Opinion
Civil Action 2:09-cv-00475.
September 21, 2010
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court for consideration of the June 21, 2010 Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 21.) In the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court remand the decision to the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings consistent with the Report and Recommendation. After moving for an extension, Defendant filed his Objections to the Report and Recommendation on July 20, 2010. (Doc. 23.) For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Objections are OVERRULED and the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Facts
The Report and Recommendation provides a more detailed description of Plaintiff's testimony, Plaintiff's medical records and history, the expert testimony, and the Commissioner's decision. (Report and Recommendation 2-7.) For the purposes of Plaintiff's Objections, the following section focuses on Dr. Hard's opinions.
On September 29, 2005, Dr. Wesley Hard, Plaintiff's treating physician, described Plaintiff's condition to the Bureau of Disability Determination. After describing Plaintiff's various impairments, Dr. Hard stated, "[c]urrently, she has quite a bit of pain in her joints, particularly her hands, knees, and also the neck and back." (R. at 109.) Dr. Hard also noted "she is disabled by pain essentially." ( Id.) Dr. Hard ended his report with the following conclusion:
Defendant's Objection does not dispute that Dr. Hard is Plaintiff's treating physician.
She cannot really do much work at all there. She, again, could lift probably 15 to 20 pounds and only sit for about a half hour before she'd have to get up and move around and can only stand for about a half hour before she'd have to sit back down. The depression, hopefully, will improve and that should help to improve her concentration. She cannot do repetitive bending or lifting.
(R. at 110.)
On August 26, 2008, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that Plaintiff was not disabled. In assessing Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined:
[C]laimant has the residual functional capacity to lift and/or carry up to 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently; sit for a total of 6 hours in an eight-hour day and stand and/or walk for a total of 3 hours in an eight-hour day. She would need a sit/stand option. She could occasionally stoop and climb stairs. She can frequently bend. She could rarely use foot controls. She is precluded from climbing ladders, working at unprotected heights, crawling or kneeling. She is precluded from bilateral overhead reaching. She is limited to simple repetitive 1-2 step tasks in a low stress environment, which in this case is defined as work requiring minimal reading or writing on the job and only limited interaction with the general public.
(R. at 11.) Additionally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's complaints about the "intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms [were] not credible." The ALJ's opinion contained only two passing references to Dr. Hard and his treatment of Plaintiff. (R. at 13.) Specifically, the ALJ briefly cited to Dr. Hard's report for the notion that Plaintiff had a migraine equivalent. ( Id.) The ALJ also mentioned Dr. Hard's opinion that Plaintiff could lift 15-20 pounds, in order to refute the opinion of a different physician, without addressing any of the other details of Dr. Hard's opinion. ( Id.) The ALJ made no statements regarding the weight or consideration that he gave to Dr. Hard's opinions.
B. The Report and Recommendation
The Magistrate Judge found that the ALJ had erred by failing to articulate his reasons for rejecting Dr. Hard's opinion. (Report and Recommendation 13.) The Magistrate Judge specifically concluded that this omission was in violation of the reason-giving requirement embedded in the Regulations. ( Id.); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.927(d)(2) ("We will always give good reasons in our notice of determination or decision for the weight we give your treating source's opinion."). The Magistrate Judge further concluded that the ALJ's failure to satisfy this procedural requirement was not harmless error. (Report and Recommendation 14-16.)
C. Defendant's Objections
Defendant's Objections acknowledge that the Magistrate set forth the appropriate law concerning treating physician opinions. (Def.'s Objections 2.) Furthermore, Defendant does not explicitly contend that the ALJ satisfied the procedural requirements of the good-reason rule. Rather, Defendant's Objections maintain that remanding this case to the ALJ would be "an idle and useless formality." (Def.'s Objections 2 (internal quotation omitted).) In particular, Defendant maintains that although the ALJ did not explicitly address Dr. Hard's statement that Plaintiff could not work, the ALJ's opinion accounted for all the limitations set forth in Dr. Hard's opinions. (Def.'s Objections 2-3.) Accordingly, Defendant asserts that because the ALJ's decision is consistent with Dr. Hard's opinion, the failure to give reasons does not necessitate remand. (Def.'s Objections 3); see Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2004) ("[I]f the Commissioner . . . makes findings consistent with the opinion, it may be irrelevant that the ALJ did not give weight to the treating physician's opinion, and the failure to give reasons for not giving such weight is correspondingly irrelevant.").
II. STANDARD
If a party objects within the allotted time to a report and recommendation, the Court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Court's review "is limited to determining whether the Commissioner's decision `is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.'" Ealy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive"). Put another way, a decision supported by substantial evidence is not subject to reversal, even if the reviewing court might arrive at a different conclusion. Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). "Substantial evidence exists when `a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate to support a conclusion [and] . . . presupposes that there is a zone of choice withing which the decision-makers can go either way, without interference by the courts.'" Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal; citation omitted). Even if supported by substantial evidence, however, "`a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the [Commissioner] fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.'" Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007).
