Opinion
Argued September 10, 1976
October 20, 1976.
Unemployment compensation — Voluntary termination — Burden of proof — Cause of necessitous and compelling nature — Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P.L. (1987) 2897 — Sufficient evidence — Conflicting testimony.
1. An employe voluntarily terminating his employment is ineligible for benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P.L. (1937) 2897 unless he proves that such termination was for cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. [613]
2. A decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review supported by competent evidence will not be disturbed on appeal because conflicting evidence was also presented. [613]
Argued September 10, 1976, before Judges CRUMLISH, JR., WILKINSON, JR., ROGERS, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 1540 C.D. 1975, from the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in case of In Re: Claim of Herman Quartz, No. B-127904.
Application to Bureau of Employment Security for unemployment compensation benefits. Application denied. Applicant appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. Denial affirmed. Applicant appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Affirmed.
No appearance for appellant.
Charles G. Hasson, Assistant Attorney General, with him Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert P. Kane, Attorney General, for appellee.
Herman Quartz (Appellant) appeals to this Court an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) which affirmed a referee's decision denying benefits to Appellant pursuant to Section 402(b)(1) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law). We affirm.
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937), as amended, 43 P. S. § 802(b)(1).
Appellant was last employed by Don Hughes Ford Sales as a mechanic. Following a conversation between Appellant and Don Hughes, who had retired from the management of the company, Appellant stopped work, and now contends that at the conclusion of the dialogue, Hughes fired him.
Since the Board found that Appellant left work voluntarily, he can be eligible for benefits under Section 402(b)(1) of the Law only if he left for a necessitous and compelling reason. Here, Appellant's decision to terminate employment was motivated solely by his own impression that he had been discharged. Notwithstanding the presentation of conflicting evidence, one cannot necessarily conclude that there is no competent or credible evidence to support the findings. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Moran, 21 Pa. Commw. 387, 346 A.2d 591 (1975). In Borman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 12 Pa. Commw. 241, 244, 316 A.2d 679, 680 (1974), we said, "A claimant for unemployment compensation benefits who becomes unemployed by voluntary termination of his work bears the burden of proving that such termination was with cause of a necessitous and compelling nature [Citation omitted.]." The Board determined that Appellant failed to meet his burden of proving that his voluntary termination was with cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. Our review of the record compels us to agree. Therefore, we must
Furthermore, in a dialogue between the referee and employer's representative, the employer indicated the Appellant could come back to work. When the referee told Appellant, "You should ask for your job back . . . ," Appellant answered, "No way."
ORDER
AND NOW, this 20th day of October, 1976, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is hereby affirmed.