Opinion
C.A. No. 01A-05-010 CHT
Date Assigned: December 3, 2001
Decided: March 8, 2002 Amended: March 11, 2002
On The Employer's Appeal from the Decision of the Industrial Accident Board.
J.R. Julian, Esquire, J.R. JULIAN, P.A., 824 Market Street, Suite 1001, P.O. Box 2171, Wilmington, Delaware 19899, Attorney of the Appellant.
R. Stokes Nolte, Esquire, Nolte Brodoway, P.A., Three Mill Road, Suite 304, Wilmington, Delaware 19806, Attorney for the Appellee.
AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
The matter before the Court arises from personal injuries suffered by the Appellee, James M. Fleming, during the course of his employment with the Appellant, Quaker City Tree Surgeons, in 1989. As a result of this incident, Mr. Fleming suffered injuries to his abdomen and back. Quaker City did not dispute the compensability of the injuries suffered by Mr. Fleming in the industrial accident. Instead, the dispute between the parties centers on medical expenses arising from the injuries suffered by Mr. Fleming. Those expenses were set forth as Claimant's Exhibit 1(A)-(C) submitted by Mr. Fleming.
A hearing was held before the Industrial Accident Board on April 11, 2001. The Board found that the submitted medical expenses were compensable with the exception of $1,952.96, as identified as Exhibit 1(C). The Board ruled that these expenses were not submitted in a timely fashion to Quaker City. The total amount awarded to Mr. Fleming by the Board was $2,101.11 as was reflected in Exhibit 1(A) and (B). In addition, the Board awarded Mr. Fleming attorney's fees in the amount of 30% of the total award pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 2320(j).
Quaker City's appeal of the Board's decision arises from an objection made by Quaker City to the admission of Exhibit 1(C). Quaker City attacks the Board's ruling in that regard on three fronts. First, Quaker City contends that the Board abused its discretion in overruling the objection because all of the medical bills contained in Exhibit 1 were not timely presented to Quaker City. It also asserts that the Board erred as a matter of law in ordering the payment of these bills because they had never been presented to Quaker City, or in the alternative, had not been timely or properly presented, or had already been paid in full or in part. Finally, due to the aforementioned errors by the Board, Mr. Fleming is not entitled to attorney's fees because they are predicated upon the receipt of an award of medical expenses.
Quaker City explained at the hearing that a portion of the submitted medical bills had been paid previously. However, their adjuster mistakenly applied Pennsylvania law to those claims which resulted in some deficiencies in the reimbursement to Mr. Fleming.
Mr. Fleming responds that the medical bills contained in Exhibit 1(A) and (B) were timely submitted with the noted exception of those contained in Exhibit 1(C), which were excluded from the award by the Board. He asserts that the Board committed no error in making the award and that the Board's decision in this regard is supported by evidence in the record. Furthermore, Quaker City made no allegations attacking the reasonableness or necessity of the bills in question. Because Exhibit 1 was properly admitted into evidence and the medical bills were properly payable, the awarding of attorney's fees to Mr. Fleming was proper.
DISCUSSION
This Court is bound by the Board's findings if supported by substantial evidence and absent abuse of discretion or error of law. Ohrt v. Kentmore Home, Del. Super., C. A. No. 96A-01-005, Cooch, J. (Aug. 9, 1996) (Mem. Op. at 8). "Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Anchor Motor Freight v. Ciabattoni, 716 A.2d 154, 156 (Del.Super. 1998); and Streett v. State, 669 A.2d 9, 11 (Del. 1995). It "is more than a scintilla and less than a preponderance" of the evidence. City of Wilmington v. Clark, Del. Super., C. A. No. 90A-FE-2, Barron, J. (March 20, 1991) (Mem.Op. at 6). This Court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility or make its own findings of fact. Johnson v. Chrysler, 213 A.2d 64, 66 (Del. 1965). Its function is to determine if the evidence is legally adequate to support the factual findings below. 29 Del. C. § 10142(d). An evaluation of the Board's decision in light of these standards requires this Court affirm the same.
The Board properly admitted the items contained in Exhibit 1(A) and (B) and properly excluded those contained in Exhibit 1(C). The Board's decision indicates that this admission was based upon letters from Mr. Fleming's counsel to Quaker City's counsel dated December 27, 1999, April 27, 2000, July 10, 2000 and September 15, 2000. These documents reflect the fact that the information contained in Exhibit 1(A) and (B) was submitted to Quaker City in a timely manner. Because notice was timely, the Board did not abuse its discretion in admitting those portions of Exhibit 1.
The survival of Quaker City's second and third contentions depends upon this Court finding that Exhibit 1 was not submitted in a timely fashion. As is stated above, the Court makes no such finding. There is no need to reach these arguments as a result. The record contains substantial evidence in support of the decision reached. Consequently, the Board's decision must be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the Industrial Accident Board is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.