This question has been before us on many recent occasions. In the case of Raines v. Wilson, 213 Iowa 1251, 239 N.W. 36, this court said at page 1262, 239 N.W., at page 40: "The question which we are now considering has been passed upon by numerous courts, including our own.

"Assuming, without deciding, that the question of error is properly before us, the action of the trial court did not constitute reversible error. We have recently had occasion to consider this question in Raines v. Wilson, 213 Iowa 1251, 239 N.W. 36. The matter of the latitude that shall be allowed in the examination of jurors upon voir dire necessarily and properly rests very largely in the discretion of the trial court. Improper matters should not be inquired into and the examination should in no way be permitted to be utilized for the purpose of attempting to inject prejudicial matter improperly into the minds of the jury.

We have said that "a wide latitude is necessarily allowed counsel in examining the jurors for the purpose of advising him as to how to exercise his peremptory challenges." Raines v. Wilson, 213 Iowa 1251, 1253, 239 N.W. 36, 37 (1931). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the defendant's objections.

We refuse to interfere with the trial court's limitations on voir dire absent bad faith on the part of examining counsel or a manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court. State v. Elmore, 201 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Iowa 1972) (citing Raines v. Wilson, 213 Iowa 1251, 1253, 239 N.W. 36, 37 (1931)). This is especially true when the court limits voir dire to prevent counsel from injecting prejudicial matter into the minds of the jurors.

"It is the general rule, as enunciated by this court, that a wide latitude is necessarily allowed counsel in examining the jurors for the purpose of advising him as to how to exercise his peremptory challenges, and that the matter must of necessity be left largely to the sound discretion of the trial court, and that in the absence of bad faith on the part of counsel, or a manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we will not interfere." Raines v. Wilson, 213 Iowa 1251, 1253, 239 N.W. 36, 37, and cases there cited. In Raines the court went on to say (quoting from Simons v. Mason City Fort Dodge Railroad Company, 128 Iowa 139, 103 N.W. 129, 133): "A wide latitude is necessarily allowed counsel in examining jurors for this purpose (advising him as to how to exercise his peremptory challenges), and must, of necessity, be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Lamaak v. Brown, 259 Iowa 1324, 1328, 147 N.W.2d 915, 917, and citations. In Montanick v. McMillin, 225 Iowa 442, 450, 280 N.W. 608, 613, where reference was made to a particular insurance company we quote the following from Raines v. Wilson, 213 Iowa 1251, 1262, 239 N.W. 36, 40: "`The question which we are now considering has been passed upon by numerous courts, including our own. The overwhelming majority of the courts sustain the right of counsel for the plaintiff, in a personal injury case, so long as he acts in good faith for the purpose of obtaining information upon which to exercise his peremptory challenges of the jurors and not for the purpose of informing the jury that an insurance company is back of the defendant of record, to interrogate prospective jurors by one form or another of questions, with respect to their interest in, or connection with, insurance companies.

[3] The extent of such examination cannot be governed by fixed rules, but is subject to the sound discretion of the trial court, the exercise of which we will not interfere with unless abuse is shown. Raines v. Wilson, 213 Iowa 1251, 1253, 239 N.W. 36, 37; Holub v. Fitzgerald, 214 Iowa 857, 859, 243 N.W. 575, 576; Hawkins v. Burton, 225 Iowa 707, 714, 281 N.W. 342, 346; State v. Dalton, 254 Iowa 96, 99, 100, 116 N.W.2d 451, 453; Mead v. Scott, 256 Iowa 1285, 1293, 130 N.W.2d 641, 645. See also 50 C.J.S., Juries, section 275a; 31 Am. Jur., Jury, section 139.

[4-6] We have repeatedly held that latitude in voir dire examination within the sound discretion of the trial court should be permitted. Proper inquiry as to connection with insurance companies has been approved. Mortrude v. Martin, 185 Iowa 1319, 1332, 172 N.W. 17; Raines v. Wilson, 213 Iowa 1251, 239 N.W. 36; Kaufman v. Borg, 214 Iowa 293, 242 N.W. 104; and Montanick v. McMillin, 225 Iowa 442, 280 N.W. 608. The court might well have told the jury that whether any party had any kind of insurance had nothing to do with the issues to be decided by the jury. Price v. King, 255 Iowa 314, 321, 122 N.W.2d 318; Youngs v. Fort, 252 Iowa 939, 946, 109 N.W.2d 230.

[4] The extent of counsel's voir dire examination of jurors is within the trial court's discretion. Kiesau v. Vangen, 226 Iowa 824, 285 N.W. 181; Hawkins v. Burton, 225 Iowa 707, 281 N.W. 342; Kaufman v. Borg, 214 Iowa 293, 295, 296, 242 N.W. 104; Raines v. Wilson, 213 Iowa 1251, 239 N.W. 36; State v. Heft, 155 Iowa 21, 134 N.W. 950; 24A C.J.S., Criminal Law, section 1867. In the Kaufman case we said:

" We have approved substantial recovery in several cases involving young children and teenagers. Graham v. City of Ames, 196 Iowa 337, 192 N.W. 299; Raines v. Wilson, 213 Iowa 1251, 239 N.W. 36; Hart v. Hinkley, 215 Iowa 915, 247 N.W. 258; Lenth v. Schug, 226 Iowa 1, 281 N.W. 510; Anderson v. Strack, 236 Iowa 1, 17 N.W.2d 719; Thornbury v. Maley, 242 Iowa 70, 45 N.W.2d 576. Graham v. City of Ames was decided in 1923.