Opinion
NNHCV186084759
08-08-2019
Allysa M. Putney v. Lisa Deane, Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph Peter Deane et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Ozalis, Sheila A., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION: MOTION TO STRIKE
OZALIS, J.
On June 12, 2019, the defendant Lisa Deane, Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph P. Deane (Estate), filed a motion to strike Count Three of the plaintiff’s substituted complaint, dated April 18, 2019, as well as the portions of the plaintiff’s prayer for relief that seek punitive damages, exemplary damages, and double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295. The defendant Estate claims that the facts alleging recklessness in Count Three under General Statutes § 14-295 do not survive the defendant’s death.
The summons was originally served on Joseph P. Deane and Peter Deane. This court notes that since the time that this action was filed, Joseph P. Deane has deceased and his estate has been substituted as the defendant in his place.
A summary of the allegations contained in the plaintiff’s three count substituted complaint reveals that on or about March 27, 2017, the vehicle owned by Peter Deane and operated by Joseph P. Deane struck the vehicle driven by the plaintiff, causing her to sustain injuries. Count three alleges statutory recklessness as to the defendant vehicle’s operator, Joseph P. Deane, for which his estate has been substituted.
The defendant Estate argues that the facts as alleged in Count Three fail to support the plaintiff’s claim for recklessness under General Statutes § 14-295 because General Statutes § 14-295 is a penal statute, and pursuant to § 52-599, the plaintiff’s statutory recklessness claims cannot be brought against an estate. (Def.’s Mot. to Strike pp. 4-5.) The plaintiff, in her objection to the motion to strike argues that substituting the defendant’s estate for the defendant himself is permitted by law, does not reopen the procedural posture of the pleadings, and that the complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action for statutory recklessness that survives against the defendant’s estate. (Pl.’s Obj. to Def.’s Mot. to Strike pp. 1-2.)
"A motion to strike shall be used whenever any party wishes to contest: (1) the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... or of any one or more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (2) the legal sufficiency of any prayer for relief in any such complaint ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Practice Book § 10-39(a). "[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016). "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).
Count Three "involves a statutory claim grounded in recklessness under General Statutes § 14-295." DeLorenzo v. Framularo, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-14-6044051-S (August 18, 2015, Arnold, J.) . General Statutes § 14-295 governs double or treble damages for personal injuries resulting from certain traffic violations and states in relevant part: "[i]n any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury ... the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a or 14-227m, subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of section 14-227n or section 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239, 14-240a or 14-296aa, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property." Count Three of the subject complaint alleges the defendant’s reckless disregard for his statutory obligations pursuant to § 14-218a and § 14-219, as well as a violation of his statutory obligations pursuant to § 14-222.
The allegations in Count Three must be considered with regard to General Statutes § 52-599, which governs whether a cause of action against a decedent survives and may be continued against the administrator of an estate. General Statutes § 52-599 states in relevant part: "(A) A cause or right of action shall not be lost or destroyed by the death of any person, but shall survive in favor of or against ... the administrator of the deceased person." Section 52-599(a)(3) provides, however, that "the provisions of this section shall not apply ... to any civil action upon a penal statute."
In the present case, this court finds that the plaintiff’s statutory reckless claims are barred by the exception set forth in § 52-599(c)(3) because § 14-295 is a penal statute. See also Maiorino v. Murphy, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-10-6010586-S (December 15, 2010, Wilson, J.) . The words ‘penal’ and ‘penalty, ’ in their strict and primary sense, denote a punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State for a crime or offense against its laws. In Jack v. Scanlon, 4 Conn.App. 451, 455, 495 A.2d 1084 (1985), our Appellate Court indicated that § 14-295 is construed as a penalty statute and held that "the imposition of the penalty of double or treble damages should be reserved for cases which involve offenses more serious than simple negligence. "(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) (assessing legality of award of double or treble damages under § 14-295).
"Penal statutes, strictly and properly, are those imposing punishment for an offense against the State ..." Plumb v. Griffin, 74 Conn. 132, 134, 50 A. 1 (1901) (defining meaning of penal statute); see also State v. Pompei, 52 Conn.App. 303, 307, 726 A.2d 644 (1999).
"The test whether a law is penal ... is whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual." Maiorino v. Murphy, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-10-6010586-S. Section 14-295 serves the purpose of "punishing reckless conduct as a wrong done to the state clearly outweighing ... any possible remedial value to the plaintiff Id. "The statutes enumerated within § 14-295 all describe wrongs against the State of Connecticut, which has a clear interest in ensuring the safety of travel upon its public highways. They are not ... designed for the purpose of providing civil causes of action ... Only secondarily, through the application of § 14-295, do these statutes purport to address wrongs done to individuals." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeLorenzo v. Framularo, supra, Docket No. CV-14-6044051-S.
Since § 14-295 is a penal statute, the allegations in Count Three of the plaintiff’s substituted complaint are barred against the defendant’s Estate in accordance with § 52-599(c)(3). For the foregoing reasons, the defendant Estate’s motion to strike Count Three of the plaintiff’s substituted complaint, as well as the portions of the plaintiff’s prayer for relief that seek punitive damages, exemplary damages, and double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295, is granted.