Summary
granting motion for judgment on the pleadings as to ADA claims for prospective injunctive relief against state agency as barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity but denying the motion as to same claims against state employees in their official capacities
Summary of this case from Lacy v. Ohio Dep't of Job & Family Servs.Opinion
Civil Action 2:07-CV-187.
November 6, 2007
OPINION AND ORDER
This is an action under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. ["ADA"], in which plaintiff, proceeding without counsel, alleges that defendants failed to accommodate his disability, resulting in the termination of plaintiff's employment by disability separation. With the consent of the parties, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), this matter is currently before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (" Motion"), Doc. No. 11.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff began working as a trooper for the Ohio State Highway Patrol ["OSHP"] in June 1997. Complaint, Doc. No. 4, at 1. Assigned to a road unit, plaintiff worked out of a patrol cruiser throughout his employment, which ended in November 2005. Id. Initially during his employment, plaintiff could adjust the cruiser seat so that he could accommodate his tall (6 10) frame; later, the patrol cruisers were outfitted with an overhead gun rack and protective cage for suspects. Id. These additions to the patrol cruisers restricted plaintiff's ability to adjust the seat for his tall frame, limiting plaintiff's ability to sit or move comfortably inside the cruiser. Id.
Plaintiff's allegations begin on page five of Doc. No. 4. Accordingly, the Court will refer to that as page one of the Complaint.
Subsequently, plaintiff developed neck and back pain and saw a chiropractor in October 2005. Id. The chiropractor diagnosed thoracic scoliosis and opined that the condition was caused by the confined conditions in the patrol cruiser. Id. Thereafter, plaintiff requested a "reasonable accommodation," which included a modified cruiser without the shotgun rack and protective cage. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff did not receive this accommodation. Id. at 2. Plaintiff also requested, as "a second reasonable accommodation," a lateral transfer that would not require him to spend all day in a patrol cruiser. Id. at 2. Plaintiff was not provided a lateral transfer, but was offered a position in the Transitional Return to Work Program with the expectation that he would return to full and unrestricted duty by the end of the program. Id. Plaintiff declined to participate in this program because he believed that returning to his job in the patrol cruiser would exacerbate his condition. Id. Thereafter, plaintiff obtained disability benefits through December 23, 2006. Id. at 2-3. At some point during this time, plaintiff learned that the overhead shotgun racks in patrol cruisers had been relocated to the trunk of the vehicles, but he denies that he was ever officially notified of this change. Id. at 3. Plaintiff contacted defendant Kevin Teaford, Captain, Columbus District, for help regarding his situation, but received no response. Id. Subsequently, plaintiff was "disability separated." Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff did not obtain another job and lived on money withdrawn from his deferred compensation and retirement accounts. Id. at 4. On March 13, 2007, plaintiff filed his Complaint against the Ohio State Highway Patrol and four individuals, seeking "to be made whole financially[,]" including back wages that he would have earned had defendants provided him a "reasonable accommodation," reimbursement for withdrawals from his deferred compensation and retirement accounts and health insurance for his entire family for the remainder of his life. Id. On June 4, 2007, defendants filed their Motion. The next day, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 12, seeking only to modify the relief sought in this action. More specifically, plaintiff requests "on-duty disability retirement[,]" which includes "a pension of no less than 61.25% and no more than 79.25 percent of [plaintiff's] final average salary and full health insurance" for plaintiff and his family for the remainder of his life. Amended Complaint. Defendants did not oppose the grant of leave to amend the Complaint to this extent and the Motion was deemed responsive to plaintiff's Amended Complaint as well. Preliminary Pretrial Order, Doc. No. 13, at 1. Thereafter, plaintiff filed his opposition to defendants' Motion. Response to Motion for Judgement Made By the Defense, Doc. No. 14 (" Response"). On June 26, 2007, defendants filed a reply memorandum in support of their Motion. Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Doc. No. 15 (" Reply").
Plaintiff had previously filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See Exhibit A, attached to the Motion.
Plaintiff named the following individuals as defendants: Paul D. McClellan, Superintendent; Kevin Teaford, Captain, Human Resources; Clarke M. Kiner, Captain, Columbus District; and Patrick B. Vessels, Lieutenant, Circleville Post (collectively, "Individual Defendants").
