Opinion
Case No. CIV-03-192-R
July 10, 2003
ORDER
Before the Court is the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs purported complaint. In response to the Defendant's motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff has filed a pleading styled "Amendment to Cause of Action and Motion to Dismiss Defendat's (sic) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Purported Complaint."
The Defendant, United States of America, seeks dismissal of the Complaint on the alternative grounds of sovereign immunity and failure to state a claim. In ruling on the Defendant's motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.Pro., the Court considers both the well-pleaded facts contained in the Plaintiffs Complaint, and the documents attached as exhibits to the complaint. Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001) (in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may look both to the complaint itself and to any documents attached as exhibits to the complaint).
As the Defendant points out, it is well settled that the United States, as a sovereign, may be sued only to the extent it consents to suit by statute. United Stales v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596,608, 110 S.Ct. 1361, 108 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983). A waiver of sovereign immunity must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign, and may not be enlarged beyond what the statutory language requires. Ruckeshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685, 103 So. Ct. 3274, 77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983). As the party bringing suit against the United States, the Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that an Act of Congress specifically authorizes the Court to entertain her particular claims. See also McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana, 298 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L. lid, 2d 1 135 (1936) (Party seeking the exercise of jurisdiction of federal district court must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction, and must carry throughout the litigation the burden of showing that he or she is properly in court); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, 511 U.S. 375, 387. 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128L. Ed.2d39l (1994). In addressing a motion to dismiss on subject matter jurisdiction grounds, courts accept the veracity of all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint, and view both the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Holt v. United Slates, 46 K 3d 1000, 1002 (10th Cir. 1995).
The Plaintiffs pleadings in this case include her original Complaint, the text of which vaguely refers to negligent or wrongful conduct in connection with the issuance of u levy, and a pleading which is styled as an "amendment" to her "cause of action," which appears to be a response to the Government's motion to dismiss. This response brief lists various numbers which appear to be citations to several state and federal statutes,
The original Complaint reads, in its entirely:
"See Attached violations of the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights I and II RRA 98 The Reports have been written!! 1 got that levy released Bogus levy issued — Nov. 1996 levy released — Sept. IV. 2002"
Attached to this Complaint, however, are several hundred pages of typed notes, copies of correspondence related to her tax levy, copies of documents received from the Internal Revenue Service, copies of a levy served upon the Metropolitan Library System, copies of Internal Revenue Service publications, copies of unidentified computer records, and even copies of newspaper and magazine articles concerning the operation of the Internal Revenue Service.
The Plaintiffs pleading styled "Admenment (sic) to Cause of Action and Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Purported Complaint" addresses the issues raised in the Defendant's motion to dismiss, and appears to be intended as a response brief. Further, the Plaintiff filed this pleading without leave of court 10 amend her Complaint. Thus, the Court interprets this pleading as a brief in response to the Defendant's motion.
First, the Plaintiffs response brief cites: "R. L. 1910; 4671; Law 1957, P78; emerg-eff Feb. 14, 1957; Laws 1999, c. 105,: 1, emerg. eff. May 6, 1975." This provision, part of the 1910 Revised Laws of Oklahoma, is now codified at Title 12, Okla. Stat. § 131, and governs the venue of actions related to real property. Next, the Plaintiff cites: "Laws 1975, C. 105, C. 105,: emerg. eff. May 6, 1975." This provision is codified at Title 12, Okla. Stat. § 143, and provides that venue statutes are to be treated as "cumulative." As state statutes, neither of these provisions can be construed as a waiver by Congress of the sovereign immunity of the United States, and does not meet the Plaintiffs burden of establishing a jurisdictional basis for her claims against the United States.
"Title 12 Okla Stat. § 131[ 12-131] provides:
"Except as provided in Section I32 of this title or Section 163 of the Title 51 of the Oklahoma Statutes:
"1. Actions for the following causes shall be brought in the county in which the subject of the action is situated
a. for the recovery of real property, or of any estate, or interest therein, or the determination in nay form of any such right or interest,
b. for the partition of real! property,
c. for the sale of real property under a mortgage, lien, or other encumbrance or charge, and
d. to quiet title, to establish a trust in, remove a cloud on, set aside a conveyance of, or to enforce or set aside an agreement to convey real property; and
2. Fur a II damages to land, crops, or improvements thereon, actions shall be brought in the county where the damage occurs,"
Title 12 Okla. Stat. S; provides:
"All venue statutes are cumulative wherever they appear and any action brought under any such statute may be maintained where brought. No court shall apply one venue statute in preference to another whether considered general or special."
