered so much. . . ." The magistrate judge questioned plaintiff closely about Sheriff Taylor's role in the alleged denial of medical care:
Q. Now you've alleged that Sheriff Taylor denied you medical care. Did you talk to the Sheriff?
A. I couldn't talk to nobody. They had me in the holding cell in there. . . . [T]he Sheriff just don't come back and talk to you. . . . All I can do is just tell the officers, "I need to go to the hospital. I need to talk to the Sheriff" of which I have complained.
Plaintiff acknowledged not only that he never talked to the sheriff personally but also that he never sent the sheriff a note and that the sheriff never even saw plaintiff.
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff was allowed to amend his complaint to clarify his claims against Moore and Taylor. Plaintiff changed very little of the complaint substantively except to state (1) that the claims were being brought against the defendants in both their individual and official capacities, and (2) that Taylor was being sued for inadequately training Moore and in his capacity as Moore's supervisor. As to the medical claim, plaintiff stated in the recitation of facts: "Defendant Moore was taken off the block and the plaintiff was placed in a drunk tank, refused medical treatment for 24 hours with the exception of some eye drops given to the plaintiff some time after the assault."
Subsequently, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation recommending that the excessive force claim against Moore be allowed to proceed but that the claims against Taylor be dismissed as frivolous. Specifically, the magistrate judge found:
As to defendant Taylor, the Sheriff of Alcorn County, plaintiff acknowledged at the hearing that he did not talk to Taylor, although he asked to be allowed to see the Sheriff. "In order to state a cause of action under section 1983, the plaintiff must identify defendants who were either personally involved in the constitutional violation or whose acts are causally connected to the constitutional violation alleged," Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted), and plaintiff has not alleged that defendant Taylor had any personal involvement whatsoever in the alleged constitutional deprivations.
The court adopted the RR without objection from plaintiff.
The case therefore proceeded solely against Moore, who, after a period of discovery, requested summary judgment on the excessive force claim. According to Moore, because plaintiff's allegation that Moore started the altercation necessarily calls into question the validity of plaintiff's guilty plea to and conviction for simple assault of a police officer, his section 1983 action is foreclosed by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In due course, the magistrate issued a second RR, which is presently before the court for consideration. In that RR, the magistrate judge concluded:
[P]laintiff's success on his damage claim against Don Moore would necessarily draw into question the validity of his conviction or sentence. . . . Despite . . . allegations of jailer misconduct and the damages which allegedly flowed from defendant [Moore's] actions, plaintiff later admitted that it was he who assaulted Moore rather than the other way around. . . . Ramsey's admittedly inappropriate, indeed felonious behavior, precipitated the December 4th attack; the charge to which plaintiff pled guilty arose from the same altercation and is based on the same events which form the basis of his § 1983 claim. If the allegations in Ramsey's amended complaint were found to be true, i.e., that it was Moore who attacked Ramsey, a finding of liability against defendant would necessarily call into question plaintiff's guilty plea. Therefore, [under Heck] plaintiff must demonstrate that the March 1998 conviction or sentence has been invalidated in order for the § 1983 cause of action to accrue.
When the magistrate judge did not receive a response from plaintiff to Moore's motion, she found that "as plaintiff has failed to come forward with anything to refute defendant's contention that plaintiff's conviction has not been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, [or] otherwise declared invalid in a state collateral proceeding or by issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus,"the motion for summary judgment should be granted on the excessive force claim. However, the magistrate judge concluded the RR with a recommendation that plaintiff's claim for denial of medical treatment be allowed to go forward for trial, presumably against Moore, the sole remaining defendant.
In response, plaintiff lodged two objections: (1) he disputed the magistrate judge's conclusion that he did not respond to the summary judgment motion, and (2) he challenged his guilty plea, stating "Even though I pled guilty to the `alleged' charge, it was because it was in the best interest for me to avoid an inflated sentence on my other charge [for drug possession]," and "Just because I pled guilty does not mean I did it. . . ."
As to plaintiff's first objection, he is correct: he did respond to the motion for summary judgment. This finding is of little comfort to him, however, as it does not alter the fact that his conviction for assaulting defendant Moore remains a valid conviction, regardless of plaintiff's reasons for entering the plea. In that situation, plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Moore clearly cannot proceed under Heck, as succinctly explained by the magistrate judge. The court's concern in this case (and the reason for the lengthy recitation of the background facts) lies in the magistrate judge's second conclusion on the medical claim. As this court reads the amended complaint, defendant Moore was removed from the premises immediately after the altercation. Plaintiff's testimony at the Spears hearing accords with that conclusion. It is therefore inconceivable that Moore was the officer who refused plaintiff medical treatment for his alleged injuries, and it would be improper to allow a trial to proceed against him on this claim when there is not even an allegation, much less any evidence, that he was the derelict officer. This, of course, would explain why Moore did not move for summary judgment on the medical care claim: plaintiff never articulated such a claim against Moore. Indeed, neither plaintiff's amended complaint nor his Spears testimony identifies the officers who refused plaintiff medical treatment; they are generically referred to as "they." Under these circumstances, the court cannot allow this matter to proceed to trial on the claim for denial of medical care.
An appropriate order and final judgment shall issue.