Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Dudley W. Gray II, Judge. Petition granted. L.A.S.C. No. YC059405
Ellis Law Corporation, Andrew L. Ellis and Justina G. Ramon for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Ecoff, Law & Salomons, Gary K. Salomons, Philip H.R. Nevinny; and William O. Fleischman for Real Party in Interest Pioneer Theaters, Inc.
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDATE
MALLANO, P. J. CHANEY, J. JOHNSON, J.
Where it is undisputed that the plaintiff in a slip-and-fall action incurred medical expenses totaling at least $8,000, and where the plaintiff seeks damages for pain and suffering, we hold that a judgment in excess of $25,000 would not be “virtually unattainable,” and, thus, the matter should proceed as an unlimited civil action.
FACTS
Jacqueline Ramos filed an unlimited civil action against Pioneer Theaters, Inc., Jose J. Vazaquez, and Abel Romero for damages arising out of an injury she suffered after tripping in an open air market.
Alleging that Ramos’s injuries were minor, the defendants moved to transfer the case to a court of limited jurisdiction. In support, the defendants provided copies of Ramos’s medical bills, which totaled a little over $8,000, and that she had not sought medical treatment for her injuries in more than one year. Respondent court granted the motion, stating: “Well, all things considered, I don’t see how this would ever result in an unlimited jurisdiction award. So the motion to reclassify is granted.”
DISCUSSION
Factors that determine whether a matter proceeds in a court of limited or unlimited jurisdiction are set forth in Code of Civil Procedure sections 85 and 86.
Code of Civil Procedure section 85 provides, in pertinent part: “An action or special proceeding shall be treated as a limited civil case if all of the following conditions are satisfied, and, notwithstanding any statute that classifies an action or special proceeding as a limited civil case, an action or special proceeding shall not be treated as a limited civil case unless all of the following conditions are satisfied:
“(a) The amount in controversy does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000). As used in this section, ‘amount in controversy’ means the amount of the demand, or the recovery sought, or the value of the property, or the amount of the lien, that is in controversy in the action, exclusive of attorneys’ fees, interest, and costs.
“(b) The relief sought is a type that may be granted in a limited civil case.”
Code of Civil Procedure section 86 provides, in pertinent part: “(a) The following civil cases and proceedings are limited civil cases:
“(1) Cases at law in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy amounts to twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less.”
Code of Civil Procedure section 403.040, subdivision (b), provides a party may file a motion for reclassification after the initial pleading and response period, and the court shall grant the motion and order reclassification if (1) the case is incorrectly classified; and (2) the moving party shows good cause for not seeking reclassification earlier.
The standard for reviewing an order transferring a case to a court of limited jurisdiction is the same standard that was used to review an order transferring a case to the municipal court from the superior court—abuse of discretion. (Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 272; Singer v. Superior Court (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320; Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 266, 276; Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 223, 231.)
“Prior to 1998, California counties had two major designations of civil courts—the superior courts and the municipal courts, and each court system had separate subject matter jurisdiction. Among other matters, the municipal court had jurisdiction over cases where the amount in controversy was $25,000 or less and the superior court had jurisdiction over cases above $25,000. A case filed in the superior court whose amount in controversy did not meet the jurisdictional minimum was subject to ‘transfer’ of jurisdiction under [former Code of Civil Procedure] section 396 from superior court to the municipal court. [Citation.]
“In 1998 the California Constitution was amended to permit unification of the municipal and superior courts in each county into a single superior court system having original jurisdiction over all matters formerly designated as superior court and municipal court actions. [Citation.] After unification, the municipal courts ceased to exist. [Citation.] Now civil cases formerly within the jurisdiction of the municipal courts are classified as ‘limited’ civil cases, while matters formerly within the jurisdiction of the superior court’s are classified as ‘unlimited’ civil action. [Citation.]
“Notwithstanding the new labels the ‘amount in controversy’ distinctions remain. Whether an action qualifies as a limited or unlimited civil action is determined initially from the prayer or demand for relief in the plaintiff’s complaint. Once classified as limited or unlimited that classification normally continues throughout the litigation. If, however, a matter has been designated as an unlimited action, and yet the amount of controversy is $25,000 or less, the statutory scheme authorizes ‘reclassification’ of the case as a ‘limited’ action and transfer of the matter to a superior court presiding over such actions. [Citation.]” (Ytuarte v. Superior Court, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 274.)
