Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2555-14T3
04-08-2016
ROBERT RAMIEREZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GEOVANNI REGALADO, Defendant, and JEFFREY M. BLOOM, Defendant-Respondent.
Harold P. Cook, III and Associates, attorneys for appellant (Matthew A. Sebera, on the brief). Foley & Foley, attorneys for respondent (Timothy J. Foley, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fisher and Currier. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-2698-13. Harold P. Cook, III and Associates, attorneys for appellant (Matthew A. Sebera, on the brief). Foley & Foley, attorneys for respondent (Timothy J. Foley, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Robert Ramierez appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Jeffrey Bloom, an attorney. Plaintiff's claim against Bloom arises from Bloom's representation of defendant Geovanni Regalado in a workers' compensation action pending in 2011, when Regalado borrowed $75,000 from plaintiff. The loan was secured by Regalado's assignment of $65,000 of his eventual recovery in the compensation matter. Bloom signed the assignment as well, agreeing "to disburse the proceeds of the aforementioned settlement, award or judgment in accordance with the terms" of the assignment. When the compensation matter settled, however, Bloom paid the proceeds to Regalado despite the terms of the assignment because N.J.S.A. 34:15-29 expressly prohibits the assignment of funds due or received from a workers' compensation claim.
In pertinent part, N.J.S.A. 34:15-29 states that "[c]laims or payments due under this chapter shall not be assignable, and shall be exempt from all claims of creditors and from levy, execution or attachment."
This appeal requires our consideration of Bloom's liability in these undisputed circumstances. Plaintiff argues that summary judgment was improperly granted because: (1) the law of the case doctrine prohibited one judge from granting summary judgment after another judge denied a similar motion; and (2) there existed material facts as to whether Bloom "entered into a valid contract with plaintiff when [he] signed and witnessed the assignment." We find no merit in either of these arguments and affirm.
During the course of the litigation, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff and against Regalado for $56,500.
Plaintiff's first argument need not long detain us. The law of the case doctrine simply has no application to the denial of summary judgment because such a determination "decides nothing and merely reserves issues for future disposition." See Gonzalez v. Ideal Tile Imp. Co., Inc., 371 N.J. Super. 349, 356 (App. Div. 2004), aff'd, 184 N.J. 415 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1092, 126 S. Ct. 1042, 163 L. Ed. 2d 857 (2006); A&P Sheet Metal Co., Inc. v. Edward Hansen, Inc., 140 N.J. Super. 566, 573 (Law Div. 1976). Moreover, such an order is interlocutory and may be revisited at any time, in the interests of justice, prior to entry of final judgment. R. 4:42-2; Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 534 (2011). Accordingly, the judge who granted summary judgment was not bound to adhere to another judge's earlier contrary determination; plaintiff's argument to the contrary is without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
In considering plaintiff's second argument, we initially observe that, as to Bloom, plaintiff only alleged a breach of contract, i.e., that Bloom failed to perform as required by the assignment. It is certainly true that Bloom did not disburse the proceeds of the compensation settlement to plaintiff, as promised, but that was because N.J.S.A. 34:15-29 barred his performance. As the motion judge correctly observed in his written opinion, Regalado's assignment of the proceeds and Bloom's agreement to disburse the proceeds to plaintiff were promises that were void as contrary to public policy. Consequently, no court could enforce such an agreement, Hudson City Contracting Co. v. Jersey City Incinerator Auth., 17 N.J. 297, 309 (1955), and plaintiff's breach of contract claim was without substance.
Plaintiff alleged that Regalado engaged in fraud, but he did not make that same claim against Bloom. --------
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION