Opinion
NO. 01-17-00262-CV
03-27-2018
ENRIQUE RAMIREZ, Appellant v. ED WELLS, COURT MANAGER OF THE OFFICE OF COURT MANAGEMENT, HARRIS COUNTY CRIMINAL COURTS AT LAW, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AND HONORABLE PAULA GOODHART, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE HARRIS COUNTY CRIMINAL COURTS AT LAW IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY, Appellees
On Appeal from the 55th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2016-25766
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this appeal of an original mandamus proceeding filed in the district court, appellant, Enrique Ramirez, sought to compel appellees, Ed Wells and the Honorable Paula Goodhart, to comply with his request for information under the Texas Public Information Act ("PIA"). After competing motions for summary judgment were filed, the trial court denied Ramirez's summary judgment and granted appellees' summary judgment. In one issue, Ramirez argues that he has the right to information related to his removal from a list of approved attorneys eligible for appointment to represent indigent defendants.
At the time litigation commenced, Ramirez sued the Honorable Margaret Harris, former presiding judge of the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law. By the time appellees moved for summary judgment, the Honorable Paula Goodhart had replaced Judge Harris as the presiding judge of the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law.
We affirm.
Background
Ramirez had been on a list of attorneys eligible to receive appointments under the Fair Defense Act [Alternative] Plan of the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law. On November 17, 2015, Ramirez, along with a number of other attorneys, received administrative order number 2015-5, stating that he was no longer eligible to receive appointments to represent indigent defendants.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04 (West Supp. 2017).
Ramirez filed an appeal of his involuntary removal. By letter dated December 17, 2015, the former presiding judge of the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law notified Ramirez he had been correctly removed.
Ramirez then contacted Wells and requested access to the information related to his removal. Wells responded, stating that the "judiciary is specifically exempt from the provisions of the Texas Public Information Act" and "internal deliberations on court or judicial administration matters are exempt from disclosure under the Rules of Judicial Administration." Wells concluded that "the requested records are exempt from disclosure and we are unable to provide you with any requested information." Wells also stated that Ramirez could appeal the denial of his request pursuant to Rule 12.9 of the Rules of Judicial Administration.
See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 12.9, reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. Tit. 2, subtit. F app. (West 2013) (stating that a "person who is denied access to a judicial record may appeal the denial by filing a petition for review with the Administrative Director of the Office of Court Administration").
Ramirez appealed to the Office of Court Administration, arguing that the decision to remove him from the list was an administrative decision and thus the information he requested did not constitute judicial records. Ramirez also argued that even if the information sought is properly categorized as a judicial record, he has a common-law right to inspect and copy judicial records absent some compelling reason to keep it hidden from public view.
The Office of Court Administration formed a special committee to determine Ramirez's appeal. In appeal number 16-005, the committee determined that the "maintenance of a list of attorneys who are eligible for appointment under a county's Fair Defense Act plan are related to a judge's adjudicative function. Accordingly, the records at issue in this appeal are not 'judicial records' as defined by Rule 12.2(d) and are not subject to Rule 12." The committee concluded that "[b]ecause the records at issue in this appeal are not judicial records under Rule 12, we can neither grant the petition in whole or in part nor sustain the denial of access to the requested records." On October 13, 2016, the appellees filed a motion for rehearing in the Office of Court Administration. On December 6, 2016, the committee issued a supplemental Rule 12 Decision stating that it was without authority to consider appellees' motion for rehearing. Nevertheless, the committee maintained that the information requested was not classified as judicial records and that to the extent that their decision conflicted with a previous Rule 12 Decision No. 08-009, that decision was overruled.
After the Office of Court Administration's special committee stated that it could neither grant the petition, nor sustain the denial of records, Ramirez filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the trial court pursuant to section 552.321 of the PIA, arguing that appellees failed to comply with the PIA. Ramirez later moved for a traditional summary judgment, arguing that section 552.023 required appellees to comply with his PIA request because the records he sought were not judicial, but administrative records. Ramirez attached an affidavit along with other supporting documentation. The appellees responded to Ramirez's summary judgment motion, arguing that the judiciary is exempt from the PIA. Wells attached an affidavit, stating that "These records were made or maintained by the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law in their regular course of business. The records were not created, produced, or filed in connection with any matter that is or has been before a court. The records are internal records of the judges and their staff, made with every intention that they remain confidential, and were never placed in open court or made public."
Section 552.321 of the PIA provides, "A requestor . . . may file suit for a writ of mandamus compelling a governmental body to make information available for public inspection if the governmental body refuses to request an attorney general's decision." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.321(a) (West 2012).
Section 552.023(a) provides, "A person or a person's authorized representative has a special right of access, beyond the right of the general public, to information held by a governmental body that relates to the person and that is protected from public disclosure by laws intended to protect that person's privacy interests." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.023(a) (West 2012).
On December 9, 2016, the trial court denied Ramirez's motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, appellees moved for summary judgment, arguing that the PIA does not apply to the judiciary, and they attached the same affidavit from Wells that was filed in response to Ramirez's summary judgment motion. The trial court granted the appellees' summary judgment and this appeal followed.
