Opinion
HHBCV185024428S
01-14-2020
Dasyam Samuel Rajasekhar v. State of Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Frazzini, Stephen F., J.T.R.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE
The plaintiff, Dasyam Samuel Rajasekhar, brought this administrative appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183 to challenge the decision of the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO, or the commission) in response to a discriminatory practices complaint the plaintiff filed against his former employer, the defendant Environmental Data Resources (Environmental Data). The commission dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint of an illegal discriminatory practice based on a finding of no reasonable cause to believe that he had- been discriminated or illegally retaliated against in connection with his former employment by Environmental Data.
The plaintiff’s complaint raises several issues. First, the complaint alleges that the fact finding did not address two issues he raised before the commission. Second, it asserts that the commission "took no action" on a claim of retaliation. The complaint also claims that he "was not afforded any opportunity to prove that the employer’s proffered business reason was neither bona fide and/or is a pretext." In conjunction with this claim, the complaint further asserts that "[o]nly a trial can determine that [Environmental Data’s] proffered reason for firing me is not bona fide reason and is simply a pretext."
The commission contends, in response, that the plaintiff has not met his burden of proof for an administrative appeal, that the commission conducted a thorough investigation of the plaintiff’s claims, and that the decision of the Department on Labor on the plaintiff’s unemployment compensation decision is not binding on the commission. Environmental Data contends the commission’s decision was proper and supported by substantial evidence. Both defendants also argue that the plaintiff’s appeal should be rejected as inadequately briefed. Finally, Environmental Data has filed three special defenses.
Environmental Data’s attorney notified the court at trial that it has abandoned the first special defense that the appeal was filed late, based on the court’s previously having heard evidence on the timeliness of the appeal and denied a motion to dismiss on that ground. See Docket entry no. 113.10. In view of this court’s determination that the plaintiff has failed to prove a violation of § 4-183(j) (quoted in footnote 4, on page 7 below), the court need not address Environmental Data’s second and third special defenses regarding the applicability of a separation agreement the plaintiff signed and the alleged preclusive effect of a federal court decision, Dasyam Samuel Rajasekhar v. Environmental Data Resources, Inc ., United States District Court, Docket No. 3:18-cv-01535 (JAM) (D.Conn. July 1, 2019), 2019 WL 2743579 (dismissing complaint filed under the Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 "on the grounds that the complaint does not state plausible grounds for relief and that this action is barred by Rajasekhar’s entry into an agreement that releases EDR from any claims arising from Rajasekhar’s employment.").
The parties appeared for hearing on the appeal on December 13, 2019, the plaintiff participating, at his request, by telephone and the defendants appearing through counsel. After review and consideration of the record and the arguments of the parties, and for the reasons described below, the court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to establish that the commission improperly prejudiced his substantial rights. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed
I
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The record discloses the following relevant facts and procedural history. On September 6, 2016, the plaintiff filed an "Affidavit of Illegal Discriminatory Practice" with the commission. Return of Record (ROR), p. 9-13. The plaintiff claimed that his former employer, Environmental Data Resources, had discriminated against him on the basis of race, religious creed, national origin, and alienage and had also illegally retaliated against him because of prior discrimination complaints. ROR, p. 9. In that affidavit, the plaintiff asserted that he had been employed by Environmental Data Resources as an Aerial Specialist between February 2013 and March 18, 2016. ROR, p. 9; p. 11, 713-5. The complaint further averred as follows:
I believe respondent discriminated against me on March 18, 2016, when I was terminated from employment. I have previously complained to HR director- Susan Hotchkiss, Supervisor- Deborah Sopchak, Manager Kodapalla Vijayarangaswamy and Neil Ashby- Risk Assessment, The complaints involved perceived acts of discrimination such as harassment, hostile environment and discrimination based on race and differences Retaliation.ROR, p. 11, ¶5. A separate paragraph in the affidavit, which the form specified was to be used "[f]or retaliation claims only" further stated as follows:
I complained about discrimination to Hotchkiss, Ashby on 14-17 of March 201 [sic] and as result of my report: I was terminated, Susan Hotchkiss mentioned that she has taken action before on my complaints of discrimination and that my last compliant [sic]- a detailed e-mail was about a day prior to my termination ...ROR, p. 11, ¶8. The defendant Environmental Data filed an answer dated October 27, 2016, denying the allegations of discrimination and responding to a "Request from Information" from CHRO. ROR, pp. 211-21.
