Opinion
4:22-CV-02186-RBH-KDW
12-01-2023
Michael Qualls, Plaintiff, v. Town of McBee, Barbara Lisenby, and Terri King, Defendant,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kaymani D. West United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Michael Qualls filed this action on July 8, 2022, alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. This lawsuit arises out of a traffic stop and subsequent arrest of Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Barbara Lisenby and Clerk of Court Terri King violated his constitutional rights in their handling of his case when he was brought before Judge Lisenby for a hearing. On June 20, 2023, Defendant Town of McBee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 42. A few days later, Defendants Terry King and Barbara Lisenby filed a joint Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 47. Plaintiff filed a Response to both Motions. ECF Nos. 53; 54. Defendants King and Lisenby filed a Reply. ECF No. 61. This matter is now ripe for review.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C, which provides for all pretrial proceedings in certain types of matters be referred to a United States Magistrate Judge. Because Defendants' Motions are dispositive, the undersigned enters this Report for the district judge's consideration.
I. Factual Background
On July 8, 2019, Deputy Justin Reichard with the Chesterfield Sheriff's Office initiated a traffic stop after he observed a vehicle, driven by Plaintiff, to be approaching him from behind at a high rate of speed before changing lanes and making a hard right turn without signaling with his blinker. Reichard Dep. 6:1-5; 16:2-19. In the course of conducting the stop, Deputy Reichard and another officer realized that Plaintiff's vehicle tag “wasn't right,” and there was no insurance on the vehicle. Reichard Dep. 21:5-13. Deputy Reichard contends that during the course of the traffic stop, Plaintiff did not want to comply with his directives, and Deputy Reichard believed there was the possibility that Plaintiff might flee. Reichard Dep. 18-20. Deputy Reichard learned that Plaintiff's driver's license was suspended after running his information through dispatch. Reichard Dep. 26:21-25. Thereafter, Plaintiff was transported to the county jail. Reichard Dep. 21:13-20. Deputy Reichard issued a ticket to Plaintiff for operating an uninsured vehicle, improper vehicle license and driving under suspension, as well as a citation for disobeying an officer. Reichard Dep. 24:1-23; 26:2-25. Plaintiff does not recall how many miles per hour he was going at the time he was pulled over, whether he used a blinker prior to turning, or whether he was going faster than the speed limit. Qualls Dep. 16:511; 12-14; 16:15-18.Plaintiff recalls Deputy Reichard slowing down in front of him, which caused him to slow down. Qualls Dep. 22:7-13. Then, Plaintiff says he turned off of the road because Deputy Reichard began driving “super slow” and that made Plaintiff nervous. Qualls Dep. 22:13-15. During the arrest, Plaintiff could not “remember exactly” whether he struggled with Deputy Reichard but indicated he did not doubt it because he becomes nervous around the police. Qualls Dep. 22:22-25; 23:1-6. Similarly, Plaintiff could not remember if he resisted getting to the patrol car. Qualls Dep. 23:7-12. At the time of the arrest, Plaintiff was apparently unaware his license was suspended. Qualls Dep. 23:13-16.
Deputy Reichard's deposition is attached as an exhibit to Plaintiff's and Defendants' Briefs. See ECF No. 42-2, Exhibit 1; ECF No. 47-1, Exhibit 1; ECF No. 43-3, Exhibit 4; ECF No. 544, Exhibit 4.
Plaintiff's deposition is attached as an exhibit to Plaintiff's and Defendants' Briefs. See ECF No. 42-2, Exhibit 2; ECF No. 47-1, Exhibit 2; ECF No. 53-3, Exhibit 3; ECF No. 54-4, Exhibit 3.
In her affidavit, Judge Lisenby recalls that when Plaintiff arrived for his hearing, she informed Plaintiff of his right to obtain counsel, of the charges against him, and of the nature of those charges. Lisenby Affidavit, ¶ 4; Attached as Exhibit 6 to ECF No. 47-6. The signed Bond Checklist for Magistrates and Municipal Judges, provided to the court, supports this recollection that Plaintiff was informed of the charges against him, the nature of those charges, his right to counsel, and specifically, his right to court-appointed counsel if he was financially unable to pay for counsel, as evidenced by what is purportedly his signature. Exhibits 4 and 5, attached to Defendant Town of McBee's Motion to Summary Judgment, ECF Nos.; 43-5; 426. Deputy Reichard also recalls that Judge Lisenby asked Plaintiff if he wanted a jury trial or bench trial, and he answered a bench trial. Reichard Dep. 32:11-13; see also Reichard Aff., ¶ 12. Deputy Reichard further recalled that Defendant Lisenby went over “the whole legality of the bench trial” with Plaintiff, and at the conclusion of her explanation she asked Plaintiff if he wanted to continue, which he answered in the affirmative. Reichard Dep. 33:11-22. Plaintiff informed Judge Lisenby that he was unable to pay his fine, and when asked how he arrived at court, he indicated he drove there. Reichard Dep. 32:1-8. Deputy Reichard recalls Defendant Lisenby gave Plaintiff 30 days to reinstate his insurance and remedy the suspension on his license. Reichard Aff., ¶ 15. Apparently, Plaintiff did not remedy the suspension on his license and drove himself to the next court appearance. Reichard Aff., ¶ 16.
Defendant Lisenby recalls that at Plaintiff's second appearance, on August 8, 2019, Plaintiff initially told Defendant Lisenby that had not driven to court. Lisenby Aff., ¶ 5. Defendant Lisenby further avers that at this second hearing, she gave Plaintiff an additional 30 days to work toward getting his license reinstated and insurance in place. Lisenby Aff., ¶ 5. Defendant Lisenby stated that once Plaintiff was released from court, she discovered that Plaintiff had, in fact, driven to court despite having a suspended license. Lisenby Aff., ¶ 5. For this reason, officers brought Plaintiff back to court for driving with a suspended license, and she informed Plaintiff he was going to jail. Lisenby Aff., ¶ 5. Defendant Lisenby indicates that Plaintiff did not appear before the Clerk of Court for an indigency screening, which is a prerequisite to obtaining court-appointed counsel, and he did not request an attorney or jury trial at his bond hearing or at the second appearance on August 8, 2019. Lisenby Aff., ¶¶ 6, 7. Defendant Lisenby contends that it was not until Plaintiff was taken into custody and escorted to jail, on August 8, 2019, that he requested an attorney and/or jury trial. Lisenby Aff., ¶ 8. Deputy Reichard also recalled that Plaintiff did not request either an attorney or a jury trial until after he was taken into custody and escorted to jail. Reichard Dep., ¶ 16. Deputy Reichard states that Plaintiff was released approximately a week later once his father paid his fines. Reichard Dep., ¶ 17.
For Plaintiff's part, he contends he was never told of his right to a public defender, was never told of his right to discovery, and he was never told the court was going to initiate a bench trial. Exhibit C to Pl.'s Response, ECF No. 54-3; Qualls Dep. 58:1-10. Plaintiff alleges that after being brought to jail, he met with Judge Lisenby, who informed Plaintiff that she would give Plaintiff a personal recognizance bond in exchange for Plaintiff promising to pay the tickets. ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff alleges he was released on a personal recognizance bond, and had a court appearance date set for September 12, 2019, which he attended. Id. Plaintiff alleges he did not plead guilty or otherwise sign a guilty plea, and that Judge Lisenby granted his request for a continuance on September 12, 2019. Id. Plaintiff then alleges that prior to leaving the building, he was questioned about how he arrived to his court appearance and returned to Defendant Lisenby. Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges he asked for counsel; however, Defendant Lisenby denied this request. Id. Plaintiff alleges he was then found guilty and sentenced to jail time, despite not being afforded a trial and without the opportunity for counsel. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that an attorney attempted to file a letter of representation; however, Defendant King would not provide the attorney with filed copies of motions and refused to allow the attorney to “meaningfully represent” Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lisenby informed the attorney that she would not provide a hearing for Plaintiff. Id. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Lisenby acted as the “investigator and prosecutor,” including conducting her own investigation and contacting the Department of Motor Vehicles personally to obtain Plaintiff's records. Id. at 3. Plaintiff's father paid the fines associated with the ticket(s), and Plaintiff was released from jail. Id. at 4.