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Even if an ALJ rejects the opinions of a treating physician the ALJ must "always give good reasons in [the] notice of determination or decision for the weight we give your treating source's opinion." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.927(d)(2). Although physician opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner are not entitled to special significance, an ALJ is still procedurally required to "`explain the consideration given to the treating source's opinion(s).'" Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting SSR 96-5: Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Medical Source Opinions on Issues Reserved to the Commissioner, 61 Fed. Reg. 34471, 34474 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 2, 1996)). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has noted the reason-giving "requirement [] ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ's application of the rule." Wilson 378 F.3d at 544.
The Sixth Circuit has made clear that the Court should not hesitate to remand ALJ decisions "that do not comprehensively set forth reasons for the weight assigned to a treating physician's opinion." Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Wilson, 378 F.3d at 545). As the Wilson Court explained, because the reason-giving requirement creates an important procedural safeguard, "[a] court cannot excuse the denial of a mandatory procedural protection simply because, as the Commissioner urges, there is sufficient evidence in the record for the ALJ to discount the treating source's opinion and, thus, a different outcome on remand is unlikely." 378 F.3d at 546; see also Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 655 (6th Cir. 2009) (indicating that an ALJ's failure to give "good reasons" for rejecting a treating source opinion "would almost always require reversal and remand to Commissioner").
The Report and Recommendation clearly explained the situations that may constitute harmless error:
Although it did not actually decide the issue, the Wilson Court opened the door for considerations of whether a violation of the good-reason requirement was harmless error. [ 378 F.3d] at 547-48. Specifically, Wilson considered three possible scenarios that could lead the Court to a finding of harmless error. Id. at 547. First, the Court indicated that harmless error might occur "if a treating source's opinion is so patently deficient that the Commissioner could not possibly credit it . . ." Id. Second, the Court noted that if the ALJ's decision was "consistent with the opinion, it may be irrelevant that the ALJ did not give weight to the treating physician's opinion, and the failure to give reasons for not giving such weight is correspondingly irrelevant." Id. Finally, Wilson considered the possibility of a scenario "where the Commissioner has met the goal of § 1527(d)(2) — the provision of the procedural safeguard of reasons-even though she has not complied with the terms of the regulation." Id.
(Report and Recommendation 14-15.)
In this case, Defendant essentially maintains that the ALJ's failure to articulate reasons for rejecting Dr. Hard's opinion falls within the second harmless error category. Defendant specifically contends that the ALJ accounted for all of Dr. Hard's opinions regarding Plaintiff's limitations, and therefore, remanding this case because Dr. Hard opined that Plaintiff could not work is unnecessary.
The Court disagrees. It is true that portions of Dr. Hard's opinions are consistent with, or even less restrictive than, the residual functional capacity the ALJ assigned. For example, Dr. Hard found that the Plaintiff could lift 15 to 20 pounds, whereas the ALJ limited the Plaintiff to up to ten pounds. (R. at 11, 110.) Additionally, the ALJ's requirement that Plaintiff receive a sit/stand option is consistent with Dr. Hard's comments that Plaintiff could neither sit or stand for more than thirty minutes at a time. ( See id.)
Nevertheless, portions of Dr. Hard's opinions are clearly inconsistent with the ALJ's decision. Dr. Hard's opinion stated that Plaintiff should not do repetitive lifting, and did not provide any weight category that Plaintiff could repetitively lift. (R. at 110.) The ALJ, on the other hand, found that Plaintiff could lift less than ten pounds frequently. (R. at 11.) Dr. Hard also opined that Plaintiff should not do repetitive bending, while the ALJ determined Plaintiff "can bend frequently." (R. at 11, 110.) Moreover, Dr. Hard's report substantiates Plaintiff's complaints of pain; the ALJ decision found that Plaintiff's complaints were not entirely credible. (R. at 13, 109.) Finally, Dr. Hard's ultimate opinion that Plaintiff was unable to work is obviously inconsistent with the ALJ's disability finding.
Due to the inconsistencies between Dr. Hard's opinions and the ALJ's decision, the Court finds that this is not a situation were it is irrelevant that the ALJ did not explain his reasons for rejecting a treating physician's opinion. As the Magistrate Judge noted, because the ALJ did not analyze Dr. Hard's contrary opinions, it is unclear whether the ALJ truly rejected them or simply overlooked them. (Report and Recommendation 12-13.) Because it is unclear why the ALJ rejected Dr. Hard's opinions, the Court is unwilling to conclude that the decision is capable of meaningful review. Blakley, 581 F.3d at 409 (quoting Wilson, 378 at 547) ("[T]he ALJ's failure to follow the Agency's procedural rule does not qualify as harmless error where we cannot engage in `meaningful review' of the ALJ's decision."). Defendant may ultimately be correct in asserting that remand will not change the ultimate result. This speculation, however, is not the standard the Court must apply in determining whether harmless error exists under the circumstances of this case.
IV. CONCLUSION
For theses reasons, Plaintiff's Objections (Doc. 23) are OVERRULED and the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 21). The Court REMANDS the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings consistent with the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.