Opinion
Civil No. 00-cv-4159 (JBS).
April 15, 2002
Anthony J. Brady, Jr., Esq., Camden, NJ, Attorney for Plaintiffs.
David Samson, Attorney General of New Jersey, By: Wayne J. Martorelli, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of Law, Trenton, N.J., Attorneys for Defendants.
OPINION
Presently before this Court is plaintiff's motion for $38,745.50 in attorneys' fees and litigation costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205, Rule 54(2)(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., and the Local Civil Rules for the District of New Jersey. Plaintiff brings this motion after a federal arbitrator found in his favor on four out of the nine claims brought in his original suit. The Court has considered these motions on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78, Fed.R.Civ.P. In addition to the principal motion papers, the Court has considered the defendants' response to plaintiff's reply brief (dated April 8, 2002) and plaintiff's reply letter (dated April 9, 2002). For the reasons discussed below, this Court will grant plaintiff's motion, but will reduce the amount of fees requested, as discussed herein.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Dean Ragone ("Ragone" or "plaintiff") sued the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles, Albert Ari, and James Weinstein (collectively the "defendants") for violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., ("ADA") after he was unable to utilize the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Offices in Haddon Heights, NJ. (Pl.'s Ex. 1.) Invoking federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, plaintiff filed suit in federal court seeking injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and costs. (Id.)
After a hearing on the matter, arbitrator Burchard S. Martin found for plaintiff on four of nine claims. (Pl.'s Ex. 6.) Neither party appealed the arbitrator's findings and final judgment on the matter was entered by this Court on January 24, 2002.
Specifically, the arbitrator found the following violated the ADA: (1) the handicapped parking lanes which were not painted properly; (2) the access ramp to the building lacked proper edges and a level area at the top, (3) the building's front door which did not open inward, and (4) the location of a newspaper box which blocked the access ramp. (Pl.'s Ex. 6.)
On February 21, 2002, plaintiff filed this motion for an award of $31,870.56 in attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205, Rule 54(2)(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., and Local Rule 46. In his reply brief, plaintiff revised his fee request to include $7,507.50, for 27.3 hours spent working in the reply brief. (Pl.'s Reply Br. at 12.) In his reply, plaintiff also withdrew the request for 2.3 hours spent preparing time calculations needed for the motion. (Id. at 11.) Thus, the total amount plaintiff is now seeking is $38,745.50.
The Court notes that the filing of plaintiff's motion for fees did not meet the fourteen day deadline mandated by Rule 54(d)(2)(B) Fed.R.Civ.P, although it did meet the thirty day deadline to file a supplemental affidavit under the Local Rules.See footnote 5, infra. Defendants, however, did not raise untimeliness in their brief. The Court will consider plaintiff's motion because the fourteen day filing requirement imposed by Rule 54(d)(2)(B) is not jurisdictional and no prejudice has been indicated by defendant. See Mints v. Educational Testing Serv., 99 F.3d 1253, 1260 (3d Cir. 1996).
42 U.S.C. § 12205 states:
In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and costs, and the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private individual.
Rule 54(2)(A) provides, in relevant part:
Claims for attorneys' fees and related nontaxable expenses shall be made by motion unless the substantive law governing the action provides for the recovery of such fees as an element of damages to be proved at trial.
In 1997, General Rule 46 was modified and renumbered as Local Rule 54.2. See L. Civ. R. 54.2, cmt. 1. Local Rule 54.2 requires that, in addition to the fourteen day filing requirement of Rule 54(d)(2)(B) Fed.R.Civ.P., a detailed supplemental affidavit in support of the requested fees must be filed within thirty days of the entry of judgment. Sokoloff v. General Nutrition Companies, Inc., 2001 WL 536072, at *4 (D.N.J. May 21, 2001) (Simandle, J.).
Defendants contest only the fee amount plaintiff is seeking in his motion. They concede that plaintiff's attorney, Anthony J. Brady, Jr., is an expert in area of disabilities law and that his hourly rate of $275 is reasonable. (Defs.' Br. at 6-7.) It is the defendants' position, however, that plaintiff is entitled to a maximum award of fees and cost in the amount of $8,126.92, which reduces his research billable hours on certain subjects and allows recovery only on the individually successful claims. (Id. at 3, 11.)
II. DISCUSSION
As a prevailing party in an ADA suit, plaintiff seeks recovery of attorneys' fees in the amount of $31,020 plus attorneys' fees in connection with preparing this application, in the amount of $7,507.50, for a total fee request of $38,527.50. In addition, plaintiff also seeks to recover expenses in the amount of $1221.81.
The breakdown of the fee amount is: 112.8 counsel hours × $275/hour = $31,020.