On October 6, 2020, approximately two years prior to the filing of this action in federal court, Plaintiff filed a state court case, Michael Qualls v. Town of McBee, Civil Action No. 2020-CP-1300672, South Carolina State Court, Chesterfield County Court of Common Pleas (the “State Court Case”). ECF No. 42-9; ECF No. 47-8. In this state court case, Plaintiff brought claims pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, SC Code Ann. 15-78-10, et. seq. against the Town of McBee for gross negligence; the breach of his rights afforded under the South Carolina Constitution, including due process and the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; false imprisonment; and malicious prosecution. See id. The facts comprising these claims arise out of the same alleged misconduct forming the basis of Plaintiff's federal court complaint.Specifically, both the instant Complaint and the complaint filed in the State Court Case include the following same set of facts: on or about July 8, 2019, Deputy Reichard charged Plaintiff with several ticket violations; Plaintiff was never read his Faretta warnings; no recordings of the proceeding were made and minimal records were kept; Plaintiff did not plead guilty to any charges; Plaintiff requested a jury trial but was not provided a jury trial; agents of the town of McBee engaged in an impermissible investigation of Plaintiff's charges; Plaintiff was not offered a public defender and was not represented by an attorney; and Plaintiff was found guilty without a trial. See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 9; 11; 15; 19-24; 27; compare ECF No. 42-9 at ¶¶ 7; 9-15; 17.
The South Carolina Tort Claims Act (the “SCTCA”) provides that the governmental agency responsible for the acts or conduct or its employees acting within the scope of their official duties is to be named as the defendant. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70. The undersigned notes that Plaintiff named the Town of McBee in the state court case as a municipality subject to suit pursuant to the SCTCA.
Neither Judge Barbara Lisenby nor Terri King were named in the State Court Case; however, the State Court Case outlines the alleged misconduct on the part of Judge Lisenby that is the same conduct complained of in the federal lawsuit.
The federal court case is the first time Plaintiff references specific conduct on the part of Clerk of Court Terri King. Additionally, Plaintiff includes a § 1983 claim against the Town of McBee; that is, that employees were acting pursuant to an “official policy or custom” when engaging in the acts complained of by Plaintiff.
In the State Court Case, after Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge Michael Nettles issued an order, dated October 4, 2022, approximately three months after the federal case was filed, granting the Town of McBee's Motion for Summary Judgment. See ECF No. 42-12. This is the basis for Defendants' argument that res judicata/collateral estoppel should preclude this action. The order in state court provides that, “due to the fact that Town of McBee provided evidence showing that Plaintiff was given his Faretta warnings, and offered court-appointed counsel, Plaintiff withdrew these claims at the summary judgment hearing.” ECF No. 42-12 at 2. The state court, in granting summary judgment in favor of the Town of McBee also made the following determinations: (1) that Judge Lisenby was acting “within the course and scope of her employment as a municipal judge;” (2) that Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts that “Judge Lisenby acted ‘in the clear absence of all jurisdiction;'” and that (3) “Judge Lisenby is absolutely immune from suit for monetary damages.” ECF No. 42-12 at 5. The state court further found that Plaintiff's state constitutional claims must be dismissed because “the undisputed facts reflect that the Plaintiff received his Faretta warnings and was given an opportunity to request a court-appointed attorney, which he also failed to do.” ECF No. 42-12 at 16. The federal court case had only been pending three months when the state court order ruling in favor of the Town of McBee was issued. Now pending before this court are many of the very same arguments that have previously been ruled upon by a state court judge.