In an affidavit captioned "Statement of Facts in Support of CHRO Complaint" and dated October 16, 2017, the plaintiff later also claimed to the commission that Environmental Data retaliated against him for having filed the complaint with the commission. ROR, pp. 3-6. In that "Statement of Facts," the plaintiff further asserted that:
He had performed his ‘job well and received a good performance evaluation in October 2015.’ ROR, p. 3, ¶3.
At the time of discharge, he was offered but initially declined a ‘severance package that is standard to EDR.’ ROR, p. 3, ¶4.
[A]lmost four months after discharge, he signed a severance agreement. ROR, p. 5, ¶17.
He was initially denied unemployment benefits, which were later awarded after a hearing before the Department of Labor; ‘I prevailed and won my unemployment claim ... thus proving that I was fired for no fault of mine. ’ (Underscoring in original.) ROR, pp. 3-4, ¶¶5-7.
After discharge his former employer ‘once again retaliated ... by threatening a lawsuit if I did not withdraw my complaint.’ ROR, p. 5, ¶14.
I believe the only reason I was discharged was an act of retaliation as I complained about what I believed to be discrimination, followed by retaliatory acts and finally discharged. ROR, p. 6, ¶21.
The plaintiff’s September 6, 2018 "Affidavit of Illegal Discriminatory Practice," stated as follows: "The severance agreement that I signed does not prohibit this complaint. Although any monetary claims are waived by me." (Paragraph 14.) Paragraph 15 of that same document then states as follows: "I request all damages that I might be entitled to under the relevant statutes."
The plaintiff’s complaint was assigned to an investigator; ROR, p. 1; who conducted a multi-day fact-finding conference; ROR, pp. 2, 7, 10; at which the plaintiff participated, by his request, by telephone. ROR, pp. 120, 124. The defendant’s attorney was present. The investigator received documentation from the plaintiff and defendant, and questioned several witnesses under oath. See ROR, p. 38, ¶26; docket entry no. 133, Parties’ Joint Statement Regarding CHRO Fact-Findings.
On August 8, 2018, the commission investigator issued a "Draft Finding of No Reasonable Cause"; ROR, pp. 2; which the investigator forwarded to the plaintiff, with the following invitation for comments:
Transmitted herewith is a draft summary of No Reasonable Cause. Prior to final action, I am providing you with an opportunity to comment. You have fifteen calendar days to provide me with any written comments concerning the draft summary ...
If you do submit comments, they will be reviewed and considered. However, if your comments do not rebut the substance of the summary or present new evidence that requires further investigation, the draft summary will be finalized.(Underscoring in original.) ROR, p. 43. On August 27, 2018, the investigator issued a final "Finding of No Reasonable Cause." ROR, p. 2. The investigator made the following factual findings on the merits of the plaintiff’s complaint:
21. Given complainant’s continuous communication issues, inability to work with his team, dissatisfaction with his job and repeated references to finding another job, respondent permitted complainant to voluntarily resign on March 18, 2016.
23. Respondent has provided legitimate business reasons for its actions through testimony or documentation.
24. Complainant has failed to present sufficient evidence to support his claims, through testimony or documentation, that respondent discriminated against him based upon his race, national origin, religion or alienage.
25. Complainant has failed to present sufficient evidence to support his claims, through testimony or documentation, that respondent retaliated against him for previously opposing discrimination of himself and others.
26. Based on this investigator’s review of the case file and the testimonies of Dasyam Samuel Rajarsekhar, complainant, Ranga Kondapally, Respondent Director of Data Services, Susan Hotchkiss, Respondent Vice President of Human Resources and Deborah Sopchak, Respondent Digital Library Manager, the undersigned investigator finds insufficient evidence to substantiate complaint’s allegations that respondent discriminated or retaliated against him.
Determination After reviewing all of the evidence in the Commission’s file, the investigator concludes that there is no reasonable cause for believing that a discriminatory practice has been or is being committed as alleged in the complaint.
The second section of the final Finding of No Reasonable Cause, captioned "Draft Comments," stated in part as follows: "A Draft finding was sent to the parties on August 8, 2018. Comments were to be received on or before August 23, 2018." (Underscoring in original.) A box next to the following was also checked: "No comments were received from the parties; therefore no changes were made to the draft finding." Id.
ROR, pp. 38-39. On the next day, the plaintiff’s complaint before the commission was dismissed based on the finding of no reasonable cause. ROR, pp. 31-32. This appeal followed.
