Opinion
C/A 0:23-03202-JFA-MHC
12-12-2023
Christopher Allan Rainey, Plaintiff, v. Chief of Police Steven Rice, Officer Joshua Cautheen, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry, United States Magistrate Judge
This a civil action filed by Plaintiff Christopher Allan Rainey, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
In an Order dated October 13, 2023, Plaintiff was directed to provide certain documents to bring his case into proper form. He was also notified of pleading deficiencies in his Complaint and given the opportunity to file an amended complaint. See ECF No. 5. He has now provided the necessary documents to bring his case into proper form. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on November 27, 2023. ECF No. 8.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an inmate at the Broad River Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC). In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983) for an alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment rights pertaining to an alleged illegal search and seizure. ECF No. 8 at 4. Plaintiff asserts that the alleged events occurred at his home in Great Falls, South Carolina on January 7, 2019. Id. at 5. He alleges that police officers asked to search Plaintiff and his shed, but they “used a complete illegal search of [his] entire property that they claim they found a[n] amount of 7 total bullets but per Rule #5 in discovery they lied and not that many bullets showed up at all[.] Plus they used illegal people to lie on [Plaintiff's] name.” Id. at 5-6 (errors in original).
As relief, Plaintiff requests $150,000 in damages. He also requests “a full investigation into [his] case which [he] can prove is completely illegal for officials to be arrested ASAP.” ECF No. 8 at 6 (errors in original).
Plaintiff may be asking that the Court prosecute or bring criminal charges against Defendants. However, a private citizen such as Plaintiff has no constitutional right to, or in fact any judicially cognizable interest in, the criminal prosecution or non-prosecution of another person. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (A private citizen does not have a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another person); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986) (applying Linda R.S. v. Richard D. and collecting cases); Collins v. Palczewski, 841 F.Supp. 333, 340 (D. Nev. 1993) (“Long ago the courts of these United States established that ‘criminal statutes cannot be enforced by civil actions.'”).
Records from Chester County and SCDC indicate that Plaintiff is serving an eight-year sentence for his conviction (guilty plea) in Chester County as to his charge of burglary second degree (case number 2019GS1220300073) with a start date of January 7, 2019. See Chester County Sixth Judicial Circuit Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Chester/PublicIndex/PISearch .aspx [search case number 2019GS1220300073]; SCDC Incarcerated Inmate Search, http://public. doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/ [Search Inmate “Christophe Rainey”] (last visited Dec. 8, 2023).
This Court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites. See Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n. 1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. 2009); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182, 2008 WL 4185869, at * 2 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2008) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of governmental websites including other courts' records).
Thus, it appears that Plaintiff's claims concern a search involving his burglary second degree charge and subsequent conviction. Review of records from Chester County do not contain any record of a direct appeal of the conviction. However, Plaintiff has a pending application for post-conviction relief (PCR) as to this conviction (case number 2019CP12000620). See Chester County Sixth Judicial Circuit Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Chester/PublicIndex/ PISearch.aspx [case number 2019CP12000620] (last visited Dec. 8, 2023).
In a previous case Plaintiff filed in this Court (case number 0:20-00693-JFA-BM), Plaintiff brought Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims against the same Defendants named here about the same incidents alleged here. The previous case was dismissed, without prejudice, because Plaintiff's claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See Rainey v. Rice, No. CV 0:20-693-JFA-BM, 2020 WL 3118653 (D.S.C. June 11, 2020).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se Complaint is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
This action should be summarily dismissed for the reasons discussed below.
A. Heck v. Humphrey
Plaintiff's claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck precludes a § 1983 claim that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of [the plaintiff's] conviction or sentence,” because “civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Id. at 486-87. Instead, “habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy” for a state prisoner to challenge his conviction or sentence. Id. at 482. Heck instructs that if granting relief on a civil claim would necessarily call into question the validity of a criminal judgment, then the civil case cannot proceed unless the conviction has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at 486-87. Heck applies to bar a plaintiff's § 1983 claim if two requirements are met: (1) a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff's conviction or sentence; and (2) the claim is brought by a claimant who is either (a) currently in custody or (b) no longer in custody because the sentence has been served, but nevertheless could have practicably sought habeas relief while in custody. Covey v. Assessor of Ohio Cty., 777 F.3d 186, 197 (4th Cir. 2015) (citations and alterations omitted). Plaintiff was found guilty on the burglary second degree charge and his Complaint includes no indication that this conviction or sentence has been overturned through a direct appeal, state post-conviction relief application, or habeas corpus proceeding or otherwise invalidated. Thus, Plaintiff's claims are ones where a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions and/or sentences and thus are subject to summary dismissal.
