Opinion
A24-0267
07-29-2024
Robert Sam Raisch, Jr., petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Robert Sam Raisch, Jr., Rush City, Minnesota (pro se appellant) Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Reese Frederickson, Pine County Attorney, Pine City, Minnesota (for respondent)
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
Pine County District Court File No. 58-CR-15-321
Robert Sam Raisch, Jr., Rush City, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Reese Frederickson, Pine County Attorney, Pine City, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
Bjorkman, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his preliminary application to vacate a conviction of second-degree felony murder, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by determining that he does not qualify under the law that grants such relief. Appellant also asserts that his second-degree intentional-murder conviction lacks sufficient evidentiary support and violates principles of due process and double jeopardy. We affirm.
FACTS
In March 2015, a Pine County sheriff's deputy responded to a reported trailer fire. When the fire was extinguished, deputies found human remains. Appellant Robert Sam Raisch, Jr. was later connected to the victim's death and charged by respondent State of Minnesota with second-degree intentional murder, without premeditation, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1 (2014); second-degree unintentional felony murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2014); first-degree arson in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1 (2014); and first-degree assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2014). The case proceeded to a jury trial where several witnesses testified, including the medical examiner. The medical examiner opined that the victim's death was caused by blunt-force injuries to the head, smoke inhalation, and thermal injuries, and that the manner of death was indicative of homicide.
A jury found Raisch guilty of all charges except first-degree arson. The district court convicted and sentenced Raisch to 480 months' imprisonment for second-degree intentional murder but did not enter convictions or impose sentences for the lesser-included offenses of felony murder and assault. On direct appeal, we affirmed Raisch's conviction. State v. Raisch, No. A16-0586, 2017 WL 1134403, at *8 (Minn.App. Mar. 27, 2017) (Raisch I), rev. denied (Minn. May 30, 2017). And we affirmed the denial of Raisch's petition for postconviction relief. Raisch v. State, No. A18-0536, 2018 WL 4391108, at *3 (Minn.App. Sept. 17, 2018) (Raisch II), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 27, 2018).
In January 2024, Raisch filed a preliminary application under 2023 legislation (the act) that allows those convicted of aiding and abetting first- and second-degree felony murder, under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(3) (Supp. 2023), .19, subd. 2(1) (2022), to apply to have their convictions vacated if they meet certain criteria. See 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, at 864-68; see also Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2a(b) (Supp. 2023) (providing that "[a] person may not be held criminally liable for a violation of [Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1)], for a death caused by another unless the person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with extreme indifference to human life"). Raisch alleged that he is entitled to relief because he was convicted of felony murder in the second-degree under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1), and met the other criteria enumerated in the act. The district court summarily denied Raisch's preliminary application, determining that the act does not apply to him because, "[t]hough [Raisch] was found guilty of a qualifying offense under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1), [second-degree felony murder,] he was not adjudicated or convicted of that offense. As such, there is no qualifying conviction to vacate, and the [a]ct does not apply." The district court also rejected Raisch's arguments that his second-degree intentional-murder conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and is constitutionally infirm.
Raisch appeals.
DECISION
In Minnesota, persons convicted of aiding and abetting first- and second-degree felony murder for acts committed before August 1, 2023, and who are in the custody of the commissioner of corrections or under court supervision, may apply to vacate their conviction if
the person was convicted for a violation of Minnesota Statutes, section 609.19, subdivision 2, clause (1), and the person: (i) did not cause the death of a human being; and (ii) was not a major participant in the underlying felony and did not act with extreme indifference to human life.2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, subds. 1, 3(a)(2), 5(e)(3), at 864, 866. In determining whether to grant the application, the district court "shall determine whether, in the discretion of that judge, there is a reasonable probability that the applica[nt] is entitled to relief under this section." Id., subd. 5(c), at 865. The district court may summarily deny an application when the applicant was not convicted of violating Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) or Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1), for crimes committed before August 1, 2023. Id., subd. 5(e)(3), at 865. If the preliminary application is approved, the defendant may then petition to vacate their conviction. Id., subd. 6(a), at 866-67.
A special term panel of this court determined that a district court's denial of a preliminary application is appealable as from an order denying postconviction relief. Raisch v. State, __N.W.3d __, __, 2024 WL 2807746, at *4 (Minn.App. June 3, 2024). A defendant seeking postconviction relief is entitled to an evidentiary hearing "[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief." Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2022).
We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. Caldwell v. State, 853 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. 2014). "A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." Brown v. State, 895 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). We review a postconviction court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that they are entitled to relief. Burrell v. State, 978 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Minn.App. 2022), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 18, 2022).
Raisch contends that the district court abused its discretion by summarily denying his preliminary application because he (1) was convicted of a qualifying offense and (2) meets the other statutory criteria because he "did not cause the death of a human being," "was not a major participant in the underlying felony[,] and did not act with extreme indifference to human life." See 2023 Minn. Laws. ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, subd. 3(a)(2), at 864. The record easily defeats Raisch's argument in both respects.
First, Raisch's second-degree intentional-murder conviction under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1, is not a qualifying offense under the act. See 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, at 864-68. And while the jury also found Raisch guilty of second-degree felony murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1)-which is a qualifying offense-the district court did not convict or sentence Raisch on that count. See id.; see also Spann v. State, 740 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. 2007) (explaining that a guilty verdict is different from a conviction); Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 5(2) (2014) (providing that a "[c]onviction" includes a jury's guilty verdict that is "accepted and recorded" by the district court). In other words, there is no qualifying conviction for the district court to vacate under the act.
Second, the jury's determination that Raisch committed intentional murder precludes any finding that he "did not cause the death of a human being" as the act requires. On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in determining that the act does not apply to Raisch and summarily denying his preliminary application on that basis.
Raisch also challenges his second-degree intentional-murder conviction under theories of due process, double jeopardy, and insufficiency of the evidence. The gist of his argument is that because the jury found him not guilty of arson, and the medical examiner's testimony established that the fire caused the victim's death, he did not murder the victim. And he asks us to review these claims in the interests of justice. We are not persuaded.
When a defendant has taken a direct appeal or sought relief under the postconviction statute, the Knaffla rule bars all claims that were or could have been raised in the prior proceeding unless an enumerated exception applies. Doppler v. State, 771 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Minn. 2009) (citing State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976)); see Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(2) (2022) ("A petition for postconviction relief after a direct appeal has been completed may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or sentence."). A claim is not Knaffla-barred if (1) the claim is novel, or (2) the interests of fairness and justice warrant relief. Doppler, 771 N.W.2d at 873.
Raisch could have raised all the claims he now asserts at the time of his direct appeal and petition for postconviction relief. Indeed, he made-and this court rejected-the precise argument regarding his acquittal on the arson charge in the direct appeal. See Raisch I, 2017 WL 1134403, at *6 (rejecting argument that the fire was the only cause of the victim's death). And because Raisch offers no argument or legal authority as to why the interests of justice compel us to consider his claims, the claims are forfeited. See State v. Bursch, 905 N.W.2d 884, 889 (Minn.App. 2017) ("Arguments are forfeited if they are presented in a summary and conclusory form, do not cite to applicable law, and fail to analyze the law when claiming that errors of law occurred.").
Affirmed.