II. Standard of Review
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. All that is required is that “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Mere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995). A party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact solely with conclusions in his or her own argument, affidavit, or deposition that are not based on personal knowledge. See Latif v. The Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore, 354 Fed.Appx. 828, 830 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment, noting plaintiff's affidavit, which offered conclusions not based on his own knowledge, did not create genuine issues of material fact).
III. Analysis
Currently pending before this court are the following claims: (1) violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights because Defendants acted with “racial and invidious discriminatory animus” toward Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate in this case for a host of reasons, including: (1) abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); (2) abstention under Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); (3) res judicata and collateral estoppel; (4) absolute judicial immunity as to Judge Lisenby; (5) quasi-judicial immunity as to Terri King; (6) Plaintiff's claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); (7) Plaintiff fails to present a genuine issue of material facts as to his claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (8) that the Town of McBee cannot be liable under a theory of supervisory liability or Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servss of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), ; and (9) that the Town of McBee cannot be held liable for a loss resulting from employee conduct outside the scope of their official duties. ECF Nos. 42-1; 47-1. Plaintiff argues that summary judgment is inappropriate on any of these grounds.
Plaintiff has brought causes of action under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights;” rather, it is “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979). Plaintiff claims the rights afforded to him under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated in the following ways: he was unable to petition for a redress of grievances; he was not read his Faretta warnings; he was denied right to counsel, a right to jury trial, or a right to a fair trial; by being investigated by a judge who performed non-judicial acts; by unlawfully detaining Plaintiff; by failing to allow Plaintiff to file motions or other papers; by failing to allow Plaintiff to appeal or access the court; by failing to provide Plaintiff due process; by engaging in conduct that shocks the conscience; by defaming Plaintiff and altering his legal status; by subjecting him to differing and unique treatment when compared to others similarly situated; and by engaging in an illegal criminal process against Plaintiff. ECF No. 1 at 5-6. Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 are brought because Plaintiff alleges Defendants “intentionally conspired to deprive Plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws and equal privileges and immunities under the law” for the same alleged conduct outlined above. ECF No. 1 at 7-8. These allegations are all borne out of the arrest and subsequent court proceedings performed in front of Judge Lisenby and in the related alleged conduct on the part of Terri King.
The undersigned begins its analysis by considering whether res judicata and collateral estoppel apply in this case to bar Plaintiff's claims. A “federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.” Weston v. Margaret J. Weston Med. Ctr., No. 1:05-2518-RBH, 2007 WL 2750216, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 20, 2007) (quoting Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984)). Res judicata and collateral estoppel are closely related, similar doctrines. The doctrine of res judicata bars the re-litigation of a second lawsuit involving the same parties based on the same cause of action if the court in the first suit issued a judgment on the merits. Parklane Hosiery Co v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5 (1979). Collateral estoppel prevents the re-litigation of a matter that was settled in a previous case. Migra, 465 U.S. at 77, n. 1. The difference between the two doctrines is that res judicata forecloses all that which could have been litigated previously, while collateral estoppel treats final only the questions actually and necessarily decided in a previous lawsuit. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 139, n. 10 (1979).
