Opinion
3:10-CV-00657-LRH-WGC
10-31-2013
MANUEL QUIROZ, JR., Plaintiff, v. JEFFREY A. DICKERSON, Defendant.
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Jeffrey A. Dickerson's ("Dickerson") Second Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal. Doc. #190. Plaintiff Manuel Quiroz, Jr. ("Quiroz") filed a Response (Doc. #195), to which Dickerson did not reply.
Refers to the Court's docket number.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On January 22, 2013, following a jury trial, the Court entered judgment in favor of Quiroz and against Dickerson in the amount of $449,914.00. Doc. #134. Thereafter, on February 17, 2013, Dickerson filed a Notice of Appeal. Doc. #139. On April 22, 2013, the Court denied Dickerson's First Motion to Stay Judgment Without Bond. Doc. #161. On September 5, 2013, Dickerson filed the present Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal, proposing a "bond or other security" in the amount of $100,000.00. Doc. #190.
The Court has since issued a Bill of Costs ordering that costs are taxed in the amount of $1,134.22 and shall be included in the judgment. Doc. #191; Doc. #192.
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II. Legal Standard
To stay the execution of a judgment pending appeal, ordinarily the appellant must furnish a proper supersedeas bond. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d); see also Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1) (a party must ordinarily move first in the district court for a stay pending appeal and approval of the supersedeas bond). "The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to preserve the status quo while protecting the non-appealing party's rights pending appeal." Poplar Grove Planting and Refining Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1190-91 (5th Cir. 1979). The bond should ordinarily include the whole amount of the judgment remaining unsatisfied, costs on the appeal, interest, and damages for delay. See id. at 1191 (holding that Rule 62(d) is consistent with its predecessor, Civil Rule 73(d), which required a bond to include costs on the appeal, interest, and damages for delay).
An appellant may be entitled to a waiver of the full bond requirement and a discretionary stay only in extraordinary cases. See Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1367 (9th Cir. 1990). The burden is on the moving party to "objectively demonstrate the reasons for such a departure." Poplar Grove, 600 F.2d at 1191. Courts that have examined this question have held that a waiver should be granted only "if the filing of a supersedeas bond would irreparably harm the judgment debtor and, at the same time, such a stay would not unduly endanger the judgment creditor's interest in ultimate recovery." Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 188 F.Supp.2d 223, 254 (N.D.N.Y.2002) (internal citations omitted). Upon waiving the full supersedeas requirement, courts "often require alternative security considerably in excess of the amount of the judgment." Id. at 255 (internal citations omitted); see also Int'l Telemeter Corp. v. Hamlin Intern. Corp., 754 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a district court may permit security other than a bond).
III. Discussion
The Court's judgment in this matter, including taxable costs, totals $451,048.22. See Doc. #134; Doc. #192. As such, the Court shall grant Dickerson's Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal on the condition that he posts a full supersedeas bond in the amount of $451,048.22 in accordance with this Order. In the event the Court's judgment is affirmed on appeal, the Court reserves the right to modify its April 22, 2013 Order requiring Dickerson to post a $2,000.00 bond for Quiroz's costs on appeal in order to fully compensate him for the expense of appeal. See Doc. #161.
The Court finds that this is not a case warranting waiver of the full supersedeas bond requirement. In denying Dickerson's first Motion to Stay Judgment, the Court found that Quiroz faced a serious risk of being unable to collect on the judgment in this matter. See Doc. #161, p. 2. The Court reiterates this concern now. Dickerson contends that "[c]ollection activity will financially annihilate [him]." Doc. #190, p. 3. Dickerson further asserts that "[i]f anything, [he] would be in a better financial position to pay at the conclusion of the appeal." Doc. #190, p. 3. However, Dickerson fails to explain and the Court fails to understand how this would be the case. Moreover, Dickerson has not shown that a lesser amount than the total judgment in this matter would adequately protect Quiroz's interest in ultimate recovery. Nor has he presented to the Court a financially secure plan for maintaining solvency during the period of appeal. Finally, Dickerson omits any explanation of the "other security with a value of $100,000.00" that he proposes in place of a supersedeas bond. Thus, the Court finds that Dickerson has not sufficiently demonstrated his need for a departure from the normal supersedeas bond requirement.
IV. Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Dickerson's Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal (Doc. #190) is GRANTED conditioned upon Dickerson posting a full supersedeas bond in the amount of $451,048.22 with a qualified third-party financial institution within twenty (20) days of the issuance of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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LARRY R. HICKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE