Opinion
Civil No. 08-2199 (JAF).
July 10, 2009
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Renato Quinones-Pagán, brings this action against Defendants, the Administración de Corrección ("ADC"); Miguel Pereira, former Secretary of the ADC; Ana López, Superintendent of the ADC; Miguel Cabán-Rosado, head of correctional officers at the ADC; Olga Álvarez, kitchen director at the ADC; and Canteen Correctional Services ("Canteen"), seeking damages for mental and emotional suffering caused by unconstitutional prison conditions. (Docket Nos. 2, 19, 38, 29.) Defendants the ADC, Pereira, López, and Cabán-Rosado ("Movants") move to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket No. 23.) Plaintiff opposes. (Docket Nos. 34, 40.)
I. Factual and Procedural Synopsis
Unless otherwise noted, we derive the following relevant facts from Plaintiff's complaint. (Docket Nos. 38, 39.) As we must, we assume that all of Plaintiff's allegations are true and make all reasonable inferences in his favor. Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins., Co., 267 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff is an inmate in the Puerto Rico prison system. On January 20, 2008, Officer Santiago, a guard at the prison, placed him in a cell that lacked ventilation, air conditioning, windows, and an opening through which to pass food and water. As a result, the cell became unbearably hot. López approved the cell placement, and was aware that the air conditioning was not functioning, but did nothing to resolve the situation. Plaintiff was again placed in a sealed, non-air-conditioned cell in March 2008. The complaint does not state the duration of Plaintiff's confinement in sealed, non-air-conditioned cells.
At least one of Plaintiff's cells also lacked a functioning toilet, forcing him to use a wash basin as a toilet for fifteen days. On several occasions Álvarez deprived Plaintiff of food, even though Plaintiff had told the prison staff that he had not been fed. Plaintiff suffered humiliation and mental anguish as a result of this treatment. Plaintiff attempted to exhaust administrative remedies.
On October 21, 2008, Plaintiff filed the present complaint in federal district court, seeking monetary damages for the pain and humiliation that he had suffered while he lacked air conditioning. (Docket Nos. 2, 38.) On February 4, 2009, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding allegations of failure to provide medical care. (Docket Nos. 19, 39.) Movants moved to dismiss on February 23, 2009 (Docket No. 23), and Plaintiff opposed on March 26, 2009 (Docket No. 34).
II. Standard
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
Under Rule 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss an action for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of demonstrating its existence. See Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 71 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1995)). Moreover, the court has "an obligation to inquire sua sponte into its own subject matter jurisdiction." McCulloch v. Velez, 364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004).
Rule 12(b)(1) is a "large umbrella, overspreading a variety of different types of challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction."Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362-63 (1st Cir. 2001). A moving party may challenge the sufficiency of the plaintiff's assertion of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 363. This requires the court to take the plaintiff's "jurisdictionally-significant facts as true" and "assess whether the plaintiff has propounded an adequate basis for subject-matter jurisdiction." Id. Alternatively, when the jurisdictional facts are distinct from the case's merits, a moving party can bring a "factual challenge," in which case the court addresses "the merits of the jurisdictional claim by resolving the factual disputes between the parties." Id.
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
A defendant may also move to dismiss an action against him, based solely on the complaint, for the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In assessing this motion, we "accept[] all well-pleaded facts as true, and we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the [plaintiff]." Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir. 1993). However, mere legal conclusions "are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
The complaint must demonstrate "a plausible entitlement to relief" by alleging facts that directly or inferentially support each material element of some legal claim. Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007)). "Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In rare instances, we may dismiss on our own motion, after granting the plaintiff notice and the opportunity to amend the complaint or otherwise respond. Cepero-Rivera v. Fagundo, 414 F.3d 124, 130 (1st Cir. 2005).
III. Analysis
Because Plaintiff is pro se, we construe his pleadings more favorably than we would those drafted by an attorney. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, his pro-se status does not excuse him from complying with procedural and substantive law. Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to inhumane conditions of confinement. (Docket Nos. 2, 38.) We address in turn Movants' arguments that we should dismiss for (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) failure to state a claim. (Docket No. 23.)
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Movants argue that we lack subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies and because some Defendants are protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. (Docket No. 23.) We address these issues in turn.
1. Failure to Exhaust
Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (" PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Under the PLRA, "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under . . . Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Although mandatory, the PLRA's exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional. Casanova v. Dubois, 289 F.3d 142, 147 (1st Cir. 2002). As the Supreme Court has clarified, exhaustion is ordinarily an affirmative defense for the defendant to raise and prove. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). "[I]nmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints." Id. Thus, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for failure to exhaust is never appropriate, and dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only if the complaint on its face conclusively shows that the plaintiff could not have exhausted his remedies. Id. at 215; see Trans-Spec Truck Serv. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 2008) (permitting dismissal on basis of affirmative defenses apparent in the complaint). If the complaint does not furnish grounds for dismissal, a defendant must raise exhaustion in his answer and move to close the case in later proceedings. Casanova v. Dubois, 304 F.3d 75, 78 (1st Cir. 2002).
Here, Plaintiff's complaint does not rule out the possibility that he exhausted his administrative remedies. (See Docket No. 38.) Accordingly, we deny Movants' motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Movants argue that we must dismiss all claims against the ADC, and Pereira, López, and Cabán-Rosado in their official capacities, as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Docket No. 23.)
Movants address Eleventh Amendment immunity in their section on Rule 12(b)(6). However, because the Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power of the courts, we address Eleventh Amendment immunity under Rule 12(b)(1). See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996).