II
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal is brought pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166, et seq., and is governed by § 4-183. At the outset, it is important to recognize the standard of review that constrains the court. The scope of judicial review under the UAPA is very restricted. "Judicial review of an administrative decision is a creature of statute." Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 226 Conn. 792, 799, 629 A.2d 367 (1993). "With regard to questions of fact, it is [not] the function of the trial court ... to retry the case or to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, 288 Conn. 790, 800, 955 A.2d 15 (2008). "[A] plaintiff who challenges an agency decision has the heavy burden of demonstrating that the department’s factual conclusion lacks substantial support on the whole record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport Dental, LLC v. Commissioner of Social Services, 165 Conn.App. 642, 650, 140 A.3d 263, cert. denied, 322 Conn. 908, 140 A.3d 221 (2016). A court may not "retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact ... Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 561.
General Statutes § 4-183 provides in relevant part: "(a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court as provided in this section ... (j) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. If the court finds such prejudice, it shall sustain the appeal and, if appropriate, may render a judgment under subsection (k) of this section or remand the case for further proceedings. For purposes of this section, a remand is a final judgment."
III
DISCUSSION
The plaintiff’s complaint in this appeal asserts that the commission did not address two issues that he claims are important- that the Department of Labor awarded him unemployment compensation benefits and that his former employer retaliated against him by threatening to sue him because he had filed the discriminatory practice complaint. The complaint also asserts that the commission took no action on his claim of retaliation after the EEOC communicated to Defendant’s CEO. Finally, it asserts that the plaintiff was denied an opportunity to prove his claims of discrimination and retaliation. He has briefed none of these issues, however, and when the trial court sits as an appellate court, as it does in administrative appeals under § 4-183, the court "is not required to consider a claim that is inadequately briefed." Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting Council, 286 Conn. 57, 85, 942 A.2d 345 (2008). As our Supreme Court has explained, courts "generally decline to consider issues that are inadequately briefed." Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., 298 Conn. 371, 402, 3 A.3d 892 (2010). "We are not obligated to consider issues that are not adequately briefed. When an issue is merely mentioned, but not briefed beyond a bare assertion of the claim, it is deemed to have been waived. In addition, mere conclusory assertions regarding a claim, with no mention of relevant authority and minimal or no citations from the record, will not suffice." (Citations omitted; quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting Council, supra, 286 Conn. 87.
The plaintiff filed both a "Brief and Response to Special Defenses (referred to below as the plaintiff’s "brief’) and a Reply Brief. Rather than legal analysis, however, both documents instead essentially contain factual allegations about the underlying events or responding to and refuting assertions made by the defendants in their pleadings. For example, the first bulleted paragraph of the plaintiff’s complaint asserts as follows:
I did not resign from the job but was fired and as a consequence Connecticut Department of Labor conducted a hearing. The investigation determined that I was terminated for no fault of mine and released my unemployment benefits. This was NOT addressed in the fact finding.
Rather than providing legal analysis or argument on this issue, however, the plaintiff’s brief merely states the following:
Section 2- Below are the proof I was terminated (EDR’s termination letter). After the investigation DOL released the employment benefits (Summary statement). CT DOL has ruled against EDR and provided full benefits to me.
The plaintiff’s brief thus disputes one of the commission investigator’s factual findings- that the plaintiff had voluntarily resigned- and asserts that the Department of Labor made a contrary finding. The plaintiff’s brief, however, offers no argument or analysis how such a contrary finding by the Department of Labor and an award of unemployment compensation benefits are pertinent to his claims of discrimination and retaliation that were the subject of the commission investigation. The brief contains no legal analysis and provides no legal authority to support any claim that an award of unemployment benefits should affect a commission investigation and findings regarding claims of discrimination and retaliation. His reply brief does mention the legal principle of estoppel, but provides no analysis about how that principle applies in this matter or whether its requirements were met here. "The parties may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case and the law cited." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 724, 138 A.3d 868 (2016). This argument is inadequately briefed and is deemed to have been abandoned.
The second claim in the plaintiff’s complaint- that the "issue of retaliation was NOT addressed in the fact finding"- "is simply wrong. Two separate paragraphs of the Finding of No Reasonable Cause expressly state that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence of retaliation. His brief and reply brief contain no analysis or argument to explain or support his assertion that the Finding of No Reasonable Cause did not address the issue of retaliation.