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants filed their Motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). When analyzing Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings, reviewing courts use the same standard applied to rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2001).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Roth Steel Prod. v. Sharon Steel Co., 705 F.2d 134, 155 (6th Cir. 1983); Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 921, 923 (S.D. Ohio 2007). In determining whether dismissal on this basis is appropriate, the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true. Bower v. Federal Express Corp., 96 F.3d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1996); Misch v. The Cmty. Mutual Ins. Co., 896 F. Supp. 734, 738 (S.D. Ohio 1994). Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States explained that "once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007). However, a plaintiff's ground for relief "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 1964-65. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]" Id. at 1965. Accordingly, a complaint must be dismissed if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1974.
In this case, plaintiff is proceeding without the assistance of counsel. A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than are formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A court should make a reasonable attempt to read the pleadings of a pro se litigant to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, despite any failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of various legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Ashiegbu v. Purviance, 74 F. Supp. 2d 740, 749 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (citing Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)). "This standard does not mean, however, that pro se plaintiffs are entitled to take every case to trial." Id. (citing Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996)). "Indeed, courts should not assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant." Id. (citing Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants contend that plaintiff's ADA claims, as asserted against the OSHP, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, Motion, at 3-4 (citing Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)), and that the Individual Defendants are not "employers" under the ADA. Id. at 4. In response, plaintiff implicitly concedes that his claims are based on the ADA, see Response, at 2 (citing the ADA and Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, discussing the ADA), but contends that the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable because he seeks an on-duty disability retirement rather than monetary relief. Id, at 2. Plaintiff also argues that defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to offer him a modified patrol cruiser or a lateral transfer. Id. In reply, defendants argue, inter alia, that OSHP has no authority to provide disability retirement and health insurance, which is a function of the Public Employees' Retirement System ("PERS"). Reply, at 2. Defendants further argue that plaintiff is estopped from arguing that defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because he asserted no such claim in either his original or amended complaints. Id. at 3.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." The immunity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment has been extended even to suits filed against a state by one of its own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The Supreme Court of the United States has specifically held that the Eleventh Amendment "prohibits state employees from suing their employers for money damages under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act." Nihiser v. Ohio EPA, 269 F.3d 626, 627 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Garrett, 531 U.S. 356). However, private individuals may seek prospective injunctive relief as against state officials under Title I of the ADA. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n. 9.
"ADA Title I prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of disability." Robinson v. Univ. of Akron School of Law, 307 F.3d 409, 411 n. 2 (6th Cir. 2002)
A. Plaintiff's ADA Claims
1. Claims against OSHP
The parties disagree whether the relief sought in this case under Title I of the ADA is monetary in nature. Regardless, however, OSHP "is immune under the Eleventh Amendment from claims brought under Title I of the ADA." Gentry v. Summit Behavioral Healthcare, No. 05-3751, 197 Fed. Appx. 434, at *437 (6th Cir. Sept. 5, 2006) (citing Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374). See also Robinson v. Univ. of Akron Sch. of Law, 307 F.3d 409, 411 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Garrett, 531 U.S. 356); Leonard v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs, No. 00-4408, 43 Fed. Appx. 771, at *775 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Cox v. Kentucky DOT, 53 F.3d 146, 152 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1995)); Longstreet v. State of Ohio, No. 1:05cv1749, 2005 WL 3298883, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 5, 2005) ("Plaintiff's Title I claims against the [State of Ohio Industrial Commission] are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.") (citing Garrett, 531 U.S. 356). Accordingly, any claim asserted against OSHP must be DISMISSED. See, e.g., Dillon-Barber v. Regents of the Univ. of Michigan, No. 99-2193, 51 Fed. Appx. 946, at * 949 (6th Cir. Nov. 22, 2002) (citing Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1999)).
2. Claims against Individual Defendants in their personal capacities
Although plaintiff does not explicitly so state, it appears that plaintiff has sued the Individual Defendants only in their official capacities. Complaint (listing individuals' official titles in case caption and discussing their roles in an official capacity); Response, at 1-2 (referencing individual defendants' titles and their behavior in their official roles during plaintiff's employment). However, the Court will nevertheless analyze plaintiff's claims against the Individuals Defendants in both their personal and official capacities. Cf. Leonard, 43 Fed. Appx. 771, at *776-75 (remanding case where district court declined to construe claim as against defendant in his individual capacity). Cf. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21 (a pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally).
The Individual Defendants cannot be held personally liable under the ADA. See, e.g., Williams v. McLemore, No. 05-2678, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 14745, at *19 (6th Cir. June 19, 2007) ("[T]he ADA does not provide for personal liability for defendants sued in their individual capacities."); Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 808 n. 1 (6th Cir. 1999); Wathen v. Gen'l Electric Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, plaintiff's claims against the Individual Defendants in their personal capacities, to the extent that plaintiff asserts such claims, must be DISMISSED.