The next paragraph of the Plaintiffs response brief makes a vague reference to "old and new tax laws — RR98 — U.S.C. T1TLI: 26," followed by the allegation that she has "read the entire Code of Federal Regulation Code U.S.C. § 26." This recitation is not sufficient to meet the Plaintiffs burden of establishing a jurisdictional basis for her claims. McNutt v. General Malory Acceptance' Corp. of Indiana, 298 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L. Ed, 2d 1135 (1936)
The Plaintiff next cites "Title 31, section 5313." The Court interprets this as a citation to Title 3 I U.S.C. § 5313, commonly known as the Bank Secrecy Act. This Section requires financial institutions to file reports on certain domestic coin and currency transactions. Nothing in this statute can be construed as a waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity, or as granting an aggrieved litigant a private right of action. Martinez Colon v. Santander National Bank, 4 F. Supp.2d 53 (D. P. R. 1998) (Bank customers could not bring private cause of action against banks under 31 U.S.C. § 5313, which requires domestic banks to report any currency transactions of more than $ 10,000.00).
Title 31 U.S.C. § 53 13 provides that when a domestic or financial institution is involved in a transaction in United Status coins or currency, in an amount or under circumstances prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, the institution is required to file a transaction report. 3 1 U.S.C. § 5313 (a). This Section further provides for the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe the manner of filing such a report. 31 U, S. C, § 5313(c). Further, this statute provides certain exemptions from the reporting requirements, 31 U.S.C. $ 5313(d), (e) and (f).
The Plaintiff next cites Title 26 U.S.C. § 6301 (a), (b), (c) and (d). Section 6301 simply authorizes the Secretary of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to collect the taxes imposed by the internal revenue laws. It cannot be interpreted as providing a private right of action to a taxpayer. Stowell v. Ives, 976 F.2d 65, 70 n. 5 (1st Cir. 1992) (There is a presumption against implied rights of action arising under federal statutes; this presumption will endure unless the plaintiff proffers adequate evidence of Congressional intent to create a private right of action).
"Title 26 U.S.C. S Section 6301 provides:
"The Secretary shall collect the tuxes imposed by the internal revenue laws."
Section 63U1 does not contain subsections, us suggested by the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff also cites Title 26 U.S. C, § 633 1. Section 6331 is the statute which authorizes the IRS to levy upon the property of a person liable for unpaid taxes. This Section does not create a private cause of action for those who claim that the Internal Revenue Service improperly issued a notice of levy. Accord, Addington v. United States, 75 F. Supp.2d 520 (S.D. W. Va. 1999); Boatmen's First National Bank of Kansas dry v. McCoy, 861 F. Supp. 846 (W. D. Mo. 1994), In re: Weisberger, 205 B.R. 727 (Bankr. M. 1). Pa. 1997); Bach v. Mason, 190 F.R.D. 567 (D. Idaho 1999), aff'd, 3 Fed. Appx. 656 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U, S, 1083, 122 S.Ct. 818, 15 1 L. kd.2d 70 t (2002). See also Monties v. Haynes, 890 F.2d 708, 710 (5th Cir. 1989) (Wrongful levy by I. R. S. under Section 6331 does not violate due process so long as there is an adequate opportunity for post-collection review).
The Plaintiff cites "employer 3401(d)." The Court interprets this as a citation to Title 26 U.S.C. § 3401 (d), which defines the term "employer" for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. This Section does not confer a private right of action, or waive the Government's sovereign immunity. Accord, Ford v. Troyer, 25 F. Supp.2d 723 (E. D. La. 1998) (Alleged employee did not have an implied private right of action under Title 26 U.S.C. § 3401 based on his employer's failure to withhold income taxes on his behalf).
The Plaintiff next mentions "IRC 6343," which the Court interprets as a citation to Title 26 IT. S. C. § 6343. Section 6343 grants the 1RS the authority to release a levy and return property under appropriate circumstances. This Section docs not provide a private right of action, and does not waive the Government's sovereign immunity. Bach v. Mason, 190 F.R.D. 567 (D. Idaho 1999), aff'd, 3 Fed. Appx. 656 (9th Cir 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1083, 122 So. Ct. 818, 151 L Ed.2d 701 (2002).