The Fourth Circuit has explained that a § 1983 claim alleging an illegal or unreasonable search does not necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence if “(1) the conviction derives from a guilty plea rather than a verdict obtained with unlawfully obtained evidence; and (2) the plaintiff does not plead facts inconsistent with guilt.” Covey, 777 F.3d at 197. Although Plaintiff's conviction derives from a guilty plea, he alleges facts inconsistent with guilt such that his claims are barred by Heck. See, e.g., Baber v. McNorton, No. 7:20-CV-00700, 2022 WL 188187 (W.D. Va. Jan. 20, 2022) (finding that the plaintiff's illegal search claim was barred by Heck where he entered a guilty plea but, unlike the plaintiff in Covey, he asserted that he did not commit the offenses for which he was convicted); Jones v. Cayce Pub. Safety, No. 3:22-CV-01808-RBH, 2023 WL 155551, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 11, 2023) (Heck barred Plaintiff's § 1983 claims related to his arrest, to which he pleaded guilty, because he pleaded facts inconsistent with guilt).
Additionally, as noted above, the claims are duplicative of the claims Plaintiff brought in case number 0:20-00693-JFA-BM. In Plaintiff's previous case, Senior District Judge Joseph F. Anderson, in dismissing the case without prejudice, wrote:
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they illegally searched his property and collected evidence which linked Plaintiff to a “break in.” Subsequently, Plaintiff pled guilty to the charge of burglary/burglary violent-second degree and was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment.
In Ballenger v. Owens, the Fourth Circuit held, “[w]hen evidence derived from an illegal search would have to be suppressed in a criminal case if the judgment in the § 1983 claim were to be applied to the criminal case and the suppression would necessarily invalidate the criminal conviction, the stated principle in Heck would apply, and the § 1983 claim would have to be dismissed; there would be no cause of action under § 1983.” Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 2003).
Here, the suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to the challenged search in this § 1983 case would necessarily imply the invalidity of the criminal conviction. If Plaintiff succeeds in demonstrating in this § 1983 case that the search of his property was illegal, the illegality of the search would require the suppression of the evidence seized. In his objections, Plaintiff has failed to advance any
circumstances to suggest how the state could convict him of burglary if the property search were to have been found illegal. Additionally, like in Ballenger, there could be no independent source or inevitable discovery of the evidence at issue. It was the evidence seized as a result of the alleged illegal search that led to Plaintiff's arrest and subsequent plea, and if that evidence were suppressed by reason of the illegality of the search, the conviction could not be salvaged.
In his objections, Plaintiff restates that Defendants have violated his Fourth Amendment rights and asserts that Defendants have done “illegal things.” Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate, in his objections or complaint, that he has successfully challenged his sentence or conviction. Without proof by the Plaintiff that his conviction has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254” or additional argument that he would have been convicted regardless of the alleged illegal search, this Court adopts the Report and finds Plaintiff's claims are barred by Heck.Rainey v. Rice, No. CV 0:20-693-JFA-BM, 2020 WL 3118653, at *2 (D.S.C. June 11, 2020). For the same reasons articulated in Judge Anderson's order dismissing Plaintiff's prior case, Plaintiff's claims in this case are subject to summary dismissal.
Because district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e). Generally, a lawsuit is duplicative of another one if the parties, issues and available relief do not significantly differ between the two.” Cottle v. Bell, No. 00-6367, 2000 WL 1144623, at *1 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[D]istrict courts may dismiss a duplicative complaint raising issues directly related to issues in another pending action brought by the same party.”).
