However, "[d]uress exists where one, by the unlawful act of another, is induced to make a contract or perform or forego some act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will." Radford v. Keith, 160 N.C. App. 41, 43-44, 584 S.E.2d 815, 817 (2003) (emphasis added) (quoting Smithwick v. Whitley, 152 N.C. 369, 371, 67 S.E. 913, 914 (1910)) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd per curiam, 358 N.C. 136, 591 S.E.2d 519 (2004). "By duress, in its more extended sense, is meant that degree of severity, either threatened and impending, or actually inflicted, which is sufficient to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness." Id. at 45, 584 S.E.2d at 818 (quoting Edwards v. Bowden, 107 N.C. 58, 60, 12 S.E. 58, 58 (1890)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A party asserting duress must show a wrong or unlawful act that induces the claimant to act under circumstances depriving the claimant of the exercise of free will. See Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 194, 179 S.E.2d 697, 704-05 (1971); Smithwick v. Whitley, 152 N.C. 369, 67 S.E. 913, 914 (1910); Radford v. Keith, 160 N.C. App. 41,43-44, 584 S.E.2d 815, 817-18 (2003). Lonesource contends that United threatened to stop supplying Lonesource.
To demonstrate the existence of duress, Molina must proffer evidence that VF Jeanswear's conduct was unlawful or wrong, that Molina was coerced into signing the agreement, and that Molina's consent to the agreement was involuntary because VF Jeanswear prevented Molina from exercising his free will. See Radford v. Keith, 160 N.C. App. 41, 44, 584 S.E.2d 815, 817-18 (2003). Molina characterizes his situation as "an intolerable choice: Either he sign an Agreement which he had repeatedly complained was unfair and unlawful under Honduran law, or he would be stranded in a foreign country without pay and the ability to move his family back home."
“Duress exists where one, by the unlawful act of another, is induced to make a contract or perform or forego some act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will.” Radford v. Keith, 160 N.C.App. 41, 43-44, 584 S.E.2d 815, 817 (2003). A threatened act is unlawful “if made with the corrupt intent to coerce a transaction grossly unfair to the victim and not related to the subject of such proceedings.”
"Duress exists where one, by the unlawful act of another, is induced to make a contract or perform or forego some act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will." Radford v. Keith, 160 N.C. App. 41, 43-44, 584 S.E.2d 815, 817 (2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The absence of free will may be determined from the following factors:
While we are aware that two federal district courts which have considered the issue have concluded that “ no [civil] cause of action for extortion exists under North Carolina law[,]" Delk v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 179 F.Supp.2d 615, 626 (W.D.N.C.2002); Godfredson v. JBC Legal Group, P.C., 387 F.Supp.2d 543, 555 (E.D.N.C.2005) (“ [A] survey of the applicable North Carolina authority indicates that no civil cause of action exists for the tort of extortion." ), we construe plaintiffs' complaint as a cause of action for duress for the sole purpose of determining whether or not it is barred by the affirmative defense of POI. SeeRadford v. Keith, 160 N.C.App. 41, 43-44, 584 S.E.2d 815, 817 (2003) (“ Duress exists where one, by the unlawful act of another, is induced to make a contract or perform or forego some act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will." (Citation and quotation marks omitted.)
ion of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-234(a)(1), and (2) Greene was speaking on behalf of all the individual defendants in an attempt to wrongfully interfere with plaintiffs' contract with the Authority to operate the FBO. Though N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-234 does not contemplate recovery of compensation by an individual, plaintiffs' complaint also expressly states a claim for extortion. While we are aware that two federal district courts which have considered the issue have concluded that "no [civil] cause of action for extortion exists under North Carolina law[,]"Delk v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 179 FSupp.2d 615, 626 (W.D.N.C. 2002); Godfredson v. JBC Legal Group, EC, 387 FSupp.2d 543, 555 (E.D.N.C. 2005) ("[A] survey of the applicable North Carolina authority indicates that no civil cause of action exists for the tort of extortion."), we construe plaintiffs' complaint as a cause of action for duress for the sole purpose of determining whether or not it is barred by the affirmative defense of POI. See Radford v. Keith, 160 N.C. App. 41, 43-44, 584 S.E.2d 815, 817 (2003) ("Duress exists where one, by the unlawful act of another, is induced to make a contract or perform or forego some act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will." (Citation and quotation marks omitted.)