The inquiry is “whether damages over $25,000 ‘could be proven’... [or] whether such damages ‘could not be obtained’.... Even more appropriately,... the test [is] whether ‘lack of jurisdiction is clear’... ’[or] ‘virtually unattainable.’” (Walker v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 269, citations omitted.) The Supreme Court explained in Walker: “‘The [trial] court may believe it highly unlikely that plaintiff will recover the amount demanded, but this is not enough to defeat jurisdiction, unless it appears to a legal certainty that plaintiff cannot recover the amount which [she] has demanded.’” (Id. at p. 270.) “[C]aution is called for in this context” (id. at pp. 270–271) and “the transfer power [should not be used] as ‘an unfettered means of clearing crowded... calendars....’” (Id. at p. 271.)
In Maldonado v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 397, the appellate court determined that a transfer was not proper when the plaintiff’s medical bills totaled over $7,000 and the doctors’ reports described disc herniation and protrusion. One doctor’s opinion was that there was a “good chance” the plaintiff would have to undergo more surgery. The Maldonado court concluded: “The unlikeliness of a judgment in excess of $25,000 is not the test. The trial court reviews the record to determine whether the result is obtainable. Simply stated, the trial court looks to the possibility of a jurisdictionally appropriate verdict, not to its probability.” (Maldonado v. Superior Court, supra, 45 Cal.App.4that p. 402, original italics.)
“[A] transfer to municipal court must not be made unless the lack of jurisdiction is clear. A transfer deprives the plaintiff of the forum of original choice, and, unless set aside on review, precludes the plaintiff from proving damages greater than those available in an inferior court. [Citations.] A decision to transfer made without proper evaluation of the facts and circumstances of the case, or motivated by a desire to diminish court caseloads, would violate a plaintiff’s interests.” (Campbell v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 147, 152–153.) While, below, The defendants cited Campbell as analogous, it should be noted that the Campbell plaintiff sought $1 million in punitive damages, but alleged no physical injury. (Ibid.)
In Singer v. Superior Court, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 1315, the appellate court stated that a trial court must not ignore the issue of pain and suffering, the calculation of which is within the province of the jury: “[T]he trial court abused its discretion in transferring plaintiff’s case to the municipal court.... [P]laintiff experienced pain and emotional suffering both as the result of the two dog bites and as a result of defendants’ failure to advise whether ‘Sunny’ had been inoculated against rabies. ‘“Pain and suffering are not subject to precise measurement by any scale, and their translation into money damages is peculiarly the function of the trier of the facts.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1320.)
In Ytuarte v. Superior Court, supra, the trial court ordered the matter transferred to a court of limited jurisdiction. In a motion to have her case reclassified as a case of unlimited jurisdiction, plaintiff Ytuarte alleged she “had incurred medical bills and expenses attributed to the accident in excess of $6,200, that she had lost about $25,000 in income and neither defendant had taken responsibility for the property damage to her vehicle. She also attached various exhibits (i.e., medical billing, medical reports and employment and income-related documents) which purportedly demonstrated the damage claims.” (Id. at p. 271.) The trial court denied Ytuarte’s motion. The appellate court vacated the trial court’s decision and ordered it to reconsider Ytuarte’s motion and explained the plaintiff’s burden: “Ytuarte is not required to show ‘the high level of certainty her the damage award will exceed $25,000’ to obtain reclassification. Instead, Ytuarte must present evidence to demonstrate a possibility the damages will exceed $25,000. The trial court, without adjudicating the merits of the underlying case, should review the record to determine whether a judgment in excess of $25,000 is obtainable. If a jurisdictionally appropriate verdict may result, (i.e., if such a verdict is not virtually unobtainable) the court should grant the motion to reclassify the case as ‘unlimited.’ Concomitantly, the court may deny the motion only where it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff’s damages will necessarily be $25,000 or less. [Fn. omitted.]” (Ytuarte v. Superior Court, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 279, italics in original.)
Although Ramos contends that her medical bills were over $12,000, the $8,000 sum proffered by the defendants, along with Ramos’s claim for pain and suffering, is sufficient to require that the case proceed in a court of unlimited jurisdiction because it cannot be said that a judgment in excess of $25,000 would be virtually unobtainable.
As there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law, and in view of the fact that the issuance of an alternative writ would add nothing to the presentation already made, we deem this to be a proper case for the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate “in the first instance.” (Code Civ. Proc., § l088; Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court (Feb. 1, 2010, S156598) __ Cal.4th __; Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1240-1241; Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218, 1222-1223; Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180.) Opposition was requested and the parties were notified of the court’s intention to issue a peremptory writ. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc., supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 180.)
DISPOSITION
THEREFORE, let a peremptory writ issue, commanding respondent superior court to vacate its order of November 13, 2009, granting defendants’ motion to reclassify this matter to a court of limited jurisdiction and to issue a new and different order denying same, in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. YC059405, entitled Jacqueline Ramos v. Pioneer Theaters, Inc., et al.
All parties shall bear their own costs.