Opinion
NO. 09-11-00213-CR
05-23-2012
JOSHUA MATTHEW QUIRK, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 07-00254
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Joshua Matthew Quirk appeals from a judgment in his criminal case, arguing that the trial court's errors in admitting evidence and in charging the jury entitle him to a new trial. Quirk received a sentence of ninety-nine years in prison after a jury found him guilty of injuring a child. In issue one, Quirk complains the trial court erroneously admitted evidence during his trial that showed he had committed extraneous wrongs. In issue two, Quirk asserts the trial court failed to define the culpable mental state for the offense of injuring a child in a manner that limited the jury to finding him guilty only of a result-oriented crime. We overrule Quirk's issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
M.D., the two-year-old daughter of Danielle Graves and Todd Davis, was injured while she was in Quirk's care. Quirk was living with Graves at the time M.D. was injured. Although Graves was working when M.D. was injured, she had arranged for Quirk to care for M.D. until Davis could pick M.D. up from Graves's apartment. Because M.D. was asleep when Davis picked her up, Davis failed to notice that M.D. had been seriously injured while in Quirk's care. Later, when M.D. awoke, Davis noticed that her head was swollen, she had thrown up, and had a very messy diaper, so he decided to take her to the hospital. The central dispute the jury resolved by trial concerned whether Quirk knowingly or intentionally caused M.D.'s injuries, or instead, whether her injuries were received due to an accident.
Extraneous Offenses
In his first issue, Quirk complains the trial court erred in admitting evidence of three extraneous wrongs. See Tex. R. Evid. 403 (Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Special Grounds), 404(b) (Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes). The first of these wrongs concerns Quirk's having allegedly threatened Gina Bloss, M.D.'s maternal grandmother. Before arriving at the hospital, Davis informed Bloss that M.D. was injured while in Quirk's care the night before; subsequently, Bloss spoke with Quirk in an effort to learn what had happened. Quirk told Bloss that M.D. had fallen off the counter; Bloss responded by accusing Quirk of beating M.D. While Quirk denied Bloss's accusation, he sounded aggravated and became defensive, threatening that he would "show [Bloss] a beating" if she wanted to see one.
Second, Quirk complains that the trial court erroneously admitted testimony from which the jury could infer that he provided the police with a false name in an effort to avoid being arrested. According to Graves, after Quirk was indicted and the police came to arrest him, Quirk told them that he was Jacob Brown. Nevertheless, Quirk was arrested.
Third, Quirk complains the trial court erred in admitting testimony from which the jury could infer that he tried to pick the lock on his transportation restraints shortly before his trial commenced. According to Deputy Robert Wayne Compton, prior to the beginning of the trial, he attempted to remove Quirk's handcuffs but his key would not enter the keyway. Other keys were attempted, but they also failed to open the restraint's lock. Quirk's handcuffs were then removed with bolt cutters. On further inspection, another officer found a piece of wire lodged in the keyway of Quirk's handcuffs, indicating, according to Deputy Compton, that someone had attempted to pick the lock. Another officer, Floyd Ducet, Jr., searched Quirk's cell for objects that might have been used to pick a lock. According to Ducet, on searching Quirk's cell, he found a piece of small metal wire just above Quirk's bunk.
We review claims challenging the admission of extraneous offenses under an abuse of discretion standard. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). "As long as the trial court's ruling is within the 'zone of reasonable disagreement,' there is no abuse of discretion, and the trial court's ruling will be upheld." Id. at 343-44 (quoting Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh'g)). Generally, a trial court's ruling to admit evidence of an extraneous offense is within the zone of reasonable disagreement if the evidence is relevant to a material issue and if the probative value of that evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. at 344.
First, we review Quirk's argument that the testimony at issue was inadmissible under Rule 404(b). Under 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible "'to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith[.]'" Berry v. State, 233 S.W.3d 847, 858 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)). However, extraneous offense evidence may be admissible when it has relevance apart from character conformity. Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). In particular, such evidence may be admissible as proof as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b); see De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 342-43. Nonetheless, this list is not exhaustive; rather, extraneous offense evidence will generally be admissible if deemed relevant, meaning it may be admitted "'so long as it logically tends to make the existence of some fact of consequence more or less probable.'" De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343 & n.10 (quoting Banda v. State, 768 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)); see also Rankin v. State, 974 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that "if evidence 1) is introduced for a purpose other than character conformity, 2) has relevance to a 'fact of consequence' in the case and 3) remains free of any other constitutional or statutory prohibitions, it is admissible").