Title 26 U.S.C. § 6343 authorizes the Secretary of the I. R. S. to release all of part of a tax levy if the tax liability is satisfied or has become unenforceable, if release of the levy will facilitate collection, if the taxpayer has entered into an agreement for installment payments, if the levy is creating an economic hardship due to the financial condition of the taxpayer, or if the fair market value of the property exceeds the underlying liability. Section 6343 also provides for the return of seized property under certain circumstances.
The Plaintiff's response brief cites Treas. Reg. § 301.6321-1. This regulation, codified at 26 C. F, R. § 301.6321, governs the establishment of tax liens against property, and cannot be interpreted as conferring a private right of action, or as waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States. Accord, Stowell v. Ives, 976 F.2d 65, 70 n. 5 (1st Cir. 1992),
"26 C.F.R. § 301.6321-1 provides, in pertinent part:
"If any person liable to pay any lax neglects or refuses lo pay the same Lifter demand, the amount (including tiny interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of (the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, belonging to such person."
The Plaintiffs response brief refers to "42 U.S.C. Civil Rights, IG act 1978." Title 42 of the United States Code does not include a Section 1978. The Plaintiffs brief also refers to "Of 1203." The Court is unable to determine which, if any, statute this is intended to cite. The Plaintiff also cites Title 26 U.S.C. § 7314. The Court finds no statute corresponding to this citation. Without more information, the Court finds no statute corresponding to any of these citations which would provide a basis for federal jurisdiction in this case. The Court finds, accordingly, that these references in the Plaintiffs response brief fail to invoke a statutory basis for federal jurisdiction.
The Plaintiffs next citation is to "6330." The Court interprets this as referring to Title 26 U.S.C. § 6330, which establishes the notice requirements for imposing a tax levy. This statute cannot be interpreted as providing a private right of action, or as waiving the Government's sovereign immunity.
26 U.S.C. § 6330 establishes specific notice requirements for tax levies, us well as tin administrative hearing process
The Plaintiff next cites Title 26 U.S.C. § 7431. This Section provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, allowing a taxpayer to recover damages for wrongful disclosure of tax return information under some circumstances. See Fostvedt v. United States, 824 F. Supp. 978 (D. Colo. 1993) (To recover under Section 7431, taxpayer must show by preponderance of the evidence that disclosure was unauthorized, that disclosure was made knowingly or by reason of negligence, and that disclosure violated general rule of confidentiality of tax returns), aff'd, 16 F.3d 416, 1994 WL 7109 (10th Cir. 1994). The Plaintiff does not allege a wrongful or unauthorized disclosure of her tax returns or return information. Thus, the Plaintiffs citation to Title 26 U.S.C. § 7431 does not meet her burden of establishing a jurisdictional basis for her claims against the United States under that statute.
The Plaintiff cites Title 26 U.S C. § 7212 and 7213 in her response brief. Section 7212 makes it a crime to interfere with the administration of the internal revenue laws. Section 7213 makes it a crime for federal or state employees to make unauthorized disclosure of tax return information. Neither of these criminal statutes can be construed as providing a private right of action for damages. Accord. Valladares v. Internal Revenue Service, 2001 WL 670629 (E. D. Cal. 2001) (No private right of action for violations of Sections 7212(a) or 7213(a)(1).
Title 26 U, S-C, § 7212 provides:
(a) Corrupt or forcible interference. Whoever corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) endeavors to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity under this title, or in any other way corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, except that if the offense is committed only by threats of force, the person convicted thereof shall be fined not more than $ 3,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. The term "threats of force", as used in this subsection, means threats of bodily harm to the officer or employee of the United States or to a member of his family.
(b) Forcible rescue of seized property. Any person who forcibly rescues or causes to be rescued any property after it shall have been seized under this title, or shall attempt or endeavor so to do, shall, excepting in cases otherwise provided for, fur every such offense, be fined not more than $500, or not more than double the value of the property so rescued, whichever is the greater, or be imprisoned not more than 2 years."
Title 26 U.S. C $ 7213 makes it unlawful for any federal or state government employee or officer to willfully disclose any return or return information to any person except as specifically authorized. Section 72 13 provides for fines and imprisonment for violations, and for dismissal or discharge of any guilty federal employee upon conviction. Section 72!3 further prohibits the solicitation of tax returns or return information, and provides criminal fines and penalties
The Plaintiffs response brief cites Title 26 U.S.C. § 7216. This Section makes it a crime for persons engaged in the business of preparing tax returns to knowingly or recklessly make unauthorized disclosures of returns or return information, or to use tax return information for any purpose other than preparation of the return. Nothing in this statute suggests that it confers a private right of action against die United States.
