On appeal plaintiff argued that the only proper method for polling a jury "is to have each juror, in court and in public, state his or her individual verdict, not his or her agreement that the vote as reported accurately stated what the jurors had decided in the jury room." 233 N.J. Super. 84, 87, 558 A.2d 38 (App.Div. 1989). Relying on Rule 1:8-10 and criminal cases involving the polling issue, the court below concluded that a poll should elicit each juror's position on the matter.

Whether issues are sufficiently separable to warrant a partial retrial ultimately depends on the circumstances of each case. See Ragusa v. Lau, 233 N.J. Super. 84, 90, 558 A.2d 38 (App.Div. 1989), rev'don other grounds, 119 N.J. 276, 575 A.2d 8 (1990). Here, the risk that the patient would commit suicide interrelates with the alleged negligence in such matters as the hospital's admission procedures, custodial care, and search.

Put differently, Sanford's testimony must be analyzed under the harmless error standard. See Ragusa v. Lau, 233 N.J. Super. 84, 89 (App. Div. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 199 N.J. 276 (1990). Under Rule 2:10-2, "[a]ny error or omission shall be disregarded . . . unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result . . . ."

Put differently, the admission of Dabney's testimony must be analyzed under the harmless error standard. See Ragusa v. Lau, 233 N.J. Super. 84, 89 (App. Div. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 119 N.J. 276 (1990). Under Rule 2:10-2, "[a]ny error or omission shall be disregarded . . . unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result."

When a trial court commits an error to which the defendant timely objected, that error is analyzed to determine whether it was harmless. See Ragusa v. Lau, 233 N.J. Super. 84, 89 (App. Div. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 119 N.J. 276 (1990). Under Rule 2:10-2, "[a]ny error or omission shall be disregarded by the [A]ppellate [Division] unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result."

Although Mr. DeLuce may not have been given the charge now required by Williams, Mr. Deluce's vote was not necessary to the verdict. A related problem existed in Ragusa v. Lau, 233 N.J. Super. 84, 88-89, 558 A.2d 38 (App.Div. 1989), certif. granted 117 N.J. 63, 563 A.2d 828 (1989), where from the polling of the jury it was impossible to tell which juror had dissented, and in fact the jurors were asked merely to state whether each agreed that the vote had been five to one.