B. Younger
Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff may be requesting that this Court intervene in his criminal case as to his burglary conviction, which has a PCR pending, this action is subject to summary dismissal. Federal courts, absent extraordinary circumstances, are not authorized to interfere with a State's pending criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 50-53 (4th Cir. 1989). Specifically, the Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Howell v. Wilson, No. 4:13-2812-JFA-TER, 2014 WL 1233703, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 25, 2014) (Plaintiff's “pending DNA application and his PCR applications are still part of his ‘pending criminal case' as that terminology is understood under Younger and its progeny.”); Smith v. Bravo, No. 99 C 5077, 2000 WL 1051855, *5 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (presuming that Younger abstention would apply to civil case that could interfere with post-conviction proceedings); Lockheart v. Chicago Police Dept., No. 95 C 343, 1999 WL 639179, *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 1999) (applying Younger because post-conviction proceedings were pending).
C. Statute of Limitations
Plaintiff's claims are also barred by the applicable statute of limitations. For a § 1983 claim arising in South Carolina, the statute of limitations is three years. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240-241 (1989) (“Because § 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions, ... a State's personal injury statute of limitations should be applied to all § 1983 claims.”); Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorney Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[T]o determine the timely filing of a § 1983 claim, courts borrow the statute of limitations from the most analogous state-law cause of action. For § 1983 suits, that cause of action is a personal-injury suit.”) (internal citations omitted); Brannon v. Blanton, No. 9:15-2434-CMC, 2016 WL 4232886, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 11, 2016) (“[T]he statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in South Carolina is three years, regardless of the underlying allegations of the § 1983 claim.”).
A § 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff possesses sufficient facts about the harm done to him that reasonable inquiry will reveal his cause of action. Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 955 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (providing that the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law). Here, Plaintiff's claims about the search and seizure occurred on January 7, 2019, the day the alleged incidents occurred.
Plaintiff filed this action on July 5, 2023. See ECF No. 1. The envelope (ECF No. 1-1) in which he mailed his Complaint is postmarked June 29, 2023, and the envelope is stamped as received by the Broad River Correctional Institution mailroom on June 29, 2023. Thus, it appears that the Houston v. Lack date for this action is June 29, 2023. However, even if the date Plaintiff allegedly signed his Complaint, June 11, 2023 (see ECF No. 1 at 12) is the appropriate date to use, Plaintiff's allegations are still barred by the applicable statute of limitations, as Plaintiff filed this action well over three years after the alleged incidents occurred.
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (prisoner's pleading was filed at the moment of delivery to prison authorities for forwarding to the district court).
D. Excessive Force
In the “Injuries” section of his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states “I was arrested by staff sued and was assaulted prior to being put in detention center in Chester, SC 29706.” ECF No. 8 at 6. To the extent that Plaintiff may now be attempting to assert an excessive force claim, his claim should be dismissed because he fails to provide any specific facts to support a claim that any of the named Defendants violated any of his federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (requiring, in order to avoid dismissal, “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests'” (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))). Although the “liberal pleading requirements” of Rule 8(a) only require a “short and plain” statement of the claim, a plaintiff must “offer more detail ... than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted); see also White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723 (4th Cir. 1989) (district court did not abuse discretion by dismissing plaintiff's complaint which “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion”). Moreover, any such claim, that allegedly occurred at the time of Plaintiff's arrest on January 7, 2019, is also barred by the applicable statute of limitations, as discussed above.
E. State Law Claims
Plaintiff may also be attempting to assert claims under South Carolina law. However, if Plaintiff fails to state any federal claim, only his state law claims would remain, and federal courts are allowed to hear and decide state-law claims only in conjunction with federal-law claims, through the exercise of “supplemental jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C. §1367; Wisconsin Dep't of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998). Of course, a district court may have jurisdiction of a civil action “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000...and is between - (1) citizens of different States....” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. However, Plaintiff has not alleged complete diversity of the parties. See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-374 (1978) (Complete diversity of parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same State as any party on the other side). In this case, Plaintiff and Defendants all appear to be citizens of South Carolina.
Thus, there is no complete diversity and Plaintiff may not bring his claims pursuant to § 1332. As Plaintiff asserts no valid federal claim and there is no diversity jurisdiction, this Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Tigrett v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 626 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's dismissal of state law claims when no federal claims remained in the case); Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants”).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process.
See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend ... the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”).
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Charleston, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).