Opinion
2:24-cv-03524-WLH-PD
07-15-2024
PAUL NAVARETTE QUINTANA, Plaintiff, v. CYNTHIA E. LERMOND, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATIONS FOR WRIT OF MANDATE TO COMPEL PERFORMANCE OF DUTY, TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND TO COMPEL AN ANSWER--COMPLAINT UNDER CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
HON. WESLEY L. HSU, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On April 25, 2024, Plaintiff Paul Navarette Quintana, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against numerous individuals and mental health centers alleging various constitutional violations. [Dkt. No. 1.] The Court is in the process of screening the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b)(1) and has not ordered service on any Defendant named in the Complaint.
On May 28, 2024, Plaintiff, who is confined at the Department of State Hospitals-Patton (herein “Patton”), filed an “Application for a Writ of Mandate to Compel Performance of Duty, Temporary Restraining Order, and Preliminary Injunction, Complaint under Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983)” and an “Application to Compel an Answer-Complaint under Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983).” [Dkt. Nos. 8, 9.] Plaintiff seeks a writ of mandate to compel performance of duty, temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction requiring Patton to stop opening any state or federal legal mail addressed to him with the notation “official business.” [Dkt. No. 8 at 2.] Plaintiff states that he received legal mail from the Court regarding the instant case on May 7, 21, and 22, 2024, and he received legal mail on May 23, 2024, that was opened. [Id. at 2-3.] Plaintiff contends that Patton is impeding the service of process of his civil rights complaint. [Id. at 3.] He further alleges that Patton is reading, tampering, interfering, and obstructing his confidential legal mail sent to and from the Court in violation of the First Amendment and is violating his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. [Id. at 4.]
Plaintiff seeks the following relief: (1) a writ of mandate to compel Patton to stop opening his legal mail and to immediately answer the application to compel an answer to Complaint under Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) or show cause why the application should not be granted; (2) a temporary restraining order ordering officials and officers at Patton to stop reading, tampering, interfering, and obstructing his legal mail during the pendency of this litigation; and (3) a preliminary and permanent injunction against Patton's officers, agents, employees, successors, and attorneys from reading, tampering, interfering, and obstructing his confidential legal mail sent to and from the Court. [Id. at 5-6.] Plaintiff also seeks an order compelling an answer from Patton as to why they are reading, tampering, interfering, and obstructing his confidential legal mail sent from the Court. [Dkt. No. 9.]
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, district courts have “original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy ... [and] is appropriately issued only when (1) the plaintiff's claim is clear and certain; (2) the defendant official's duty to act is ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt; and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.” Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Although 28 U.S.C. § 1651 states that all courts established by Act of Congress “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law,” the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to a state agency or official. See Demos v. United States District Court for the E. Dist. of Wash., 925 F.2d 1160, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 1991) (“to the extent that Demos attempts to obtain a writ in this court to compel a state court to take or refrain from some action, the petitions are frivolous as a matter of law”); Robinson v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 997 F.Supp. 1303, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (finding that federal courts are without power to issue writs of mandamus to direct state agencies in the performance of their duties); Newton v. Poindexter, 578 F.Supp. 277, 279 (E.D. Cal. 1984) (noting that federal mandamus statute has no application to state officers or employees). Therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandate to compel Patton to stop opening his legal mail and to immediately answer Plaintiff's application to compel an answer to the Complaint.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 sets forth the procedure for issuance of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b). A district court has the power to issue a temporary restraining order upon a showing “that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1)(A). The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are “substantially identical.” Stuhlbarg Intern. Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To qualify for injunctive relief, Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that he will suffer irreparable harm without an injunction; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20. The Ninth Circuit has held that injunctive relief may issue, even if the moving party cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits, if “ ‘serious questions going to the merits' and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). Under either formulation of the principles, preliminary injunctive relief should be denied if the probability of success on the merits is low. Johnson v. California State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (even if the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the moving party, it must be shown as an irreducible minimum that there is a fair chance of success on the merits.).
Further, “[a] federal court may issue an injunction [only] if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.” Zepeda v. U.S.I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)(2) (listing persons bound by an injunction). The Court may not attempt to determine the rights of those who are not before it. Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 727. As courts of limited jurisdiction, a federal court must have before it an actual case or controversy regarding injunctive relief. City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-102 (1983).
Here, in order to grant Plaintiff's desired relief - ordering Patton to stop officials, officers, and employees from reading or tampering with Plaintiff's legal mail - the Court would have to have jurisdiction over Patton. However, Patton is not a Defendant or party to this action.
For these reasons, Plaintiff's Applications for a Writ of Mandate, Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Complaint under Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) and to Compel an Answer-Complaint under Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) from Patton are DENIED. [Dkt. Nos. 8, 9].
IT IS SO ORDERED.