As noted throughout, an OSC was the charging document in immigration proceedings prior to the enactment of IIRIRA. See Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510, 512-13 (9th Cir. 2001). I. Initial Deportation Proceedings

Because the BIA affirmed the decision of the IJ without opinion, we review the decision of the IJ. See Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 2003). We review constitutional challenges de novo. Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510, 517 (9th Cir. 2001). DISCUSSION

IIRIRA § 309(c)(5)(A) (emphasis added). We first addressed this "before, on, or after" language in Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2001). Ram argued that the stop-time rule — which specifies that an alien's period of continuous physical presence ends when deportation proceedings begin — could not be applied to his petition because the INS had initiated proceedings against him before IIRIRA took effect and application of the rule to him would have an impermissible retroactive effect.

But this reference made no sense because NTAs were used to initiate proceedings under the newly enacted IIRIRA, whereas the transitional rule was designed to deal with proceedings initiated under the prior statute. Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510, 515 (9th Cir.2001). Proceedings under the prior statute were initiated by OSCs. The original text of § 309(c)(5) was amended soon thereafter by Section 203(f) of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 ("NACARA"), which replaced "notices to appear" with "orders to show cause."

Before 1996, an alien was eligible for suspension of deportation if: (1) he or she had been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date an alien filed an application for suspension of deportation; (2) he or she was a person of good moral character; and (3) deportation would result in extreme hardship to either the alien or an immediate family member who was a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994); Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510, 513 (9th Cir. 2001). An alien in deportation proceedings before 1996 "continued to accrue time towards satisfying the seven-year residency requirement for suspension of deportation during the pendency of the proceedings."

" After IIRIRA, aliens are placed in removal proceedings after being served with a notice to appear, and can seek relief by applying for "cancellation of removal." See Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510, 513 (9th Cir. 2001). The law in effect when these petitioners made their temporary return to Mexico in 1993 provided for suspension of deportation for those who were continuously physically present in this country for seven years and allowed for "brief, casual, and innocent" absences from the United States. IIRIRA became effective April 1, 1997, when these petitioners' proceedings were pending. It provides for cancellation of removal for those who have been continuously present for ten years, allowing for one absence of up to 90 days and absences in the aggregate of up to 180 days.

Petitioners claim that the application of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IRRIRA") § 309(c)(5) stop-time provision to their case violated their due process rights. In light of this Court's decision in Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510 (9th Cir.2001), their argument must fail. In Ram, 243 F.3d at 517, this Court held that the application of the stop-time provision to cases that were pending at the time of IRRIRA's enactment "does not offend due process."

Finally, Sanchez-Rodriguez argues that the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 ("NACARA") § 203, which permits certain aliens to apply for special rule cancellation of removal in accordance with the more lenient terms of pre-IIRIRA suspension of deportation law, violates equal protection by making distinctions between nationalities. Because Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594 (9th Cir.2002), Hernandez-Mezquita v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir.2002), and Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510 (9th Cir.2001), foreclose Sanchez-Rodriguez' claims, we deny her petition for review. In Jimenez-Angeles we conducted a detailed analysis of a similar claim, measured against the Supreme Court's test under INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001).

Cause in 1994, with the exception only of brief, casual trips outside the country. SeeRam v. INS, 243 F.3d 510, 513-16 (9th Cir.2001). The IJ and the BIA found that Garcia-Moreno failed to establish his continuous presence in the United States prior to 1990.

We review de novo constitutional challenges. Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510, 516 (9th Cir.2001). We deny the petition.