Opinion
No. C 01-02303 CRB
July 17, 2002
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to possession of methamphetamine for sale (Cal. Health and Saf. Code, § 11378) in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Sonoma. On or about March 22, 1999, he was sentenced to eight years and eight months in state prison. Petitioner appealed, but the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction and the Supreme Court of California denied review. Petitioner then filed the instant federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Per order filed on August 23, 2001, the court found that the petition, liberally construed, stated a cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel under § 2254 and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer to the order to show cause. Petitioner did not file a traverse.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the case as follows:
Appellant's conviction is based on conduct on two separate occasions. Appellant s challenge on appeal relates only to the second count of possessing methamphetamine for sale while out on bail, occurring on April 17, 1998. On that date, a California Highway Patrol officer made an "enforcement stop" after making "some observations" of a car appellant was driving. The record does not disclose the nature of the officer's "observations" justifying the traffic stop but appellant does not challenge the legitimacy of the stop for an apparent traffic violation.
Appellant did not have any documentary identification. The officer asked appellant his name, and appellant gave his name as Hector Manuel Valencia (omitting Quezada). The officer asked who owned the car and the front seat passenger said that he was the owner. The passenger produced a new registration. The officer "ran the plate" on the car but the registration was not on file, perhaps because it was too new. The officer lifted the armrest on the driver's seat and found two baggies and a wrapped ball of suspected methamphetamine. The officer arrested appellant and the passenger.
People v. Quezada. No. A086467, slip op. at 1-2 (Cal.Ct.App. May 30, 2000) (Respondent Exh. D).
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a).
The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id. § 2254(d).
"Under the `contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). "Under the `reasonable application clause,' a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413.
"[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409.
In our circuit, a state court decision may be disturbed as involving an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law only if the federal habeas court reviewing the state court decision is left with a "definite and firm conviction" that an error was committed — in other words, "that clearly error occurred." Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2000).
B. Analysis
Petitioner's sole cognizable claim for federal habeas relief is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not file a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the traffic stop. Petitioner specifically argues that under Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998), the arresting officer violated the Fourth Amendment by searching the vehicle after he merely failed to produce a driver's license and a registration on file.
In order to prevail on an ineffectiveness assistance of counsel claim, petitioner must establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, i.e., that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.
In order to establish prejudice from failure to file a motion, petitioner must show that (1) had his counsel filed the motion, it is reasonable that the trial court would have granted it as meritorious, and (2) had the motion been granted, it is reasonable that there would have been an outcome more favorable to him. Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999).
The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner's ineffective assistance claim on the ground that "any motion to suppress was destined for denial." People v. Quezada, No. A086467, slip op. at 2. The court correctly noted that under the Strickland standard a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to challenge unlawfully seized evidence must establish prejudice by demonstrating that a motion to suppress the evidence would have been granted. Id. The court then explained in detail why a motion to suppress would have failed:
Appellant claims that the officer improperly searched the car by lifting the driver s seat armrest. However, the Vehicle Code permits a California Highway Patrol officer to inspect a car and its title in order to determine ownership. (Veh. Code, § 2805, subd. (a).) The Vehicle Code also requires a driver to produce his or her driver's license and registration upon an officer's demand. (Veh. Code, §§ 4462, subd. (a), 12951, subd. (b).) "Within constitutional limits, such statutes authorize an officer to enter a stopped vehicle and conduct an immediate warrantless search for the required documents." (People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 430, cert. den. (1992) 503 U.S. 1009.)
Appellant relies upon a recent United States Supreme Court case to argue that searches for a driver's license and registration are outside constitutional limits. (Knowles v. Iowa (1998) 525 U.S. 113.) Knowles disallows a full search of an automobile and driver when police officers issue a traffic citation instead of making a custodial arrest. (Id. at pp. 114-119.) In contrast to a full search during a traffic stop, California law permits a limited search for documents material — a driver's license and registration. (See People v. Hart (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 479, 491-493 [contrasting identification search and Knowles].)
Here, appellant did not produce his driver's license or other identification, and the registration offered by the passenger could not be verified. The officer looked in the driver's seat armrest, which is a likely place for storage of a license and registration. The officer's intrusion did not exceed the scope justified by the need to locate a license and registration. (Cf. In re Arturo D. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 160, 167, review granted Mar. 15, 2000, S085213 [search under driver's seat exceeded scope of search for registration].)
Moreover, the search is justified as one incident to arrest. Appellant's failure to present his driver's license upon being stopped for a traffic violation subjected him to custodial arrest. (Veh. Code, § 40302, subd. (a).) "[T]he lawful custodial arrest of a vehicle's occupant permits officers to contemporaneously search the passenger compartment and any containers therein." (People v. Mitchell (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 672, 674.) The officer was free to search incident to arrest before making the custodial arrest. (People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 538.)
Id. at 2-3.
The California Court of Appeal did not "clearly err" in rejecting petitioner's ineffectiveness claim. See Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1153-54. Knowles does not prohibit limited searches for identification prior to a custodial arrest or citation. Narrowly read, its restrictions apply only to full searches. See Knowles, 525 U.S. at 117-18. The California Court of Appeal reasonably distinguished Knowles and reasonably applied California law establishing a distinction between full searches and limited searches for identification. See People v. Hart, 74 Cal.App.4th 479, 493 (1999).
The California Supreme Court recently affirmed this distinction in In re Arturo D., 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 581, 593 (2002), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Apr. 22, 2002) (No. 01-9812):
Absent contrary direction from the high court, at this juncture we agree with the Attorney General that the court in Knowles addressed itself only to the question of allowing a full-scale warrantless search for contraband following the issuance of a traffic citation, and that the court did not address (nor do we read its opinion to cast doubt upon) the longstanding authority, established under California law as well as federal and sister state decisions, permitting a police officer to conduct under certain circumstances a limited warrantless search of a vehicle for required regulatory documentation, prior to issuing a traffic citation.
This conclusion is supported by the Ninth Circuit's post-Knowles decision in United States v. $109,179 in United States Currency, 228 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2000). In $109,179 in United States Currency, the court determined "whether the insertion of a car key into the lock of a car door for the sole purpose of aiding the police in identification of an individual is, by itself, an unreasonable search proscribed by the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1087. In balancing the defendant's Fourth Amendment privacy interest against the government interests of law enforcement, the court held that the insertion of the key for identification purposes was not unconstitutional. Id. at 1088. While there is a higher Fourth Amendment interest for an armrest inside a car as opposed to a lock on a car door, the Court of Appeal could similarly balance in favor of — without clear error — the governmental "need to locate a license and registration."
In sum, it cannot be said with a firm and definite conviction that the California Court of Appeal's rejection of petitioner's claim was "clearly erroneous." See Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1153-54, 1159. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.
SO ORDERED.