Evidence of extraneous wrongs or bad acts is sometimes admitted to show consciousness of guilt, which is relevant apart from the question of character conformity. See Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (op. on reh'g). In Ransom, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained that any extraneous conduct which tends to show consciousness of guilt may be deemed relevant, stating:
criminal acts that are designed to reduce the likelihood of prosecution, conviction, or incarceration for the offense on trial are admissible under Rule 404(b) as showing "consciousness of guilt." These include threats against the prosecutor; threats against witnesses, and their families; physical violence against witnesses; escape from confinement; bail jumping; and the presentation of fake identification to the police.Id. at 299 (internal citations omitted). Criminal acts showing a "'consciousness of guilt'" "designed to reduce the likelihood of prosecution, conviction, or incarceration for the offense on trial are admissible under Rule 404(b)[.]" Id.; see also Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 905 n.11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Felder v. State, 848 S.W.2d 85, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
Here, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Quirk's threat—to "show" Bloss a beating—was probative of Quirk's consciousness of guilt, making it relevant under 404(b). See Ransom, 920 S.W.2d at 299; see also Wilson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Rodriguez v. State, 577 S.W.2d 491, 492-93 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). The second and third wrongs, consisting of Quirk's providing a false name to police and tampering with his handcuffs, are also matters the trial court could reasonably conclude showed a consciousness of guilt. See Ransom, 920 S.W.2d at 299. We conclude that the three extraneous wrongs were admissible under Rule 404(b).
Nevertheless, relevant evidence can be excluded where its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. See Tex. R. Evid. 403. Once a trial court determines that extraneous offense evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), the trial court must, over proper objection by the opponent of the evidence, weigh the probative value of the evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389; see Tex. R. Evid. 403. Rule 403 favors admissibility of relevant evidence, and the presumption is that generally, relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389. Unfair prejudice does not mean the evidence injures the opponent's case—"the central point of offering evidence." Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). "Rather[,] it refers to 'an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.'" Id. (quoting Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)).
Although not limited to the following enumerated factors, courts should balance the following factors under a rule 403 analysis: (1) the probative value of the evidence; (2) the potential of the evidence to impress the jury in some irrational, yet indelible, way; (3) the time needed to develop the evidence; and (4) the proponent's need for the evidence. De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 348-49; Prible v. State, 175 S.W.3d 724, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The trial court is presumed to have conducted the proper balancing test if it overrules a 403 objection, regardless of whether it conducted the test on the record. See Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Weighing the rule 403 factors, we hold that the trial court could reasonably have found that the evidence at issue was probative of Quirk's consciousness of guilt. See Ransom, 920 S.W.2d at 299-300 (noting probative value of an extraneous crime showing consciousness of guilt may well outweigh its prejudicial impact); Torres v. State, 794 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no pet.) (stating "'consciousness of guilt' is perhaps one of the strongest kinds of evidence of guilt"). In Quirk's case, the evidence at issue was valuable because it tends to show that he was not being truthful about what had caused M.D.'s injuries. In this case, the medical experts of the parties provided differing interpretations regarding whether Quirk's explanation provided a sufficient account to explain the extent of M.D.'s injuries. The State's medical expert explained that, in considering the extent of M.D.'s injuries, Quirk's explanation did not offer a sufficient explanation to account for them. On the other hand, based on the evidence provided by Quirk's medical expert, the jury might have chosen to infer that Quirk had offered a plausible explanation to account for M.D.'s injuries. Additionally, the State's need for evidence showing a consciousness of guilt was significant because none of the witnesses who testified were present when M.D. was injured. We conclude that evidence tending to show Quirk's consciousness of guilt was probative in this case to assist the jury in determining whether M.D.'s injuries were accidental, as Quirk claimed. See Torres, 794 S.W.2d at 598-99.
We also consider whether the evidence the trial court admitted was likely to influence the jury in an irrational way. See De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 349. In this case, there appears little chance that the evidence was likely to influence the jury irrationally, as the conduct at issue does not involve instances where Quirk caused other injuries.
