Opinion
C. A. 3:20-3063-CMC-SVH
02-24-2021
Alwayne Dontrell Quillin, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Daniel Simon, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Lee County, also known as Lee County Sheriff's Office, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHIVA V. HODGES, SOUTH CAROLINA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Alwayne Dontrell Quillin, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), originally filed this matter in the Court of Common Pleas for Lee County, South Carolina (“state court”). Daniel Simon, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Lee County (“Defendant”), removed this case from state court on August 26, 2020. [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff's case concerns the alleged treatment he received when arrested on July 3, 2017, as well as an alleged police cover-up that followed thereafter. Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to disclose evidence and deliberate indifference (fourth and fifth causes of action) and for negligence pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”), SC Code Ann. § 15-78-10 et seq. (first and second causes of action). [See ECF No. 1-1 at 30-57 (operative complaint), ECF No. 7 (stipulation of dismissal as to the third cause of action and previously-named defendants), see also ECF No. 14 at 2 n.2].
This matter comes before the court on Defendant's motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 34]. Defendant's motion having been fully briefed [see ECF Nos. 35, 36], this matter is ripe for disposition.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(f) (D.S.C.), this matter has been assigned to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff's federal claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and remand this matter to the Court of Common Pleas for Lee County, South Carolina. I. Factual and Procedural Background As relevant to the resolution of Defendant's motion, Plaintiff alleges that on July 3, 2017, three police officers negligently arrested him, negligently harming him during the arrest. [See ECF No. 1-1 at 32-56]. Plaintiff further alleges that thereafter, one of the officers negligently destroyed and withheld exculpatory evidence during Plaintiff's prosecution. See id.
Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant Daniel Simon in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of Lee County, a/k/a Lee County Sheriff's Office (“Simon” or “LCSO”), is the publicly elected Sheriff of Lee County and is named as a Defendant under, inter alia, SC Code Ann. § 15-78-70.” Id. at 32. Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully convicted “due to the exclusion of material evidence . . . with the acquiescence and complicit consent of his supervisors, including . . . Sheriff Daniel Simon” and that Defendant “participated in this trial, despite [his] knowledge or willful ignorance” of two exculpatory videos. Id. at 40, 42.
Plaintiff additionally alleges that Defendant “has Stipulated in this Court that the actions of the Off-Duty officer related to the Plaintiff were [taken in] ‘the scope of their official duties as employees of the Defendant/Lee County Sheriff's Office[] at all time relevant to their interactions with Plaintiff.” [ECF No. 1-1 at 31-32].
Plaintiff originally filed this matter in state court, asserting a claim for negligence pursuant to the SCTCA. [ECF No. 1-1 at 2-6]. On March 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed an amended summons and complaint, asserting the same claim as he had previously. Id. at 7-12.
On August 10, 2020, Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his complaint for a second time, and he filed his second amended complaint on August 20, 2020, asserting negligence claims and claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [ECF No. 1-1 at 30-57, ECF No. 6 at 3-4, ECF No. 7 at 1, ECF No. 10-1, ].
Defendant removed this case from state court on August 26, 2020. [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff filed a motion to remand on September 4, 2020, that was denied by the district court, with the district court adopting the report and recommendation the undersigned issued. [ECF Nos. 14, 20]. Plaintiff has filed a motion to alter or amend the district court's denial of his motion to remand that remains pending before the district court. [See ECF No. 28]. Additionally, Defendant has filed a motion for protective order/to quash notice of deposition/to stay discovery that is not yet ripe. [See ECF No. 37].
On September 6, 2020, Plaintiff also filed stipulation of dismissal, dismissing his third cause of action from his second amended complaint in its entirety, dismissing his fourth cause of action as to previously-named defendants except as to Defendant, and seeking to proceed with “the only Defendant in this case” being “Defendant Daniel Simon in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of Lee County, a/k/a Lee County Sheriff's Office (“LCSO”) . . . .” [See ECF No. 7].
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the plaintiff's complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is “not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint.” Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244. Indeed, “[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support the legal conclusion.” Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001).
B. Analysis
1. Federal Claims
The Eleventh Amendment provides “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has long held the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends not only to suits against a state per se, but also to suits against agents and instrumentalities of the state. Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001).
Because Defendant is the sheriff and is being sued in his official capacity only, he is considered an arm of the state and not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F.Supp. 947, 954-55 (D.S.C. 1988) (addressing whether sheriffs in South Carolina are state or county officials); Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Greenville County Sheriff, in his official capacity, was immune from suit for monetary damages under § 1983); Cone v. Nettles, 417 S.E.2d 523, 524-25 (S.C. 1992) (concluding that South Carolina sheriffs and their deputies are state officials for purposes of § 1983); see also Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that a Georgia county sheriff was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity).