Under South Carolina law, “res judicata . . . defines the effect a valid judgment may have on subsequent litigation between the same parties” and “ends litigation, promotes judicial economy and avoids the harassment of relitigation of the same issues.” Plum Creek Development Co., Inc. v. City of Conway, 512 S.E.2d 106, 108-09, 334 S.C. 30 (S.C. 1999). It operates as a bar to a later-filed action “by the same parties when the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject of a prior action between those parties.” Id. To establish this doctrine applies, a defendant must prove: (1) identity of the parties; (2) identity of the subject matter; and (3) adjudication of the issue in the prior suit. Id. South Carolina courts hold that the doctrine of res judicata applies to issues adjudicated in the prior suit and issues which could have been raised. Hilton Head Center of S.C. v. Public Service Comm'n, 362 S.E.2d 176, 176, 294 S.C. 9 (S.C. 1987). Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, once a court determines an issue necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude re-litigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). This doctrine ensures that a party has a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue, while also preventing the needless re-litigation of that issue. Lyles v. Broach, No. 4:16-3188-TMC-TER, 2018 WL 1064251, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 26, 2018). Under South Carolina law, a party asserting collateral estoppel must show that the issue of fact or law in the present lawsuit was: “(1) actually litigated in the prior action; (2) directly determined in the prior action; and (3) necessary to support the prior judgment.” Id. (quoting Carolina Renewal, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 684 S.E.2d 779, 782, 385 S.C. 550, 554 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009). Traditionally, collateral estoppel requires mutuality of the parties; however, modern courts recognize mutuality is not necessary for the application of this doctrine when the party against whom estoppel is asserted has had a “full and fair opportunity” to previously litigate these issues. Id. The undersigned recognizes that there are two similar arguments advanced in this case as to why Plaintiff's claims should be barred: the first is that Plaintiff could have brought these two claims now brought in federal court in the underlying state court action because they rely upon the same set of facts; and the second is that regardless of this fact, the state court judge has made certain findings (for example, that immunity applies) which preclude these issues from being re-litigated in this court.
Plaintiff argues that res judicata and/or collateral estoppel should not apply. Plaintiff argues because the order in the state action is pending on appeal, and therefore not “final,” this element has not been met. Plaintiff further argues that the causes of action and the parties are not identical because Barbara Lisenby and Terri King are not parties to the state court action, nor could they have been. Plaintiff argues that as to the different claims, because “different proofs” are required for the causes of action, res judicata is inapplicable. While Plaintiff argues collateral estoppel should not apply, Plaintiff does not advance an argument as to why Defendants have not shown that the issues before this court were not litigated and determined in the final action. Instead, Plaintiff relies upon the argument that like res judicata, because the lower court order is on appeal, collateral estoppel should not apply.
It is true that the parties and causes of action involved in the federal court case are not identical to the parties and causes of action in the state court case. However, the subject matter of the state court litigation and the federal court litigation are the same. The issues now brought forth in federal court could have just as easily been raised in state court; however, Plaintiff chose not to do so. Instead, he waited until the state court case was at the summary judgment stage before filing a similar action in federal court resting upon the same set of facts. Res judicata prevents this type of piecemeal litigation to occur.
Similarly, collateral estoppel prevents Plaintiff from litigating the same issues he raised previously and with which he got an unfavorable ruling. The undersigned finds a case cited by Defendants to be instructive. See Lyles v. Broach, No. 4:16-3188-TMC-TER, 2018 WL 1064251 (D.S.C. Feb 26, 2018). In Lyles v. Broach, this court previously considered whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied in a similar situation. 2018 WL 1064251 at *2. The plaintiff in Lyles conceded that he presented the same facts in the federal action and the state court action; however, he argued that the issues raised in the two actions were not identical, and different parties were involved. Id. That plaintiff also argued that, like the instant case, the South Carolina Tort Claims Act prevented the plaintiff from suing employees and instead required him to sue the agency for which they worked. Id. This court rejected that argument, explaining that Plaintiff could have raised his § 1983 claim in the state court action, but chose not to do so. The undersigned finds Lyles instructive in this case, and notes that Plaintiff does not seek to distinguish why Lyles is inapplicable to the case before this court. As aptly pointed out by Lyles, “[a] plaintiff should not be allowed to bring ‘piece-meal litigation by naming different defendants and alleging new causes of action, when all of his claims arise from the same operative facts.'” Id. (quoting Ali v. Jeng, 86 F.3d 1148 (4th Cir. 1996)). It is clear that Plaintiff could have raised these two claims in state court, as there is concurrent jurisdiction in both state and federal court, because they are premised upon the same set of facts.