The third claim contained in the plaintiff’s complaint states as follows: "After EEOC communicated to Defendant’s CEO, CHRO on their own initiative amended the charge to include retaliation. However CHRO took no action." The commission’s "Corrected/Clarified Answer" to this allegation denies that "it amended the CHRO complaint to include retaliation." The commission’s brief correctly asserts that retaliation had already been alleged in the plaintiffs initial CHRO complaint; see ROR, pp. 9 and 11. It argues that "[o]n January 3, 2017, the CHRO made a technical change to the CHRO complaint to add the correct statutory reference." Neither the plaintiff’s brief nor his reply brief explains how a change to the complaint by adding a correct legal citation has any legal significance for his appeal. This argument is thus inadequately briefed and deemed to have been abandoned.
The affidavit of illegal discriminatory practice that the plaintiff submitted to the commission alleged retaliation because of prior discrimination claims. ROR, p. 9; p. 11, ¶8. On January 3, 2018, the commission investigator notified the parties by email that "the affidavit in this matter ... has been technically amended to cite C.G.S. 46a-60(a)(4)" and that "[n]o response is required." ROR, p. 106.
On the first page of the "Affidavit of Illegal Discriminatory Practice" filed by the plaintiff, he checked off a box "believe that my ... previously opposed, filed or assisted ... was/were in part a reason in this action." ROR, p. 9.
See ROR, p. 11, ¶8, quoted in the text on page 4 above.
The fourth and fifth claims in the plaintiff’s appeal complaint assert that he was denied an opportunity to prove his claims. His brief and reply brief contain numerous assertions about claimed mistakes and malfeasance by the investigator. The record shows, however, that the commission investigator reviewed many documents submitted by the plaintiff, and as part of the fact-finding the investigator heard sworn testimony from the plaintiff himself and the three representatives of the employer that the plaintiff wanted the investigator to question. See ROR, p. 124, letter from plaintiff to the commission dated October 16, 2017, asking the investigator to call Susan Hotchkiss, Deborah Sopchak and Ranga Kondapally as witnesses at the fact-finding hearing; ROR, p. 38, page six of the "Finding of No Reasonable Cause" stating in paragraph 26 that the investigator considered the testimony of the plaintiff and those three other people; and docket entry no. 133.
The appeal complaint states as follows:
That document, which the plaintiff captioned as a cover letter "in support of my affidavit," stated in part as follows:
In an administrative appeal, the findings of fact are made by the agency, at the administrative level. An administrative appeal to the superior court provides an aggrieved person the opportunity to argue that factual findings made by the agency are not supported by substantial evidence in the record or are somehow infected by legal error. The administrative appeal itself is decided based on the administrative record submitted to the court, and is not itself, as the plaintiff’s appeal complaint and briefs appear to request, the occasion for a trial to ascertain facts. "[R]eview of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency’s findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable ... Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 257 Conn. 128, 137, 778 A.2d 7 (2001). Although the plaintiff complains that he was not provided an opportunity to prove his case, he has not argued that the factual determinations made by the commission investigator are not supported by substantial evidence. His brief merely asserts that "this appeal is the opportunity to prove" and that "EDR simply can’t dispute the CT Dol." His reply brief contains numerous factual assertions about the federal court proceeding, the Department of Labor proceeding, his job performance, and other circumstances. None of those assertions constitute legal analysis or meet the requirement of briefing a claim. As was well-stated in a different administrative appeal,
It is not the court’s responsibility to comb the record for the plaintiff or to invent arguments on his behalf. "It is well settled that [w]e are not required to review claims that are inadequately briefed ... We consistently have held that [a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly ... [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal ... the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. We do not reverse the judgment ... on the basis of challenges to its rulings that have not been adequately briefed ... [A]ssignments of error which are merely mentioned but not briefed beyond a statement of the claim will be deemed abandoned and will not be reviewed ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nowacki v. Nowacki, 129 Conn.App. 157, 163-64, 20 A.3d 702 (2011). "Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law ... Self-represented parties are not afforded a lesser standard of compliance, and [a]lthough we are solicitous of the rights of pro se litigants ... [s]uch a litigant is bound by the same rules ... and procedure as those qualified to practice law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Emile L., 126 Conn.App. 283, 285, n. 3, 11 A.3d 1117 (2011). Accordingly, the court concludes that this claim is inadequately briefed, and therefore waived.Bristol v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, docket no. HHBCV125015602S, 2014 WL 279687 (January 2, 2014) (Prescott, J.).