Analysis
In his sole issue on appeal, Ramirez argues that section 552.321(a) of the PIA entitles him to the information he requested.
Standard of Review
We review de novo the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). When both sides move for summary judgment, and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, reviewing courts consider both sides' summary-judgment evidence, determine all questions presented, and render the judgment the trial court should have rendered. Gilbert Tex. Constr., L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 327 S.W.3d 118, 124 (Tex. 2010). Each party moving for traditional summary judgment bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); see Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215-16 (Tex. 2003). When a plaintiff moves for summary judgment on its own claim, it must conclusively prove all essential elements of its cause of action. See Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1999); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). A defendant moving for summary judgment must conclusively negate at least one essential element of each of the plaintiff's causes of action or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997). Whether information is subject to the PIA and whether an exception to disclosure applies to the information are questions of law. See City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2000) (citing A & T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp, 904 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Tex. 1995)).
Public Information Act
The Texas Legislature enacted the PIA with the express purpose of providing the public "complete information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.001(a) (West 2012); Jackson v. State Office of Admin. Hearings, 351 S.W.3d 290, 293 (Tex. 2011). The PIA is aimed at preserving a fundamental tenet of representative democracy: "that the government is the servant and not the master of the people," and reflects the public policy that the people of Texas "remain[ ] informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.001(a). To advance these policy goals, the Legislature has directed that we liberally construe the PIA in favor of disclosure of requested information. See id. § 552.001(b); Jackson, 351 S.W.3d at 293.
The PIA guarantees access to "public information," subject to certain exceptions. See generally TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 552.001-.153 (West 2012 & Supp. 2017). "Those exceptions embrace the understanding that the public's right to know is tempered by the individual and other interests at stake in disclosing the information." Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2011). The Act applies to any information that is written, produced, collected, assembled, or maintained under a law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business: (1) by a governmental body or (2) for a governmental body and the governmental body owns the information or has a right of access to it. . . ." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.002(a)(1), (2) (West Supp. 2017). However, the judiciary is specifically excluded in the PIA's definition of "governmental body." See id. § 552.003(1)(B) (West Supp. 2017) (providing that for purposes of PIA, governmental body "does not include the judiciary"); State v. Newton, 179 S.W.3d 104, 111 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.) (holding that "[t]he State's arguments are fatally flawed because the [PIA] clearly and unequivocally excludes judicial information from its scope"). Instead, section 552.0035 of the PIA provides that "access to information collected, assembled, or maintained by or for the judiciary is governed by the rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Texas or by other applicable laws and rules." See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.0035 (West 2012); Abbott v. State Bar of Tex., 241 S.W.3d 604, 608-09 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied) (stating that information collected, assembled, or maintained by or for the judiciary and thus public access to information is not governed by the PIA);.
Here, appellees' summary judgment motion included the affidavit of Wells, who averred,
In my job capacity I am familiar with the records made by the judges and the staff of the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law in qualifying attorneys for the approved list of attorneys to represent indigent defendants under the Rules of Court for the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law, and also in removing attorneys from the list.
These records that were requested by Enrique Ramirez in his open records request were made on behalf of the judges and the staff of the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law in deliberating whether to remove him from the list of approved attorneys under Rule 24 Section H(2)(A) of the Rules of Court for the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law. These records were made or maintained by the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law in their regular course of business. The records were not created, produced, or filed in connection with any matter that is or has been before a court. The records are internal records of the judges and their staff, made with every intention that they remain confidential, and were never placed in open court or made public.
Wells's affidavit shows that Ramirez sought information produced, maintained, or assembled by the judiciary. Ramirez presented no evidence to contradict that his request for information sought information produced, maintained, or assembled by the judiciary. In the absence of controverting evidence, we conclude the records sought by Ramirez are "information collected, assembled, or maintained by or for the judiciary" and that public access to it is not governed by the PIA. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 552.002(a), 552.003(1)(B). Consequently, Ramirez is not entitled to the records at issue in this case pursuant to the PIA as alleged in his petition for mandamus.
The Texas Supreme Court has stated,
The Legislature has determined that the judiciary should not be subject to the Open Records Act at all, not only to relieve it from the additional burdens that Act imposes and to preserve a means of construing and enforcing the Act in disputes between people and the other Departments of Government, but to preserve the independence of the judiciary. The wisdom of the Legislature's decision is shown by the federal Freedom of Information Act, which, like the Open Records Act, simply does not apply to the judiciary. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B).Order and Opinion Denying Request Under Open Records Act, 1997 WL 583726, at *6 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).
We hold that Ramirez's request seeks information from the judiciary, which is specifically excluded from the definition of a governmental body. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.003(1)(B). As a matter of law, the PIA does not apply to Ramirez's request. Because Ramirez's original petition for writ of mandamus sought information pursuant to the PIA, and the PIA does not apply to the judiciary, the trial court properly denied his summary judgment and granted the appellees' summary judgment motion.
We overrule Ramirez's sole issue on appeal.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Sherry Radack
Chief Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Massengale and Brown.