In analyzing the ADA, it is appropriate to rely on Title VII cases. See, e.g., Wathen, 115 F.3d at 404 n. 6 ("Because Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA define 'employer' essentially the same way, an analysis based on Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA case law is appropriate.").
3. Claims against Individual Defendants in their official capacities
As noted supra, the parties disagree as to the proper characterization of the relief sought by plaintiff. Defendants argue that plaintiff seeks a remedy in the nature of monetary damages; plaintiff argues that the relief sought by him is essentially injunctive in character. Accordingly, the Court will address each in turn.
a. Claims for monetary damages
The Eleventh Amendment protects the Individual Defendants sued in their official capacities from liability for monetary damages. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (The bar to suit provided by the Eleventh Amendment "remains in effect when State officials are sued for damages in their official capacity."). Eddy v. Hayes, No. 2:04-CV-465, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44398, at *6-7 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 2005) ("To the extent Plaintiff sues Defendant . . . in an official capacity, Plaintiff's claim is essentially one against the State. . . . Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold defendant . . . liable in an official capacity for money damages under the ADA, she is immune from suit."). Cf. Longstreet v. State of Ohio, Indus. Comm'n., No. 1:05CV1749, 2005 WL 3298883, at *2 (N.D.Ohio Dec. 5, 2005) (a plaintiff may sue state officials for non-monetary relief). Accordingly, plaintiff's claims against the Individual Defendants for monetary damages in their official capacities, to the extent that he asserts such claims, must be DISMISSED.
b. Claims for equitable relief
As previously noted, only prospective injunctive relief is available under Title I of the ADA against the Individual Defendants. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n. 9 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)); Longstreet, 2005 WL 3298883, at *2. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has clarified the distinction between monetary and injunctive relief: "[U]nder the Ex parte Young doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction over suits against state officials when the relief sought is retrospective or compensatory in nature." MacDonald v. Village of Northport, MI, 164 F.3d 964, 971 (6th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff contends that his claim for "on-duty disability retirement" and health insurance for himself and his family may proceed because those forms of relief do not constitute money damages. Response, at 2; Amended Complaint. Citing no case authority, defendants summarily conclude that "[d]isability retirement benefits, including pension and health insurance, are neither prospective nor injunctive" and therefore are unavailable to plaintiff. Reply, at 2.
Reinstatement to employment constitutes prospective injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacities that is authorized by Ex parte Young, Carten v. Kent State University, 282 F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2002). See Turker v. Ohio Dep't. of Rehab. and Corrs., 157 F.3d 453, 459 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover, retirement and disability benefits and health insurance are often collateral benefits of employment. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, (1990) (noting that most employment provides regular paychecks, health insurance and other benefits); Martin v. Ethyl Corp., 341 F.2d 1, 3 (2nd Cir. 1965) (observing that retirement benefits are incidental to employment). At least one court has held that the Eleventh Amendment does not foreclose a claim seeking reinstatement to medical leave status in order to obtain disability benefits, reasoning that such relief is both prospective and injunctive in nature. Russell v. Dunston, 896 F.2d 664, 668 (2nd Cir. 1990).
This Court concludes that plaintiff's demand for on-duty disability retirement and health insurance, which are collateral benefits of employment, is in the nature of prospective equitable relief. Accordingly, defendants' Motion, as it relates to the non-monetary claims against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities, is DENIED. B. Plaintiff's Claim for Violation of Constitutional Rights Under Fourteenth Amendment.
The defendants also argue that it is PERS, not OSHP, that controls the grant of disability retirement benefits. Reply, at 2. To the extent that the relief sought by plaintiff would require his reinstatement to employment in order to apply for such benefits, officials of the OSHP would appear to be appropriate defendants. The Court expresses no opinion as to whether or not officials of the PERS ought to be joined as well.
Plaintiff appears to allege, for the first time in his Response, a violation of his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Response, at 2. Defendants argue that plaintiff is estopped from asserting this claim. Reply, at 3. Defendants' argument is well-taken. Neither the Complaint nor the Amended Complaint assert a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; plaintiff has therefore failed to provide fair notice to defendants of such a claim as is required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c).
C. Plaintiff's argument regarding mitigation of damages
In light of the Court's discussion, supra, the Court need not address plaintiff's additional argument regarding mitigation of damages as a purported basis for opposing the Motion. Response, at 2-3.
WHEREUPON, Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Doc. No. 11, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. All claims against OSHP are DISMISSED; all claims against the Individual Defendants in their personal capacities are DISMISSED; and all claims for monetary damages against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities are DISMISSED. Plaintiff's claims for prospective injunctive relief against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities may proceed.