To the extent Plaintiff is bringing § 1983 claims against the sheriff's office via Defendant as the office's representative, the sheriff's office is likewise considered an arm of the state and not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See, e.g., McCall v. Williams, 52 F.Supp.2d 611, 623, (D.S.C. 1999) (“[T]he Sheriff's Department, like the Sheriff, is an arm of the state and entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”).Smith v. Carter, C/A No. 9:19-967-HMH-BM, 2019 WL 6532957, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 5, 2019) (“Further, even if an otherwise proper claim had been alleged against these Defendants, Defendant Charleston County Sheriff's Office and Defendant Sheriff Al Cannon (in his official capacity) are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from a suit for monetary damages because Sheriff's Departments in South Carolina are state agencies, not municipal departments, and Sheriffs and their deputies are state employees.”), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 9:19-967-HMH-BM, 2019 WL 6524676 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 2019)
In his original and amended complaint, Plaintiff identified Defendant, as the sheriff of LCSO, and LCSO as two separate parties being sued. [See ECF No. 1-1 at 2-3, 8-9]. However, in Plaintiff's second amended complaint-the operative complaint before this court-Plaintiff's claims are brought against “Defendant Daniel Simon in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of Lee County, a/k/a Lee County Sheriff's Office (‘Simon' or ‘LCSO').” [ECF No. 1-1 at 31-32, see also ECF No. 7]. LCSO is not identified as a separate party. See id.
Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that Defendant in his official capacity, or the sheriff's office generally, can be sued as an “entity” “under Monell and Fourth Circuit precedent interpreting same.” [See ECF No. 35 at 3]. However, while counties can be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under what is commonly referred to as a Monell claim, sheriffs, in their official capacities, and sheriff's offices, cannot, as stated above. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (noting that for purposes of § 1983, a person includes individuals and bodies politic and corporate). Cases cited by Plaintiff do not support his argument. See Shelley v. Cty. of Kershaw, C/A No. 3:11-3477-CMC, 2013 WL 3816708, at *3 (D.S.C. July 22, 2013) (“As to Plaintiff's constitutional claims, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Kershaw County, McCaskill was an ‘arm of the state.' Therefore, to the extent sued in his ‘official capacity,' Defendant McCaskill is immune from suit because he is treated as an “arm[ ] of the State.”); see also id., at *4 (“a federal court acks jurisdiction to hear a cause of action against a South Carolina Sheriff's Department, as such a suit is barred by [the] state['s Eleventh Amendment] immunity”).
Plaintiff additionally appears to argue that his claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should survive Defendant's motion to dismiss based on alleged representations made by defense counsel that Defendant, in his official capacity, was the proper defendant for these claims. [See ECF No. 35]. Defendant disputes Plaintiff's allegations. [See ECF No. 36 at 2 (“At no point has counsel for Defendant ever informed any person that Sheriff Simon in his Official Capacity would be a proper party to any claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”)]. Notwithstanding, this is an insufficient basis upon which to defeat Defendant's motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's federal claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2. State-Law Claims
Although the court retains supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims that form part of the same case or controversy as the federal claims, “[a]s a practical matter . . . many district judges will exercise their discretion under the supplemental jurisdiction statute and dismiss the remaining claims.” 16 Moore's Federal Practice § 107.14(3)(b)(ii) (3rd ed. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction “if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” See also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.”); United States ex rel. Scott v. Metropolitan Health Corp., 375 F.Supp.2d 626, 647 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (“[T]he strong federal custom . . . has been to dismiss those claims in order to permit state courts to decide their own law, as is their prerogative.”); see also AJP Group, Inc. v. Holmes, C/A No. 4:13-611-RBH, 2013 WL 3148416, at *2 (D.S.C. June 18, 2013) (“Given that Plaintiff's Complaint states no federal cause of action, the Court finds that the case should be remanded.”); Morris v. Joe Gibson Automotive, Inc., C/A No. 7:08-1739-HMH, 2008 WL 2705000 (D.S.C. July 9, 2008) (granting the plaintiff's motion to amend to remove the sole federal claim, and granting the plaintiff's motion to remand).
The undersigned recommends the district judge decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and remand this case.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs federal claims [ECF No. 34] and remand this matter to Court of Common Pleas for Lee County, South Carolina.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.