U.S.C. § 7216 provides, in part:
"(a) General rule. Any person who is engaged in the business of preparing, or providing services in connection with the preparation of, returns of the tax imposed by chapter 1, or any person who for compensation prepares any such return for any other person, and who knowingly or recklessly —
(1) discloses any information furnished to him for, or in connection with, the preparation of any such return, or
(2) uses any such information for any purpose other than to prepare, or assist in preparing, any such return,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $1000. or imprisoned not more than I year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution."
Subsection (b) of Section 7216 provides exceptions to criminal prosecution for those disclosures made pursuant to statute or regulation, or pursuant to court order, and for the "use" of information to prepare state or local tax returns.
The Plaintiff next cites Title 26 U.S.C. § 7202. This Section makes it a crime for any person required to collect taxes to willfully fail to collect and truthfully account for such taxes. Nothing in this statute provides a private right of action against the United States, or waives its sovereign immunity.
U.S. C 7202 provides:
"Any person required under this title to collect, account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect or truthfully account for and pay over such tax shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $ 10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution."
Finally, the Plaintiff alleges that she is entitled to relief under the "Taxpayer Bill of Rights," citing Title 26 U. S C. §§ 7431, et seq. Section 7433 of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights provides the exclusive remedy for recovering damages resulting from reckless or intentional disregard of Internal Revenue Code provisions by 1IS employees in collecting taxes. Fishburn v. Brown, 125 F.3d 979 (6th Cir. 1997). The limited waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, like any other such waiver, must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign. Gonsalves v. Intermit Revenue Service, 975 F.2d 13 (1st Cir 1992); Fishburn v. Brown, 125 F.3d 979 (6th Cir. 1997).
Section 7433 of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights authorizes suits for damages only in the narrow circumstances where an IRS agent has violated tax statutes or regulations in connection with the collection of federal taxes. Fishburn v. Brown, 125 F.3d 979 (6th Cir. I997). In order to recover under Section 7433, a plaintiff must show that an IRS agent recklessly or intentionally disregarded a provision of the Internal Revenue Code, or a regulation promulgated pursuant to it, and that the plaintiff was damaged thereby. Section 7433's limited waiver of sovereign immunity allows taxpayers to recover for damages incurred because of wrongful collection activities, but not for wrongful actions in connection with the assessment of taxes, or the determination of the amount owed. Kachougian v. United Suites, 1998 WL 233750 (D. R, I. 1998); Williams v. United States, 165 K.3d 30, 1998 WL, 537579 (6th Cir. 1998); Gonsalves v. Internal Revenue Service, 975 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1992) (The legislative history of Section 7433 reveals that it authorizes a suit only if an IRS agent disregards a statute or regulation in connection with the collection of federal taxes; a suit under Section 7433 may not be based on alleged errors or "disregard" in connection with the determination of tax liability).
The Court notes that a taxpayer bringing suit under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights must first exhaust his or her administrative remedies. Fishburn v. Brawn, 125 F.3d 979 (6th Cir. 1997); Conforte v. United Slates, 979 F.2d 1375, 1377 (9th Cir. 1992); Venen v. United States, 38 F.3d 100, 103 (3rd Cir. 1994), Although it appears from the numerous documents appended to the Complaint that the Plaintiff has filed one or more administrative claims against the IRS, the parties have not addressed in the instant motion the issue of whether the Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies In light of the Courts analysis of the other issues, the Court need not reach the issue of administrative exhaustion at this time.
ln Kachougian, supra, the court noted that although the assessment of the tax was wrong, none of the collection actions violated the tax code or regulations. Further, the plaintiffs could not show that they were damaged during the collection of a federal tax. because the IRS never enforced the lien or actually collected any money through the lien. Thus, their Section 7433 claim was dismissed Kochnugian, supra.
The text of the Plaintiffs Complaint reads, in its entirety: "See Attached Violations of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights I II RRA 98." To her Complaint the Plaintiff has attached several hundred pages of documents, including a copy of an administrative claim for damages submitted to the Internal Revenue Service on September 21, 2001. The administrative claim alleges that the Plaintiff had informed the Internal Revenue Service that in 1994, her social security number was being used by someone other than herself, and that these persons had been allowed to receive tax refunds under her social security number. The Plaintiff alleged in her administrative claim that the IRS and the Taxpayer Inspector General for Tax Administration have been negligent in resolving this problem in a timely manner.