Lyles has been cited in another recent case, Wilder v. Krebs, No. 2:17-763-CMC-MGB, 2019 WL 1862648 (D.S.C. April 25, 2019). Wilder also considered whether res judicata and collateral estoppel barred a plaintiff's § 1983 claims. In Wilder, the plaintiff brought suit in state court against the South Carolina Department of Corrections (the “SCDC”), bringing claims arising out of the same instances of alleged dental mistreatment he later pursued in federal court. 2019 WL 1862648 at *2. SCDC was granted summary judgment in state court after the state court judge determined the plaintiff failed to show SCDC was grossly negligent. Id. The plaintiff then brought a § 1983 action in federal court against the dentist he alleged mistreated him. Id. This court rejected plaintiff's argument that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply on the grounds that he only pursued a gross negligence claim and the individual defendant was not named in the state court action. Id. This court found that there was identity of the claims because the claims against the individual defendant were “indisputably based on the same underlying transaction as the state court lawsuit.” Id. at *3. Further, the court found that the facts articulated in the state court summary judgment order and the federal complaint were essentially identical, and the plaintiff had a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate whether he received substandard dental care, the same issue underlying the federal claim. Id. The court also considered the fact that there was no reason the plaintiff could not have brought his § 1983 claim in the state court case. Id. Finally, the court found there to be identity of the parties or their privies because the dentist was in privity with SCDC because his interests as a treating dentist whose actions are being challenged are the same as those of SCDC in the prior litigation. Id.
Here, Plaintiff seeks to distinguish the state court case from this case by arguing that because “different proofs” are required for his state court gross negligence claim and his federal constitutional claims, res judicata is inapplicable. As support, he relies upon Jensen v. Conrad, 570 F.Supp. 114 (D.S.C. 1983). However, Conrad did not analyze whether claims brought in state court barred a similar lawsuit in federal court; Conrad simply pointed out that while a gross negligence claim and a deliberate indifference claim are similar, there are significant distinctions. Nor does Plaintiff offer any argument that the issues presented in his state court case were distinguishable from the issues presented here, or that the claims were based upon a different underlying set of facts.
Plaintiff alternatively argues that, should the court decide res judicata or collateral estoppel applies, the court should stay this action pending resolution of the appeal in state court. However, even assuming the appellate court agrees with Plaintiff Qualls and finds error in granting summary judgment, the issues of abstention still apply as the lawsuit would still be pending in state court. Indeed, the issues on appeal in the state court action are: (1) whether the Town of McBee is entitled to judicial immunity (2) whether the Town of McBee is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity; and (3) whether Plaintiff could maintain an action for gross negligence against any other of the Town of McBee's agents. See Qualls v. Town of McBee, Appellant Case No. 2022-001741. Even though federal and state courts may share concurrent jurisdiction with respect to a dispute, and federal courts should generally exercise jurisdiction, abstention is appropriate when exceptional circumstances warrant abstention in deference to the parallel state proceedings. Dennis v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc., No. CA 0:10-2693-MJP-PJG, 2011 WL 3876916, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 11, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. CA 0:10-2693-MBS, 2011 WL 3876909 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2011) (citing Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-19 (1976)). Here, the potential for inconsistent rulings would still apply.
The undersigned finds Wilder and Lyles to be indistinguishable from the case before this court. In considering the claims that were litigated on the merits in the state court action, the state court order determined that Judge Lisenby, and by extension the Town of McBee, are immune from suit. Further, like Lyle s and Wilder, Plaintiff has not articulated a reason that he could not have brought his § 1983 or § 1985 claims in state court. The facts comprising his arrest and subsequent appearance in front of Judge Lisenby (as well as the subsequent interaction between attorney Marsh Julian and Defendant Terry King) were not only known to Plaintiff, but integral to the nexus of facts set forth in the state court action. Plaintiff's current claims against these Defendants are based on the same set of underlying transactions or facts as the state court lawsuit. The facts, as relayed in both complaints, as well as the facts supplied in the order granting summary judgment in state court, are nearly identical. More importantly, the judge issuing the state court order determined that Judge Lisenby (and the Town of McBee) were cloaked in immunity and alternatively, did not act with gross negligence. This is a decision on the merits. The same arguments against summary judgment that are being raised before this court were raised in state court (i.e., the state court determined that Judge Lisenby acted within the scope of her employment, and that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a breach of any duty occurring at his judicial proceedings).In short, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims in state court, including having a hearing on the summary judgment motion in state court, as well as the opportunity to engage in the discovery process in the state court action.Defendant Town of McBee initially filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on November 1, 2021 in state court. Since that time, the parties in the state court action engaged in discovery, including the deposition of Judge Lisenby. Plaintiff has not provided an explanation as to why he sought to bring these allegations against the Town of McBee, Judge Lisenby, and Terri King, a year and a half after he filed suit in state court. South Carolina law bars litigants from raising not only issues that were actually litigated in the former suit (such as judicial immunity and due process in the instant case), but also issues that might have been raised in the former suit. Eichman v. Eichman, 329 S.E.2d 764, 766, 285 S.C. 378 (S.C. 1985) (emphasis in original).
As pointed out in Wilder, there is no reason Plaintiff could not have brought several causes of action and named separate defendants in the state court action: a SCTCA claim against the Town of McBee, and § 1983 and § 1985 claims against Defendants Lisenby and King.
Judges are immune from suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under certain conditions. King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 356 (4th Cir. 1992). Judges are immune from liability “for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, even if such acts were allegedly done either maliciously or corruptly.” Id. For judicial immunity to apply, a judge's actions could not have been undertaken in “the clear absence of all jurisdiction” and must have been a “judicial act.” Id. at 356-57. Plaintiff alleges within the Complaint that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by “performing non-judicial acts, including investigating Plaintiff, presenting evidence, and prosecuting Plaintiff.” ECF No. 1 at 5. Further, Plaintiff alleges the actions of Defendant Lisenby were “not judicial acts that are normally done by officials in their positions.” ECF No. 1 at 6. This issue is squarely in front of this court and was previously litigated in the state court action.
Indeed, the deposition of Plaintiff and Deputy Reichard occurred in 2021, several months after the state court action was filed. Judge Lisenby and Marsh Julian were deposed in 2022, prior to the filing of this lawsuit.
As to the preclusive effect on Defendant Terri King, the undersigned agrees that the analysis differs slightly in that she is not specifically named in the facts of the state court lawsuit. On the one hand, Plaintiff does not reference the alleged behavior encountered by attorney Marsh Julian when he spoke to the Defendant King regarding the filing of documents. On the other hand, these facts were clearly contemplated in the state court action because the deposition of Marsh Julian was taken in connection with the state court lawsuit. Similarly, like Judge Lisenby, Terri King, as an employee of a governmental entity, could not have been named in the underlying lawsuit. Nevertheless, even were res judicata not to squarely apply to Defendant King, the undersigned still recommends dismissing these claims. Absolute quasijudicial immunity extends to non-judicial officers “performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.” McQuatters v. Town of Irmo Corp., No. 3:10-1375-CMC-PJG, 2011 WL 3555689, at *4 (D.S.C. July 27, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:10-1375-CMC-PJG, 2011 WL 3555771 (D.S.C. Aug. 11, 2011) (citing Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994)). Quasi-judicial immunity extends to judges' subordinates for “functions that are more