Although the plaintiff thus purports to raise various issues on appeal, his briefs contain no legal analysis regarding any of these claims. His reply brief responds to the defendant’s assertion that his claims are inadequately briefed with the following:
Appears, CHRO is asking for a professional writing with citations. The constitution provides the right to all. Moreover, at the beginning, I requested this court (and other courts) to appoint counsel due to informa pauperis. I have included CHRO malfeasance in previous paragraphs (al documents in docket- previously submitted). This information became known because of this appeal. No abandonment and enough points provided. There is enough material to overturn the decision of CHRO. I have not abandoned.
Reply brief, pp. 6-7. Courts at every level, however, decline to review claims that are inadequately briefed:
[F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal ... the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs ... [A]ssignments of error which are merely mentioned but not briefed beyond a statement of the claim will be deemed abandoned and will not be reviewed by this court"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Paoletta v. Anchor Reef Club at Branford, LLC, 123 Conn.App. 402, 406, 1 A.3d 1238, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 931, 5 A.3d 491 (2010). Our Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this principle in State v. Buhl, supra, 321 Conn. 688. "Where an issue is merely mentioned, but not briefed beyond a bare assertion of the claim, it is deemed to have been waived." Bridgeport Hospital v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 232 Conn. 91, 115, 653 A.2d 782 (1995) "Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Keating v. Ferrandino, 125 Conn.App. 601, 603, 10 A.3d 59 (2010). "Where the parties cite no law and provide no analysis of their claims, we do not review such claims." Mullen & Mahon, Inc. v. Mobilmed Support Services, LLC, 62 Conn.App. 1, 10, 773 A.2d 952 (2001). A self-represented party is not relieved of these obligations. None of the claims in the plaintiff’s brief having been briefed, they are all deemed to have been abandoned and waived.
IV
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the plaintiff has not met his burden of proving that his substantial rights were prejudiced or that the commission acted arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion in finding no reasonable cause. The plaintiff has not shown any illegality, abuse of discretion, or prejudice to his substantial rights in the commission’s decision, and his appeal is accordingly denied and dismissed.
The commission’s "Corrected/Clarified Answer" denies that ... it amended the CHRO complaint to include retaliation" and points out that "retaliation had already been alleged in the [p]aintiff’s] initial CHRO complaint." The commission’s answer refers to the amendment as "a technical change to the CHRO complaint to add the correct statutory reference." From its own review of the record, court file, the general statutes, and legislative history, the court believes that the statutory reference in the January 2018 email to "C.G.S. 46a-60(a)(4)" was referring to our state statutes prior to legislative changes to General Statutes § 46a-60 that had become effective on October 1, 2017, three months before that email to the parties. Section 46a-60 is one of the portions of the Connecticut statutes defining "discriminatory employment practices" within the commission’s purview. Until October 1, 2017, that statute stated in relevant part as follows:
(a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: ... (4) For any person, employer, labor organization or employment agency to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because such person has opposed any discriminatory employment practice or because such person has filed a complaint or testified or assisted in any proceeding under section 46a-82, 46a-83 or 46a-84; ...Until October 1, 2017, § 46a-60(a)(4) had thus referred to retaliation as a discriminatory practice prohibited by the CHRO statutes. Section 46a-60 was amended, however, effective October 1, 2017, by "An Act Concerning Pregnant Women in the Workplace," Public Acts, 2017, No. 118. That act inserted provisions extending protection of the CHRO statutes to pregnant women into a new subsection (a) of § 46a-60. Former subsection (a) and its subsidiary numbered clauses become part of a new subsection (b) and subsidiary clauses. The court concludes that the investigator’s email was referring to § 46a-60(a)(4) before this legislative change.
I was not afforded any opportunity to prove that the employer’s proffered business reason was neither bona fide and/or is a pretext.
Only a trial can determine that defendant’s proffered reason for firing me is NOT bona fide business reason and is simply a pretext. This last prong of the shifting burden is on me and CHRO denied this.
I request the investigator to call to witness at minimum:
a. Ms. Susan Hotchkiss- Vice President Human Resources who discharged me and whose signature appears in my discharge document
b. Ms. Deborah Sopchak- Supervisor at discharge;
c. Mr. Ranga Kondapally- Manager.ROR, p. 124.