Although Plaintiff's Counsel Hours lists the total cost of expenses as $218.06, this total does not match the itemized breakdown of the litigation costs. (Pl.'s Counsel Hours at 6.) The Court will include the following costs for a total of $1221.81:
Expert $1,028.75
Filing Fee of Complaint $150.00
Service by Mercer County Sheriff $27.50
Service by Camden County $15.56 SheriffTotal $1,221.81
While defendants do not oppose plaintiff's motion, they object to the amount of attorney's fees plaintiff is seeking for two reasons: (1) the time expended was unreasonable; and (2) plaintiff did not prevail on all of his claims and thus should not receive full attorney's fees. The Court will consider each of these arguments in turn.
Defendants' third argument, that time spent preparing attorney hours should not be recoverable, is moot since plaintiff subsequently withdrew this expense and will not be considered by the Court. (See Pl.'s Reply Br. at 11.)
A. Legal Standard
Under the fee-shifting provisions of the ADA, a district court is permitted, in its discretion, to award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205. In determining the number of hours for which attorneys' fees may be awarded, a district court is obligated to "review the time charged, decide whether the hours set out were reasonably expended for each of the particular purposes described and then exclude those that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Attorney fees that go beyond what is reasonable in either amount charged per hour or number of hours billed must be reduced by the court. See generally Maldonado, 256 F.3d at 184-85.
The party requesting the fee bears the burden of proving that the demand is reasonable. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Lanni v. New Jersey, 259 F.3d 146, 149 (3d 2001); The ARC of New Jersey v. Township of Voorhees, 986 F. Supp. 261, 269 (D.N.J. 1997). The attorney seeking fees must document the hours for which payment is sought with sufficient specificity to allow a court to determine whether the hours claimed are reasonable for the work performed. See Evans v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 273 F.3d 346, 361 (3d Cir. 2001). The party challenging a fee petition must make specific objections to the requested fee. See Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 598, 602 (D.N.J. 1998) (citingRode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990)).See also Smith v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 107 F.3d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 1997).
B. Analysis
Defendants set forth two arguments why the amount of attorneys' fees requested is unreasonable. First, defendants claim the amount of time spent researching certain areas of legal doctrine were superfluous and unnecessary. Second, defendants argue the hours requested includes time expended on unsuccessful claims and that these hours should be excluded so plaintiff would only recover fees for claims on which he prevailed.
Defendants do not challenge the amount of the expenses plaintiff is requesting.
1. Reasonableness of Time
Defendants argue that the amount of time plaintiff's lawyer spent on two issues is unreasonable. The first is the 47.1 hours spent researching whether the holding of Ex Party Young was applicable to plaintiff's case. (Defs.' Br. at 4-8.) The second is the amount of time spent preparing the reply brief and materials. (Def.'s Sur-Reply 1-7.)
As noted above, when reviewing a motion for fees and costs, the court must determine the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel, excluding unproductive time such as hours that are "excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary" because such fees cannot be recovered. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 598, 604 (D.N.J. 1998) (quoting Hensley).
a. Ex Party Young Research
Defendants first argue that the 47.1 hours spent researching the applicability of the Ex Party Young doctrine was excessive and should be entirely deducted from plaintiff's fee motion. (Defs.' Br. at 4-8.) Specifically, defendants point out thatYoung has remained valid law since it was decided by the Supreme Court in 1908. (Id. at 6.) Additionally, defendants claim that since plaintiff's attorney holds himself out as an expert in disability law, he should have known that Young continues to apply to plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief from state actors. (Id. 6-7.) Further, defendants argue plaintiff should be entirely barred from compensation for the Young research because it was performed only in anticipation of a motion which was never filed by defendants. (Id. at 6.)
It is plaintiff's position that defendants are estopped from questioning the amount of time spent researching Young issues since defendants raised the sovereign immunity of the Eleventh Amendment as an affirmative defense in their answer to plaintiff's suit. (Pl.'s Reply Br. at 5). Plaintiff's attorney further argues that because he is not a constitutional law expert, the entire amount of time spent on the Young research was necessary. (See Counsel Certification in Pl.'s Reply Br. at ¶ 8.)
While this Court agrees with defendants that the time spend researching this issue was excessive, it finds that some research on the topic was necessary since defendants raised the Eleventh Amendment as an affirmative defense. See The ARC of NJ, 986 F. Supp. at 269. Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to recover some portion of the fees for research of this issue. Accordingly, the time will be reduced to the amount reasonably required to ascertain the well-settled law of the Eleventh Amendment and theYoung doctrine. Thus, the 47.1 hours of legal research conducted by plaintiff's attorney on the application of Young to his ADA claim for injunctive relief shall be reduced to a total of 4 hours.
b. Reply brief
Defendants further object to payment for the amount of time plaintiff spent on his reply brief. Defendants, in their sur-reply brief received on April 9, 2002, assert that plaintiff's reply brief, for which he now seeks 27.3 hours in attorneys' fees, "is long on invective and short on actual argument" and therefore should not add approximately $7,507.50 in additional fees onto any award granted by this Court. Plaintiff responded to the sur-reply with a letter brief, reasserting that his lengthy pondering of the Eleventh Amendment and the Young doctrine were necessary, despite the lack of any pending motion on those grounds.