The administrative claim read, in pertinent part:
"I informed the IRS, in 1994, that My Social Security Number, was being used by someone other than myself. The IRS issued my SSn. — I was told the problem had been cleared up in 1996 — ii was not. These persons were allowed to receive tax refunds under my SSn. As of 1999 they were still using my SSn. The FBI when contacted in Aug. 2001 — found these persons listed in it's data bank. 1 Informed TIGTA, of the problem, and reported this misconduct. My civil rights have been and the IRS and TIGTA, have been negligent, in resolving this issue, in a timely manner. I charge misconduct, non-performance, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, and a cover-up — It is my right to meet with the, Problem Resolution Office — and to take — case higher."
(Spelling and punctuation in original)
At most, the Complaint and the voluminous documents submitted with it vaguely allege that IRS employees acted unreasonably with regard to releasing the levy against the Plaintiffs earnings, and in failing to afford her an adequate hearing for her grievances. Some of the documents appended to the Complaint include the names of individuals who appear to be IRS employees. However, the Complaint and its attachments do not clearly identify the statutes which such individuals are alleged to have "disregarded" in violation of Section 7433.
As explained in the preceding paragraphs, the Plaintiffs brief in response to the Defendant's motion to dismiss includes a long string of citations of statutes and regulations. Most of the statutes and regulations cited are unrelated to the collection of taxes and thus do not support a claim under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights. Although some of the statutes and regulations cited by the Plaintiff relate to the imposition and release of tax levies, the Plaintiff has not alleged, in a coherent manner, facts showing that I. R. S. agents intentionally or recklessly disregarded such statutes or regulations. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Complaint, viewed in its most favorable light, fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted pursuant to the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights.
The Plaintiff may also intend to raise a civil rights claim against the United States, and her Complaint likewise fails in that regard. Several circuits have concluded that by providing an exclusive remedy. Section 7433 effectively precludes a Bivens-type civil rights suit for due process violations. Gonsalves v. Internal Revenue Service, 975 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1992), Fishburn v. Brown, 125 F.3d 979 (6th Cir. 1997); Vennes v. An Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents, 26 F.3d 1448, 1454 (8th Cir. 1994) (Sections 7432 and 7433 provide carefully crafted legislative remedies, thereby confirming that, in the politically sensitive realm of taxation. Congress's refusal to permit unrestricted damage actions by taxpayers has not been inadvertent), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1076, I 15 S.Ct. 72 1, 1 30 L.Ed.2d 627 (1995); McMillen v. United States Department of Treasury, 960 F.2d 187, 190 (1st Cir. 1991); Wages v. Internal Revenue Service, 915 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1990) (Remedies provided by Congress foreclose a Bivens action for due process violations), cert. denied, 498 U, S. 1096, 111 S.Ct. 986, 112 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1991); Shreiher v. Mastrogiovanni, 214 F.3d 148 (3rd Cir. 2000) ( Bivens action is not available to taxpayer seeking damages against IRS agents accused of violating the taxpayer's constitutional rights in the course of making a tax assessment). See also National Commodity and Barter Association v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1248(10th Cir. 1989) (The unavailability of complete relief under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights docs not mandate the creation of a Bivens remedy when other meaningful safeguards or remedies are available). Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief under Bivens.
"See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau o Nareoties, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed 2d 619 (1971).
Having reviewed the Plaintiffs Complaint and the hundreds of pages of disorganized documents attached to it, the Court finds that the Complaint does not comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)'s requirement of a "short and plain statement of the claim." Notwithstanding the various inadequacies of the Complaint, the Court cannot determine based on the record before u that it would be futile to grant the Plaintiff leave to amend. Rule 15, Fed.R.Civ.Pro. The Court will, therefore, grant the Plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint to plead further facts m support of her claim under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Title 26 U.S.C. § 7433. In that regard, the Plaintiff is reminded of the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Conclusion.
Of all of the statutes cited by the Plaintiff the only one which potentially confers a private right of action, and offers a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, is the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Title 26 U.S.C. § 7433, The Complaint, including its attachments, fails to state a claim for relief under that statute. Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and the Complaint is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling. The Plaintiff is hereby GRANTED leave to amend her Complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. Any amended complaint filed by the Plaintiff must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ."