Opinion
No. E2004-02192-CCA-R3-CD.
Assigned on Briefs June 29, 2005.
Filed August 18, 2005.
Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Carter County; No. 11019; Lynn W. Brown, Judge.
Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed.
James T. Bowman, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellant, William Matney Putman.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Assistant Attorney General; Joe C. Crumley, Jr., District Attorney General; and Kenneth C. Baldwin, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Alan E. Glenn, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which James Curwood Witt, Jr. and Robert W. Wedemeyer, JJ., joined.
OPINION
In 1995, the petitioner, William Matney Putman, pled guilty to first degree murder and aggravated robbery and was sentenced to concurrent terms of life without parole and twenty years, respectively. In 2004, the post-conviction court resentenced the petitioner to life with the possibility of parole for the murder conviction. On appeal, the petitioner argues the court erred in resentencing him to life with parole after vacating the illegal sentence of life without parole. We affirm the post-conviction court's sentencing of the petitioner.
FACTS
After the petitioner was granted habeas corpus relief because he had been sentenced to life without parole, punishment which only later became available for his offense, the post-conviction court, with the concurrence of the State, determined that he should be resentenced. Before the resentencing hearing, the petitioner filed a petition to withdraw his guilty plea. However, during the hearing, he orally moved to dismiss the petition. Over the petitioner's objection, the court imposed a sentence of life with parole.
ANALYSIS
The petitioner argues he is in a legal "no man's land," saying the post-conviction court could not impose the sentence of life with parole unless he consented, which he did not.
The petitioner's offenses were committed in June 1993. The sentencing law for first degree murder committed before July 1, 1993, provided "but two possible punishments . . .: life imprisonment (with the possibility of parole) or the death penalty." Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911-12 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(b) (1991)); see also State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 735 (Tenn. 1998) ("We conclude that the specific enabling provision of the 1993 act, which clearly states that the amendment applies to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1993, controls, as a matter of statutory construction. . . . There is no indication that the legislature intended that the option of life without parole apply retrospectively to offenses occurring before July 1, 1993.").
In seeking relief, the petitioner relies upon the language inWoods v. State, 928 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1996), that "the judgment may not be amended to reflect a sentence consistent with the statute unless the petitioner knowingly and voluntarily agrees to the changes." He also cites the holding of McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 800 (Tenn. 2000), that "[o]n remand, the trial court may impose a sentence that is mutually agreeable to the State and appellant, so long as the sentence is available under the 1989 [Sentencing] Act. If an agreement is not reached, though, appellant may withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial on the original charges." Furthermore, a defendant acknowledges that by not withdrawing his guilty plea, "the conviction remains intact." McLaney v. Bell, 59 S.W.3d 90, 94-95 (Tenn. 2001).
After hearing the petitioner's argument that it lacked authority to sentence him, the post-conviction court said, "I don't think that it makes any sense to do what you're proposing that nothing happens. . . . Something has to happen. You're saying . . . he wants to keep his guilty plea in the record, and . . . that he consents to no sentence and, therefore, the court has no authority to sentence him?" The court then sentenced the petitioner, over his objection, to life with the possibility of parole:
THE COURT: I will inquire further of [the petitioner], the court then is of the opinion if you do not withdraw your guilty plea then the court imposes a sentence of life with parole, and then determines whether that sentence is consecutive or concurrent to other counts in sentences. Because the judgment of Circuit Court for Wayne County is that it vacated the sentence. And with the sentence vacated the guilty plea and finding of guilt in the record that is the only logical thing that this court can do. Do you understand that?
[THE PETITIONER]: Yes, I understand it.
. . . .
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So, that — so, there won't be any misunderstanding in the record, his understanding does not . . . signify his agreement.
THE COURT: He does not agree to that?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, sir.
The post-conviction court then gave its rationale for the sentencing and distinguished the petitioner's case from cases like Woods and McConnell that discussed sentences both the petitioner and the State had agreed to:
In this case whatever sentence the court imposes for murder in the first degree, since the state did not choose any, or actually, never had the opportunity to go in the position to seek the death penalty, whatever sentence he gets from this court is going to be less. That is something that — that is — is just — does not exist in any of these other cases. In all the other cases the defendant pled guilty. He took a sentence that was longer than he could have received. In this case [the petitioner] pled guilty and [the original trial court], by agreement, sentenced him to life without parole. Well, any sentence the court imposes, whether — the only sentence would be life with the possibility of parole, and even if it turns out to be consecutive to all his other sentences that is still a lesser punishment than life without the possibility . . . of parole. . . . He's actually, with his post conviction, getting a better deal than he got when he pled guilty and took life without parole.
We, like the post-conviction court, are not impressed by the petitioner's claim that, by not seeking to withdraw his plea of guilty while at the same time not agreeing to imposition of life with parole, the only available sentence, he has brought the justice system to a standstill. The authorities upon which he relies do not support the conclusion he seeks to extract from them.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.