The amount of time it took during the trial to develop the testimony addressing Quirk's extraneous acts was not significant. See id. In Quirk's trial, the evidence concerning Quirk's extraneous acts is contained within approximately seventeen of the trial transcript's two hundred pages. Thus, the record reflects that the State did not spend an excessive amount of time developing the evidence.
In summary, we conclude that the trial court's decision to admit the extraneous offense evidence was within the zone of reasonable disagreement; we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. See Tex. R. Evid. 403, 404(b); De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343. Having also considered Quirk's Rule 403 objections to this same evidence, we also hold that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We overrule Quirk's first issue.
Charge Error
In issue two, Quirk contends the trial court erred in defining the culpable mental states connected with the crime of injury to a child by using language that allowed the jury to consider both the result of Quirk's conduct as well as the nature of his conduct in deciding whether he had committed the offense with the requisite mental state required to commit the offense of injuring a child. Quirk argues that the definitions of the culpable mental states provided by the trial court in the charge should have restricted the jury's discretion to considering only the results of his conduct in evaluating whether he possessed the mental state required to commit the offense of injuring a child.
In reviewing a claim of jury charge error, we must first decide whether error actually exists in the charge. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (en banc) (citing Middleton v. State, 125 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). If we find that error exists, we must then analyze for harm. Id. However, when a defendant fails to object or states that he has no objections to the charge, we will not reverse for jury charge error unless the record shows "'egregious harm'" to the defendant. Id. at 743-44 (quoting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)).
During the charge conference, Quirk's attorney advised the trial court that Quirk did not have any objections to the proposed charge. Therefore, to be reversible, Quirk must show that the alleged error in the charge was so harmful that it resulted in his receiving an unfair and partial trial. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171; see also Allen v. State, 253 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). To determine harm, we look at the trial as a whole. Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc).
For both preserved and unpreserved charging error, "the actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.Id. (quoting Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171). "In assessing harm resulting from the inclusion of improper conduct elements in the definitions of culpable mental states, we 'may consider the degree, if any, to which the culpable mental states were limited by the application portions of the jury charge.'" Id. at 492 (quoting Hughes v. State, 897 S.W.2d 285, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)).
A person commits the offense of injury to a child if he intentionally or knowingly causes serious bodily injury to a child. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(a) (West Supp. 2011). Injury to a child is a result-oriented offense requiring a mental state that relates not to the specific conduct but to the result of the conduct. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). "It is error for a trial judge to not limit the definitions of the culpable mental states as they relate to the conduct elements involved in the particular offense." Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc). Nevertheless, if the application paragraph of the charge points the jury to the appropriate portion of the definitions, an error in providing definitions that do not limit the jury to considering only the results of the defendant's conduct is considered harmless error. Patrick, 906 S.W.2d at 493; Hughes, 897 S.W.2d at 296-97.
We cite to the current version of the Texas Penal Code because no amendments affect the issues on appeal.
In Quirk's case, in the abstract portion of the charge, the trial court provides the statutory definitions for the terms "intentionally" and "knowingly." The definitions of the terms "intentionally" and "knowingly" used in the charge mirror the definitions of those terms in the Texas Penal Code. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a), (b) (West 2011). As a result, the definitions in the trial court's charge include both nature of conduct and result of conduct language. See id. However, the application paragraph of the charge instructed the jury to find Quirk guilty if he "intentionally or knowingly cause[d] serious bodily injury to [M.D.], a child not older than fourteen years of age or younger, hereafter styled the Complainant, by hitting Complainant with his hand[.]"
Because the application paragraph of the charge limited the jury's consideration to the result of Quirk's conduct, causing serious bodily injury, we are confident that the jury convicted him based on the result of his conduct. We conclude the facts, as applied to the law in the application paragraph of Quirk's jury charge, pointed the jury to the appropriate portions of the definitions of the terms intentionally and knowingly. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court's failure to limit the definitions of the terms under discussion was harmless and that the trial court's error did not cause Quirk to suffer any egregious harm. Patrick, 906 S.W.2d at 492-93; Hughes, 897 S.W.2d at 296-97; Coleman v. State, 279 S.W.3d 681, 686-87 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006), aff'd, 246 S.W.3d 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We overrule Quirk's second issue.
Having overruled both of Quirk's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.
HOLLIS HORTON
Justice
Do Not Publish Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.