Plaintiff has requested fees for the 27.3 hours spent formulating a reply to defendants' brief. (Pl.'s Reply Br. at 12.) While plaintiff is correct that he is entitled to recover for the fees incurred in responding to defendants' arguments, this Court finds the amount of time spend on the reply brief excessive, particularly in light of the fact that the arguments made are largely unsupported by law.
For example, plaintiff lists several entries for time spend researching the Gregory v. Administrative Office of the Courts case. (Pl.'s Additional Counsel Hours at 1-2.) This Court finds any amount above the amount of time it would take to read the opinion is excessive since it is clear that in the Gregory case, the District Court of New Jersey rejected the state's position that the Eleventh Amendment barred a plaintiff from recovering from a state in an ADA action. See Gregory v. Administrative Office of the Courts, 168 F. Supp.2d (D.N.J. 2001) (Orlofsky, J.).
Further, the time sheet contains several vague entries listed as "research" with no explanation on the subject matter being investigated. For this time plaintiff has not meet his burden which requires that an attorney must submit hours "with sufficient specificity to allow the District Court to determine whether the hours claimed are unreasonable for the work performed." Evans, 273 F.3d at 361 (quoting Washington v. Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1037 (3d Cir. 1996). Courts in the Third Circuit require an attorney petitioning for fees to include in his billing records submitted to the court fairly detailed information regarding hours devoted to general activities.Evans, 273 F.3d at 361 (citing Washington, 89 F.3d at 1037).
These entries are as follows:
March 26, 2002 Research at Rutgers University 2.1
March 28, 2002 Research at Rutgers University on 1.8 motion
March 29, 2002 Drafting of brief and research 6.2
(Pl.'s Counsel Additional Hours at 1-2.)
Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for 27.3 hours for work on the reply brief will be reduced by this Court to a more reasonable amount of 5 hours, which represents more than half of a work day.
2. Reduction for Unsuccessful Claims
Defendants finally argue that plaintiff can only recover fees for issues where plaintiff was the "prevailing party." It is defendants' position that since plaintiff only prevailed on four of the nine ADA violations raised by his suit, he is only entitled to recover 4/9 of his gross attorneys' fees. (Defs.' Br. at 9-11.) According to defendants, plaintiff's fee application is inflated because it incorporates time spent on unsuccessful efforts. (Id. at 10) (citing Sinclair v. Ins. CO. of N. Am., 609 F. Supp. 397, 404 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1031 (3d Cir. 1996).
Recognizing that not all of his claims were successful, at the outset, plaintiff's counsel deducted an unspecified amount of hours of time from the original billing records which were spent on issues regarding access to the DMV's bathrooms. (Pl.'s Reply Br. at 7.) Additionally, plaintiff argues that the main thrust of the litigation was compliance with the ADA to gain access to the front entrance of the DMV building. (Id. at 6.) Thus, plaintiff argues that the claims on which he was not successful were nominal and not central to the reasons why he brought his suit. (Id.) Defendants do not contest this position, but argue that no fee award is due on unsuccessful claims.
Plaintiff's attorney, however, has not submitted the amount of hours or a description of work completed in relation to the work completed on these unsuccessful claims.
a. Prevailing Party Status
According to the Supreme Court in Hensley, a plaintiff is deemed "prevailing" even though he succeeded on only some of his claims for relief when the failed claims were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded, and if plaintiff achieved a level of success that made the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. It is only when a plaintiff is unsuccessful on discrete claims based on distinctly different facts and theories that a court may exclude time spent on these claims. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
Further, the Supreme Court recently spoke on the issue of who can be considered a "prevailing party" for the purpose of fee shifting statutes, including the one at issue here, 42. U.S.C. 12205. See Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001). In Buckhannon, the Court overruled the precedent of a majority of circuits and rejected the "catalyst theory" of recovery, holding that the fee-shifting provision of the ADA requires only that a party secure either a judgment on some of the merits or court-ordered consent decree in order to qualify as "prevailing party." Id. at 603-04 ("This view that a "prevailing party" is one who has been awarded some relief by the court can be distilled from our prior cases."). The Court reasoned that prevailing party status could be conferred on a plaintiff who does not acquire a judgment on all of his claims because the plaintiff received at least some relief based upon the merits of his claim which caused a material alteration of legal relationship of parties. Id. at 603 (emphasis added).See also Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 775, 760 (1987) ("Respect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail.").
Despite his incomplete success, the Court finds that plaintiff is a "prevailing party" because he succeeded on acquiring a judgment on the merits which caused a material alteration of legal relationship of parties. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-04; see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 ("Litigants in good faith may raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the court's rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing a fee. The result is what matters.").
Here, the District Court, through a federal arbitrator, considered the merits of plaintiff's claims and ruled on those claims, some in his favor. The Court granted relief that changed the legal relationship between the parties by requiring the defendants comply with federal law. Further, plaintiff obtained an enforceable judgment on the merits. In addition, plaintiff's attorney claims to have excluded the hours spent on the unsuccessful issues. (Pl.'s Reply Br. at 7.) Thus, consistent with Buckhannon and Hensley, plaintiff is a prevailing party, and is entitled to recover attorneys' fees and costs under the ADA.
b. Adjustment for Partial Success
When the prevailing party has only succeeded on some claims, the court must address (1) whether the unsuccessful claims were unrelated to the successful claims; and (2) whether the plaintiff achieved a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. The Third Circuit in Washington v. Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1035 (3d Cir. 1996), summarized the purpose of the partial success adjustment as assuring "that the amount awarded in counsel fees should reflect the extent to which the litigant was successful. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440, 103 S. Ct. at 1943 (`A reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole.')"Washington, 89 F.3d at 1043 (emphasis added in Washington).
Here, plaintiff prevailed on only four of his nine alleged ADA violations. Specifically, plaintiff was successful on the following issues: (1) the handicapped parking lanes were not properly painted; (2) the height and edge of the access ramp violated the ADA; (3) the front door failed to open inward; and (4) a newspaper box improperly blocked the access ramp. (Pl.'s Ex. 6.)
The defendants prevailed on five claims. The following claims were decided in favor of the defendants on the merits: the dumpsters did not block access to the parking lot; the parking lot was properly maintained; and that the signs for handicap parking spaces were adequate. The remaining two claims were dismissed on procedural issues and were never adjudicated on the merits. The bathroom claim was dismissed because plaintiff lacked standing to raise such a claim and the claim regarding the height of the counter was dismissed as moot because plaintiff agreed an ADA-compliant counter existed.
The claims related to the dumpsters, the parking lot, and parking space signs are closely related to the four claims on which plaintiff prevailed — the condition of the parking lot and access to the building. The two claims which were not related to the parking lot or building access — the bathroom and counter claim — were not decided on the merits. Additionally, in this motion, plaintiff's attorney did not submit for reimbursement the time spent on the bathroom claim.
Further, this Court's independent analysis finds that the total fee award is reasonable in light of plaintiff's success. As determined in section II.C below, the lodestar amount is $20,542.50. Overall, the lodestar amount "is strongly presumed to yield a reasonable fee." Washington, 89 F.3d at 1035, citing City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
Therefore, defendant's request for downward adjustment for partial success will be denied and plaintiff's fees will not be reduced based on the fact that plaintiff was not successful on all claims.
C. The Lodestar Amount
Under the ADA, a "lodestar" amount provides the starting point for determining reasonable attorneys' fees. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990). The lodestar is comprised of the court's determination of the reasonable hours expended multiplied by the court's determination of the reasonable hourly rates. See id. See also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Washington, 89 F.3d at 1035. Based upon the above discussion, the loadstar amount, plus the uncontested expenses of this case, is:
74.4 Hours × $275.00 Hourly Rate = $20,542.50 Costs + $ 1,221.81 _____ _ __________ TOTAL = $21,764.31
This figure was arrived at through the following calculation:
Original Requested Hours 115.1
Reduction of Hours for Young Research -43.1 (47.1 Requested and 4 allowed)
Reduction of Billing For Preparation of -2.3 Timesheets
Hours Allowed for Reply Brief 5
TOTAL HOURS 74.7
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, this Court holds that the amount of $20,542.50 represents a reasonable award of attorney's fees for the work preformed in this case. Additionally, the Court will award the full amount of costs claimed, $1221.81, as this amount is reasonable and uncontested.
Therefore, plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and cost will be granted in part, and the total fees awarded will be $21,764.31. The defendants are directed to pay plaintiff's in the sums set forth above. The accompanying Order is entered.
ORDER
Upon application of plaintiff, Dean Ragone, for reimbursement of attorneys' fees and costs [Docket Item 15-1], and for the reasons stated in the Opinion of today's date pursuant to Rule 54(d), Fed.R.Civ.P.;IT IS this ____ day of April 2002 hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees be, and hereby is, GRANTED IN PART, with the fee amount being reduced as discussed in today's Opinion and this Order;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff, Dean Ragone, shall recover from the defendants, attorney's fees and expenses in the amount of $21,764.31; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants shall pay plaintiff's counsel, Anthony J. Brady, Jr., Esq., the amount set forth above within 20 days.