Under the Eleventh Amendment, "an unconsenting State is immune from federal-court suits brought by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another State." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is treated as a state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Metcalf Eddy, Inc. v. P.R. Aqueduct Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935, 939 (1st Cir. 1993). The ADC and its employees, in their official capacities, benefit from immunity from monetary damages. Padilla Cintrón v. Rosselló González, 247 F. Supp. 2d 48, 57-58 (D.P.R. 2003).
Here, Plaintiff brings only claims for monetary damages. (Docket No. 2.) Accordingly, we dismiss all claims against the ADC, and dismiss claims against Pereira, López, and Cabán-Rosado in their official capacities.
B. Failure to State a Claim
Movants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim arising from the conditions of his confinement because he has not demonstrated that he was deprived of a federally-protected right or that Defendants acted with the requisite mental state to establish liability. (Docket No. 23.) We also consider, sua sponte, whether Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for mental or emotional damages because he does not allege any physical injuries, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (" PLRA"). Finally, Movants argue that we should dismiss Plaintiff's claim for failure to provide medical care, asserting that Plaintiff is "judge-shopping." (Docket No. 23.)
1. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. "`The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.'" Giroux v. Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). Prison officials must provide humane conditions of confinement by "ensur[ing] that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care" and "`tak[ing] reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.'" Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832).
To establish an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison conditions, a prisoner must show (1) that a prison official denied him "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,"Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, and (2) that the prison official's state of mind was that of "deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety," id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)). A plaintiff can show deliberate indifference by showing that prison officials did nothing, despite obvious and known risks to health or safety.Id. at 837-38.
a. Lack of Functioning Toilet
A plaintiff may establish an Eighth Amendment violation by alleging facts showing that "he was purposefully subjected to dehumanizing prison conditions." Mitchell v. Newryder, 245 F. Supp. 2d 200, 204 (D. Me. 2003). For example, in Newryder, the district court found that an inmate stated a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation by alleging that a prison official refused to allow him to use a toilet, causing him to have a bowel movement in his pants, and then refused to allow him to clean himself. Id. at 203.
By asserting that he was forced to use a washbasin as a toilet for more than two weeks, Plaintiff has alleged facts demonstrating that prison officials deprived him of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." See id. at 204-05. However, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants possessed the requisite culpable mental state, since he has not asserted facts demonstrating that this deprivation was purposeful, or that Defendants were aware of the deprivation and did nothing. See id. at 203. Accordingly, we dismiss Plaintiff's claims based on the assertion that his cell lacked a toilet. b. Cell Conditions
Prison officials may not provide inmates with a nutritionally-inadequate diet. Domegan v. Fair, 859 F.2d 1059, 1063 (1st Cir. 1988); see Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-14 (9th Cir. 2009). Nor may officials isolate prisoners for long periods in substandard conditions. See Domegan, 859 F.2d at 1064-65; see also Graham v. Warden, N.H. State Prison for Women, No. 07-295, 2007 WL 4468724, at *5 (D.N.H. Dec. 13, 2007) (finding that inadequate heating and ventilation can create unconstitutional conditions).
Plaintiff states that he was deprived of food on several occasions and was kept in an a unventilated, non-air-conditioned cell that became unbearably hot. (Docket No. 38.) He asserts that the prison guards knew that he was not given food and that the air conditioning was malfunctioning, but did not correct the situation. (Id.) However, he has alleged no facts relating to the duration of his confinement. (Id.) We, therefore, order Plaintiff to show cause why we should not dismiss his complaint for failure to state a claim for inhumane conditions of confinement. See Domegan, 859 F.2d at 1063-65.
2. Failure to Allege Physical Injury
The PLRA provides that a prisoner may not bring federal civil suits for mental or emotional injuries suffered while incarcerated without also establishing physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see McGoldrick v. Farrington, 462 F. Supp. 2d 112, 113 (D. Me. 2006). The physical injury need not be substantial, but must be more than de minimis. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 534-35 (3rd Cir. 2003); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 626-28 (9th Cir. 2002); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc in part on other grounds, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000); Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1997).
Here, Plaintiff seeks damages for mental and emotional suffering from being kept in an unventilated cell without air conditioning, and from being denied food. (Docket Nos. 2, 38.) However, he has not alleged that he suffered any physical injury. (See id.) We, therefore, order Plaintiff to show cause why we should not dismiss his complaint, without prejudice, for failure to allege damages compensable under the PLRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); McGoldrick, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 113.
3. Failure to Provide Medical Care
Movants argue that we should dismiss Plaintiff's claims for inadequate medical care because he is engaging in "judge-shopping," as he included identical claims as part of another suit currently pending before the Honorable Raymond L. Acosta. (Docket No. 23; see Case No. 07-1327, Docket No. 40.) We do not agree with Movants that Plaintiff should be sanctioned for judge-shopping. Nonetheless, as Plaintiff is represented by an attorney in the proceedings in Case No. 07-1327, we dismiss without prejudice his claims for failure to provide medical care, in the interest of judicial economy.
IV. Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, we hereby GRANT IN PART Movants' motion to dismiss (Docket No. 23). We DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE the claim against the ADC and Pereira, López, and Cabán-Rosado in their official capacities and the claim for lack of a toilet. We also DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE his claims for failure to provide medical care.We ORDER Plaintiff to SHOW CAUSE, on or before July 29, 2009, as to why we should not dismiss without prejudice his other Eighth Amendment claims relating to conditions of confinement for failure to allege physical injury and failure to allege facts relating to the duration of his confinement in substandard conditions.