Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3576-13T4
04-07-2015
ALLEN RABERT, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and MAGYAR BANK, Respondents.
Allen Rabert, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Steven Hahn, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Genova Burns, attorneys for respondent Magyar Bank (Celia S. Bosco, of counsel and on the brief; Joseph V. Manney, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Accurso and Manahan. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 419,355. Allen Rabert, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Steven Hahn, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Genova Burns, attorneys for respondent Magyar Bank (Celia S. Bosco, of counsel and on the brief; Joseph V. Manney, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Appellant Allen Rabert, formerly employed as head teller at the North Brunswick branch of Magyar Bank, appeals from the final decision of the respondent Board of Review disqualifying him from receipt of unemployment compensation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). The Board determined that Rabert left his job without good cause attributable to the work. We affirm.
On January 9, 2013, after being at the bank for nearly eight years, Rabert tendered a letter of resignation to his immediate supervisor explaining "it [was] time for [him] to move into a new area and develop another set of professional skills." His final day of work was February 2, 2013. The following day, Rabert filed for unemployment benefits. After a deputy claims examiner determined he was entitled to benefits, the bank appealed.
At an in-person hearing before the Appeal Tribunal in which Rabert was represented by counsel, two bank vice presidents testified they met with Rabert before he tendered his resignation and offered him a lateral transfer to the Bridgewater branch, where he would continue to work as head teller but would also have some additional sales responsibilities. The two denied telling Rabert that he would be terminated if he did not take the job. According to them, Rabert's performance met Magyar's expectations, and he would have remained in the head teller position in North Brunswick had he declined the lateral transfer.
They testified that Rabert expressed concern that the approximately eleven-mile longer commute would prevent him from getting to his volunteer job driving a developmentally-challenged woman home from work two or three evenings per week and asked to be allowed to consider the offer overnight. Believing the request a reasonable one, the bank officers agreed. A few hours later, Rabert's branch manager informed them Rabert had resigned.
Rabert testified he came away from that meeting with the understanding that he would be terminated if he turned down the transfer, although neither vice president had said so directly. When asked by the Appeal Tribunal if he asked them whether it was their intent to terminate him if he refused the transfer, Rabert claimed he did not do so because he found them both very intimidating. He also declined to speak to anyone in human resources because he did not trust the people in that department.
Instead, he claimed that he asked his branch manager whether he was correct in assuming that he would be terminated if he turned down the transfer and likely fired anyway if he accepted it based on the bank's history of terminating head tellers in the Bridgewater branch. When she confirmed his surmise, Rabert tendered his resignation, believing it easier to find new employment if he left voluntarily rather than being fired. He testified he was not interested in the new job because it would have involved about a thirty-five minute longer commute, affected his part-time job, added new responsibilities, and, he assumed, required travel outside of the office. His counsel argued that Rabert did not voluntarily quit his job but resigned to avoid termination or, at worst, declined unsuitable work.
The Appeal Tribunal found that Rabert was disqualified for benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because he left his job without good cause attributable to the work. The Tribunal found no proof that Rabert would have been in imminent danger of discharge had he rejected his employer's offer and no suitable explanation of why he acted in haste to submit his resignation. The Appeal Tribunal rejected the claim that Rabert was entitled to only a limited disqualification for benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c) for refusing to accept suitable new work because his employer had not made an offer of substantially different work, and Rabert chose to tender his resignation rather than consider the offer.
Rabert appealed and the Board of Review remanded to the Appeal Tribunal for additional testimony from the bank's branch manager on the questions of whether Rabert left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work or refused an offer of suitable work.
The branch manager testified on remand that she learned on January 8, 2013 Rabert was being considered for a transfer, and that she endorsed the plan. That same day, Rabert came to her, worried that he was going to be fired at the next day's meeting. She testified she told him to "just . . . go and talk to them."
When Rabert came to her the following day with his resignation letter, she asked him why he was resigning. She claimed he said the distance to the Bridgewater branch was too far for him to travel. She testified she encouraged him to take the transfer but never said that he would be fired if he rejected the offer. The branch manager denied being aware of any plan to fire Rabert and stated that she did not participate in the making of such decisions and was without authority to fire him herself.
Rabert testified on remand that the branch manager specifically told him that he would be fired if he rejected the transfer offer. He reiterated his earlier testimony that he resigned only because the branch manager told him he would be fired if he rejected the transfer, and he did not want the termination to affect his future job prospects.
The Appeal Tribunal again found no evidence Rabert would have been in imminent danger of discharge had he rejected the bank's offer of transfer and affirmed its earlier decision for the reasons previously expressed. The Board found Rabert had been afforded a full and impartial hearing and "agree[d] with the decision reached" on "the basis of the record below."
On this appeal, Rabert contends the Appeal Tribunal displayed bias in favor of the bank "by improperly rejecting claimant's testimony without any finding of non-credibility" and "improperly reviewed the case as a voluntary quit case instead of as a refusal to accept suitable work matter."
Our role in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency is limited. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). "'[I]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether [we] would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was [ours] to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Ibid. (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)). We also give due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge their credibility. Logan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 346, 348 (App. Div. 1997). "If the Board's factual findings are supported by 'sufficient credible evidence, [we] are obligated to accept them.'" Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210 (quoting Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). "Unless . . . the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, the agency's ruling should not be disturbed." Ibid.
N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), a provision of the New Jersey Unemployment Compensation Law, states that a claimant is disqualified for benefits "[f]or the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed . . . ." Claimants bear the burden of proof to establish their right to unemployment benefits. Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 218 (citing Zielenski v. Bd. of Review, 85 N.J. Super. 46, 51 (App. Div. 1964); DiMicele v. General Motors Corp., 51 N.J. Super. 167, 171 (App. Div. 1958), aff'd, 29 N.J. 427 (1959)). An employee who leaves work voluntarily bears the burden to prove he did so with good cause attributable to the work. Ibid. Although the statute does not define "good cause," our courts have long construed the statute to mean "cause sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed." Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting Condo v. Bd. of Review, 158 N.J. Super. 172, 174 (App. Div. 1978)). N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b) defines "good cause" as "a reason related directly to the individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no choice but to leave the employment."
Reviewing the record in the light of these standards convinces us that we have no cause to disturb the Board's determination that Rabert is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. The Appeal Tribunal heard the testimony of the witnesses and determined that Rabert was in no imminent danger of losing his job were he to reject the transfer to Bridgewater. As there was ample proof in the record to support that conclusion, we are obligated to accept it. Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210. Although the Tribunal did not expressly state it found the bank's witnesses more credible than Rabert, that conclusion is inescapable from its findings. We find no evidence of bias.
We also reject Rabert's argument that the Board should have analyzed the case as a refusal to accept suitable work under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c) instead of as a voluntary quit without good cause. The Appeal Tribunal found Rabert never actually turned down the transfer offer but instead chose to prematurely and unreasonably resign from his current position even though it remained available to him. The Tribunal's determination, adopted by the Board, that claimant left work voluntarily, without good cause attributable to the work, is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole and is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Accordingly, we find no basis to disturb the Board's finding.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION