Opinion
12-P-292
12-18-2012
WILL QUARTERMAN v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD & another.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Will Quarterman, appeals from a judgment dismissing his racial discrimination and retaliation claims stemming from the denial of his application for a liquor license by the city of Springfield's board of license commissioners (board). Quarterman contends that the judge erred when she allowed the defendants' motion in limine, excluding most of his evidence on the theory that the underlying issue was precluded by a decision in a prior Federal case between the same parties. He also argues that the judge abused her discretion when she then dismissed his case sua sponte after he asked for clarification of the ruling. We agree that the motion in limine was allowed in error and vacate the judgment of dismissal.
Background. Quarterman filed two law suits against the city of Springfield and the board; each involved an allegation of racial discrimination in the denial of a liquor license application. Federal court action. In August, 2004, Quarterman applied to transfer an existing liquor license from his establishment on State Street in Springfield to a new venue on Main Street, also in Springfield. The board denied the application on March 9, 2005. In 2007, Quarterman filed an action in Federal court against the city, alleging racial discrimination in the board's decision to deny the application. That case was tried in a bench trial in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts; it ended with a judgment for the defendants in June, 2010.
State court action. In January, 2006, Quarterman applied for a new license for the Main Street property; a hearing was held in April, 2006. The board denied the new application as well, with written findings issued in January, 2007. In August, 2008, Quarterman filed a complaint against the defendants in the Superior Court, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in the second denial. The defendants removed the matter to Federal court; however, the United States District Court judge remanded the matter to the Superior Court.
During the Federal court trial, the plaintiff's counsel extensively questioned former Mayor Charles Ryan regarding his testimony at the April, 2006, board hearing; the subject of the State court litigation. Ryan's testimony at the board's hearing expressed his opposition to the plaintiff's second license application. Ryan stated that he opposed the application because he wanted to see more restaurants in the 'entertainment district,' rather than nightclubs. His opposition to another nightclub in the area was due to the violence that was occurring in the entertainment district at closing time. Ryan also testified about a 2004 shooting incident at the plaintiff's previous establishment on State Street (Logan's Lounge). The plaintiff held an after-hours party, forbidden by the existing liquor license, at which a man was shot two times in the chest. The defendant, Peter Sygnator, also testified at the trial about his participation at the April, 2006, board hearing.
In addition, at the time of the hearing, Ryan told the commission: 'I want to read to you this letter . . . . One of the people I've always had great admiration for is Judge Constance Sweeney of the Superior Court. I think she's been an outstanding woman with a long career in public service. She was a [c]ity [s]olicitor for this community some [twenty] years ago and . . . she is a very active member of the Superior Court, the top trial court in Massachusetts. . . . Here is what she is quoted as saying in February of 2005 in the 'Springfield Republican.' The judge said it had bothered her for more than a year that the Superior Court has seen so many cases of shootings and stabbings and other crimes in the entertainment district. . . . She went on to say that Logan's -- that Logan's has become a noticeable and distinct crime scene. She suggested that local law enforcement needs a new approach to police (inaudible). However, she said she is not sure how much police resources can (inaudible) to deal with the, quote 'wildness,' that occurs there.'
At the end of the trial in the United States District Court, the judge issued oral findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record, believing that both cases were before him. Quarterman's counsel reminded the judge that the merits of the 2006 license denial were not before him, that case having been remanded to State court. Evidence regarding the second board hearing had been admitted merely to 'throw light on what was really going on' in March, 2005, that is, whether there was racial animus prompting the first license transfer denial by the board. In response to counsel's statements, the judge indicated he was 'delighted' not to have to make a decision with regard to the April, 2006, denial; taking that later denial out of the calculus made his decision regarding the 2005 denial 'all the easier.' On June 16, 2010, he issued a written judgment, stating that no element of racial discrimination by the city played a part in the 2005 denial of the plaintiff's liquor license transfer request, nor did such denial constitute an act of retaliation.
While the Superior Court case was pending, the defendants filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude all evidence offered by the plaintiff in the United States District Court action 'used to substantiate his claims of racial discrimination and retaliation in connection with the [board's] March 10, 2005 denial of his transfer of liquor license request.' After a hearing, the trial judge allowed the defendants' motion, ruling that '[t]he factual findings and evidentiary rulings made by the United States District Court judge on June 15, 2010, in [the Federal litigation] preclude the plaintiff from offering the same evidence in this case for the purposes of establishing alleged racial discrimination and retaliation in the case currently before this court.'
