Opinion
Nos. 2014AP1672 2014AP1673.
2014-12-23
In re the termination of parental rights to SARYAH M. M., a person under the age of 18: Racine County Human Services Department, Petitioner–Respondent, v. Latasia D. M., Respondent–Appellant. In re the termination of parental rights to Sunai M. M., a person under the age of 18: Racine County Human Services Department, Petitioner–Respondent, v. Latasia D. M., Respondent–Appellant.
As can be seen from this passage, the court did not rely on the Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) “substantial parental relationship” factors or the jury's verdict at the fact-finding hearing in its consideration of § 48.426(3)(c). The court instead focused on the reduced contact between Latasia and her children that resulted in the children losing any substantial relationship they once had with their biological mother.
Appeals from orders of the circuit court for Racine County: Charles h. Constantine, Judge. Affirmed.
¶ 1 REILLY, J.
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(e) (2011–12). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011–12 version unless otherwise noted.
In these consolidated appeals from orders terminating her parental rights to Saryah M. and Sunai M., Latasia M. argues that she is entitled to a new fact-finding and/or dispositional hearing as the court erred when it (1) failed to permit her to withdraw her jury demand, (2) admitted evidence of her battery conviction, and (3) failed to properly consider the “substantial relationship” factor in the dispositional phase. Additionally, Latasia argues that Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) is facially void for vagueness. We disagree and affirm the circuit court in all respects.
¶ 12 The statute not only provides exactly what is needed to prove the ground of failing to assume parental responsibility, i.e., failing to have a substantial parental relationship with the child, the statute also expressly defines this concept and lists factors that may be considered in making this determination. The statute does so by employing words and concepts “well enough known to enable those within their reach to correctly apply them,” Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926), and giving an ample description of the proscribed conduct such as to provide both advance warning to “one bent on obedience” and a standard to be applied by the trier of fact. Latasia has not met her heavy burden of proof. Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(6) is not void for vagueness.
Battery Conviction
¶ 13 Latasia next contends that the court erroneously admitted evidence of her conviction for battery. Latasia argues that this conviction was irrelevant as it involved Latasia's battery of her eldest daughter, not Saryah or Sunai. A circuit court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an erroneous exercise of discretion. La Crosse Cnty. DHS v. Tara P., 2002 WI App 84, ¶ 6, 252 Wis.2d 179, 643 N.W.2d 194. We will not upset an evidentiary decision if it has a rational basis in accordance with the law and facts of the case. Id. Latasia's challenge fails under this deferential standard.
¶ 14 The court allowed the admission of Latasia's battery conviction into evidence as the conduct involved was the reason that Saryah and Sunai had been removed from Latasia's home and the reason for several of the conditions Latasia had to meet before they would be returned. The court thus found that this evidence was relevant to the proceedings. The court limited references to the incident over the course of the four-day trial and Latasia was allowed to present evidence there had not been further abuse.
¶ 15 The court's decision to admit evidence of Latasia's battery of her eldest daughter for the limited purpose of explaining the reason that her younger daughters had been removed from her home and why safety considerations were a condition of their return had a rational basis in accordance with the law and the facts of this case. See Reynaldo F. v. Chri stal M., 2004 WI App 106, ¶ 20, 272 Wis.2d 816, 681 N.W.2d 289. The court did not err in admitting this relevant evidence.
Substantial Relationship
¶ 16 Lastly, Latasia argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion at the dispositional phase of the proceedings “by failing to properly consider” whether Saryah or Sunai had a substantial relationship with Latasia and whether it would be harmful to sever this relationship. See Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3). “A proper exercise of discretion requires the circuit court to apply the correct standard of law to the facts at hand.” State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶ 32, 234 Wis.2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475. Latasia contends that the court improperly applied the law by relying on the jury's verdict at the fact-finding hearing that Latasia did not have a substantial parental relationship with the girls as well as by utilizing its own experience in rendering its decision. We disagree that the court's comments in this area reflected an erroneous exercise of discretion.
¶ 17 Although the court addressed the jury's verdict at the fact-finding hearing, it did not rely on the jury's findings during the portion of its oral decision that focused on the Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3) factors. The court specifically addressed the § 48.426(3)(c) “substantial relationship” factor as follows:
The youngest child here really has not had a substantial relationship with her mother or father. She's been out of the house for basically essentially most of her life. Her contacts with her parents have been limited; with her father, really limited; with her mother, less limited.
I concede [Latasia, the father,] when those children were born, they were there. They provided for them. They were there every single day. They cared for them. They put them to sleep. They probably read to them, walked them, don't have an issue with that. But what happened was the children were removed, contact lessened, and basically, you know, you lose that substantial relationship, okay. I mean, it happens.
I have some experience with that. My oldest child is adopted. Her father is alive. She visits him on occasion, but he's not her father. I'm her father. I've had the substantial relationship. He had one at one time. She was with him for four years, but he doesn't anymore, and he knows it, and he's a hell of a nice guy.
As can be seen from this passage, the court did not rely on the Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) “substantial parental relationship” factors or the jury's verdict at the fact-finding hearing in its consideration of § 48.426(3)(c). The court instead focused on the reduced contact between Latasia and her children that resulted in the children losing any substantial relationship they once had with their biological mother.
¶ 18 The court's comments regarding its own experience with an adopted daughter highlighted how reduced contacts can affect the biological relationship. Such observations are not outside the common knowledge and experience of the average person such that they were improperly considered by the court in its weighing of the evidence. See State v. Sarnowski, 2005 WI App 48, ¶¶ 15–16, 280 Wis.2d 243, 694 N.W.2d 498.
¶ 19 Further, even if the court had relied in part on the definition and factors from Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) to analyze whether Saryah and Sunai had a substantial relationship with Latasia, we do not necessarily view this alone as applying an incorrect standard of law. The court stated that it was “important to remember” the jury's finding with regard to Latasia no longer having a substantial parental relationship with her daughters, not that it was bound by that decision, and Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3) expressly permits the consideration of other nonenumerated factors in evaluating the best interests of the children. Many of the factors utilized to determine whether Latasia had a substantial parental relationship with Saryah and Sunai at the fact-finding hearing are likewise relevant to determining whether Saryah and Sunai had a corresponding substantial relationship with Latasia and whether termination of their mother's parental rights would be in the best interest of the children. Additionally, implicit in the court's determination that the children no longer had a substantial relationship with Latasia was that it would not be harmful to sever this diminished relationship. We find no erroneous exercise of discretion.
CONCLUSION
¶ 20 As Latasia has identified no error meriting a reversal of either the jury's decision at the fact-finding hearing or the court's decision at the dispositional hearing, we affirm the court's orders terminating her parental rights to Saryah and Sunai and denying her postdisposition motion.
Orders affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. RuleE 809.23(1)(b)4.