administrative in character that have been undertaken pursuant to the judge's explicit direction.” In re Mills, 287 F. App'x. 273, 279 (4th Cir. 2008). In the order granting summary judgment in state court, the judge found that the Town of McBee was not liable for a loss “resulting from legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial” action. ECF No. 42-12 at 12. It would strain logic to envision a scenario where Defendant King, serving as Clerk of Court, was somehow found to be acting outside her official duties when she allegedly refused to provide copies of his filings because she was working in concert with Judge Lisenby. Moreover, Plaintiff cites to no statute or law that suggests the Clerk was required to provide to Plaintiff's attorneys copies of whatever he was filing. The only other allegation is that Defendant King told Mr. Julian he was filing too many things and wasting her ink. However, Plaintiff did not allege Defendant King prevented him from filing documents such that his due process was denied. Indeed, upon the conversation with Defendant King, Mr. Julian noted that he was able to speak with Judge Lisenby. While Plaintiff argues in his Response that Defendant King refused to file “everything,” Mr. Julian represented that documents were filed, and that he was able to speak to the judge who denied his motions. Julian Dep. 6:25-78; 11:16-17; attached to Plaintiff's Brief at ECF No. 54-2. Mr. Julian also testified that he was not sure the name of the person he spoke to on the phone (though she identified herself as a clerk). Julian Dep. 14:2325. However, Plaintiff's claims are also fatal because Defendant King was acting under the direction of Judge Lisenby. While Plaintiff alleges his due process rights were violated, Mr. Julian's interactions with who is presumed to be Defendant King occurred entirely after he had been arrested, been brought before Judge Lisenby twice, and had paid the fines which were associated with his tickets. There is no genuine dispute as to whether the court received and considered the motions filed by Mr. Julian after all of these facts occurred, and indeed, Mr. Julian was clear that the Judge contacted him and spoke to him about his filings. Thus, the undersigned does not agree that there is any genuine issue of facts as to whether the allegations that Defendant King violated his due process rights, even assumed to be true, amount to a constitutional violation.
There is one slight difference between this case and Lyles; that is, Plaintiff in this case has appealed the state court order; thus, Plaintiff argues this judgment is not “final.” This court has previously found that a state court summary judgment order in an earlier action constituted a final judgment for res judicata purposes. Machado v. Davis, No. 4:11-cv-1758-KDW, 2012 WL 4051123 at *7 (D.S.C. Sept. 13, 2017); see also Shoup v. Bell & Howell Co., 872 F.2d 1178, 1181 (4th Cir. 1989). Further, this court has determined that the fact that an order granting summary judgment is currently pending on appeal does not affect the application of res judicata. Machado, 2012 WL 4051123 at *7 (citing Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 898 (4th Cir. 1992); 18A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Fed. Practice & Procedure § 4433 at 78-79 & n. 11 (2d ed. 2002)). While neither party argues that the South Carolina Supreme Court has not decided this precise issue, the weight of authority from other jurisdictions warrants giving preclusive affect to an order pending appeal. Machado, 2012 WL 4051123 at *7 (citing Campbell v. Lake Hallowell Homeowners Ass'n, 157 Md.App. 504, 521-22, 852 A.2d 1029, 1039 (Md.Ct.App. 2004) (citing cases for the proposition that the rule that a pending appeal does not affect the finality of a judgment is followed by a majority of states)).
As a final matter, as to Plaintiff's civil conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, to the extent this claim is somehow distinct from the underlying state court action, the undersigned recommends finding summary judgment would be appropriate. Plaintiff does not provide any facts to support any allegation that Defendants acted with racial animus or that some racial animus “permeated the Town of McBee.” Plaintiff's sole reason for alleging any claims based on race is that, during Judge Lisenby's deposition, which occurred more than two years after the incident giving rise to the claim took place, when she was clarifying which defendant they were speaking about, she called Plaintiff “that black guy.” Otherwise, there is no evidence during the proceedings that anyone treated Plaintiff differently based on race. Indeed, by all accounts, Judge Lisenby attempted to provide Plaintiff two chances to pay his fines and decided to send him to jail only after she found out he lied to her. There is no evidence that there was any “meeting of the minds” regarding the treatment of Plaintiff. Therefore, the undersigned recommends finding any claims brought pursuant to § 1985 should be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends finding that res judicata and collateral estoppel bar Plaintiff's action before this court. Thus, if this recommendation is accepted, Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, ECF Nos. 42; 47 should be granted.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).