After she announced her findings orally, the Superior Court judge also indicated that she would 'be here Monday to try this case.' Although plaintiff's counsel sought further guidance from the court with regard to how he should proceed at trial in light of the fact that the evidence from the trial in the United States District Court had been excluded, the judge refused to elaborate beyond instructing Quarterman's counsel not to 'deviate from the parameters' of the ruling. On October 24, 2011, the parties appeared for trial. The plaintiff filed an 'emergency motion to continue trial to allow the plaintiff to pursue an interlocutory appeal' that was denied. Also included in the plaintiff's emergency motion was a request for a conference with the judge prior to trial to seek guidance on the judge's ruling on issue preclusion; the judge responded, 'my ruling stands, and I simply am not going to say anything more on the issue [that] I ruled on last week.' In response to this ruling, plaintiff's counsel stated that, '[i]f the [c]ourt has ruled that the issue is precluded, then there's no trial to be had, the issue has been decided.'
For example, counsel inquired whether it was the issue itself or the supporting evidence that was excluded. The judge responded 'I have made my rulings. I will not engage with you back and forth. No, I won't do it.'
The judge did, however inquire, with reference to a pending motion for her to recuse herself, whether there was 'any evidence coming in with respect to any statement that references my name, that is going to be proffered and likely to be admitted?'
After continued attempts by plaintiff's counsel for guidance from the judge on how to proceed with his case, the judge sua sponte ordered the case dismissed 'based on the [c]ourt's rulings, and the statements made by both counsel as to the current status of the case and the viability of trial at this time and the epilogue to each one of those rulings.' Judgment entered for the defendants. RA 221, 223. The plaintiff appealed.
Discussion. It is well established that 'when considering the preclusive effect of a Federal court judgment, [the court shall] look to Federal law to determine whether to apply collateral estoppel.' Whitehall Co., Ltd. v. Barletta, 404 Mass. 497, 501 (1989). The principle of issue preclusion 'bars relitigation of any factual or legal issue that was actually decided in previous litigation between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.' Keystone Shipping Co. v. New England Power Co., 109 F.3d 46, 51 (1997) (citation omitted). See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982). Accordingly, a party seeking to preclude evidence must establish four essential elements: '(1) the issue sought to be precluded must be the same as that involved in the prior action; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated; (3) the issue must have been determined by a valid and binding final judgment; and (4) the determination of the issue must have been essential to the judgment.' Ibid. See Supeno v. Equity Office Properties Mgmt., LLC, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 470, 473-474 (2007).
Here, the defendants have failed to meet their burden because the issue they seek to preclude is not the same as that decided in the prior action. Although the parties involved in both the Federal Court and Superior Court actions are the same, the issue in the Federal Court litigation was whether the city displayed racial animus against Quarterman in denying his 2005 liquor license transfer request; the issue raised in the Superior Court litigation is whether the city had racial animus and retaliated against Quarterman a year later, in 2006, when the city denied his application for a new liquor license. That second issue, regarding the 2006 decision, was not litigated during the Federal trial; evidence of what had transpired at the city's 2006 license hearing was offered only to 'show that [the city] had animus' in 2005.' That the Federal judge made no 'necessary intermediate findings' was illustrated by the judge's statement that he was 'delighted to hear' that he did not have to decide the merits of the city's April, 2006, decision 'because the decision with regard to April, 2006, is a bit harder than the decision with regard to March, 2005.' Cf. Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 111 F.3d 205, 210 (1997).
Finally, 'the term 'judgment' refers to a final determination on the merits of the proceeding. For a ruling to have preclusive effect, it must have a bearing on the outcome of the case. 'If issues are determined but the judgment is not dependent upon the determinations, relitigation of those issues in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded." Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 533 (2002), quoting from Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 comment h (1982). The question whether there was racial animus and retaliation in the city's 2006 decision was not essential to a determination on the merits of the Federal Court litigation about what happened a year earlier. Ibid. Further, since the parties were not fully heard during the Federal action on the claims raised in the Superior Court action, 'the requisite level of finality' was not reached. Id. at 534. The judgment entered in the U.S. District Court related only to the '[d]efendants' action in denying the transfer application.'
Accordingly, it was error for the Superior Court judge to allow the defendants' motion in limine, thereby excluding all of the plaintiff's evidence admitted in the Federal Court action. The judgment entered in favor of the defendants is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. Judgment vacated.
The plaintiff also argues that the judge abused her discretion when she denied his emergency motion to continue the trial. Because we decide that the motion in limine was allowed in error, we do not reach this argument. For the same reason, we vacate the dismissal, without commenting on the procedure by which the judge arrived at that action. However, given all of the history of this case, we think that a fresh look is appropriate, and, accordingly, direct that on remand from this decision the matter be considered by a different judge.
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By the Court (Graham, Vuono & Hanlon, JJ.),