Pursell v. Horn

83 Citing cases

  1. Thomas v. Beard

    388 F. Supp. 2d 489 (E.D. Pa. 2005)   Cited 8 times
    Stating claims of counsel's ineffectiveness must be pled with specificity

    Therefore, this court must look to the version of the waiver bar in effect between 1989 and 1995. Compare Pursell v. Horn, 187 F. Supp. 2d 260, 293 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (At the earliest, Pursell waived certain issues when he failed to raise them at trial in 1982 or on direct appeal in 1985. At the latest, he waived other issues when he failed to raise them in his PCRA filings with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1994.

  2. Rollins v. Horn

    Civil Action 00-1288 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 26, 2005)   Cited 9 times
    Denying petitioner's challenges to the procedure by which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court conducted its proportionality review because that court had examined the procedures in Commonwealth v. Gribble, 550 Pa. 62, 703 A.2d 426, and had found nothing arbitrary or capricious about them, and denying certificate of appealability

    McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3rd Cir. 1999). Even if the state court refuses to hear a claim because it is time-barred or waived, the claim is still exhausted as long as the state court is given the opportunity to address it. Pursell v. Horn, 187 F. Supp. 2d 260, 288-89 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (citingBond v. Fulcomer, 864 F.2d 306, 309 (3rd Cir. 1989) (holding that presentation of an untimely petition to the state's highest court satisfied the exhaustion requirement)); see also Laird v. Horn, 159 F. Supp. 2d 58, 91 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (concluding that petitioner had exhausted claim where it was presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on PCRA review and rejected on the grounds of waiver). Petitioner has clearly satisfied the exhaustion requirement in this case.

  3. Porter v. Horn

    No. CIV.A.99-2677 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 26, 2003)   Cited 130 times

    "The phrase `clearly established Federal law' refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of Supreme Court opinions at the time that the state court conviction became final." Pursell v. Horn, 187 F. Supp.2d 260, 297 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted). "A conviction is deemed final under Pennsylvania law `at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.'"

  4. Yarris v. Horn

    230 F. Supp. 2d 577 (E.D. Pa. 2002)   Cited 5 times
    Discussing the "practice in death penalty cases of allowing merits review for claims barred by the PCRA time-bar"

    Thus, the issue before this court is whether the claims raised for the first time in Mr. Yarris' second PCRA petition were properly raised and exhausted in state court or are procedurally defaulted. Recently, many district courts in the third circuit which have been confronted with the issue of the PCRA time-bar, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 9545(b), have decided that it was not an independent and adequate state ground to bar federal review until Commonwealth v. Banks was decided March 2, 1999. Cf, Baker v. Horn, 210 F. Supp.2d 592, 636 (E.D.Pa. 2002); Pursell v. Horn, 187 F. Supp.2d 260, 295-96 (W.D.Pa. 2002); Pace v. Vaughn, No. CIV. A.99-6568, 2002 WL 985689, at *10 (E.D.Pa. 2002); Banks v. Horn, 63 F. Supp.2d 525, 533-34 (M.D.Pa. 2001) [Banks III] rev'd on other grounds; Bronshtein v. Horn, No. CIV.A. 99-2186, 2001 WL 767593, at *8 (E.D.Pa. July 5, 2001). This court concurs with these other decisions as well as follows the holding in Pace.

  5. Nara. v. Frank

    488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007)   Cited 1,344 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding no excusable neglect under Rule 60(b) where an attorney would have received notice of the order he untimely sought to challenge had he complied with the standing order to register with the electronic filing system

    McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir.1999). Even if a state court refuses to consider the claim on procedural grounds, it is still exhausted as long as the state court had the opportunity to address it. Bond v. Fulcomer, 864 F.2d 306, 309 (3d Cir.1989); Pursell v. Horn, 187 F.Supp.2d 260, 288 (W.D.Pa.2002) (Smith, J.). The Commonwealth suggests the Supreme Court's decision in Baldwin v. Reese may have limited the viability of the McCandless analysis.

  6. United States v. Hertel & Brown Physical & Aquatic Therapy

    1:21-cr-39 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 2023)

    prejudice where there exists a considerable "cooling off period between a prejudicial news account and the trial date. See, e.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 802 (1975) (finding that media coverage did not serve to prejudice petitioner because the articles about the petitioner's crimes were published seven months prior to jury selection); Altawarh v. Wetzel, No. CV 17-1303, 2017 WL 4855858, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2017) (passage of five months' time between the pretrial publicity and the start of trial was "a sufficient cooling off period to dissipate the effect of even significantly prejudicial publicity"), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 17-1303, 2017 WL 4838730 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2017); Foy v. Lamas, No. 2:12-0088, 2013 WL 838191, at *25 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2013) (extensive media coverage that ended seven months before trial did not justify presumption of prejudice); Pursell v. Horn, 187 F.Supp.2d 260, 302-03 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (six-month period between adverse publicity and trial militated against presumption of prejudice).

  7. Robinson v. Beard

    No. 2:06-cv-00829 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 10, 2021)

    As this Court noted in quoting the relevant standards, severe and extensive reporting does not necessarily give rise to prejudice. See Id. at *31 (citing Pursell v. Horn, 187 F.Supp.2d 260, 302 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (noting “lapse in time” between severe and extensive publicity and trial can dissipate prejudicial effect)). Moreover, this Court performed a detailed review of instances of pretrial reporting in which inflammatory, non-factual language was used.

  8. Xavier v. Harlow

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-1603 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2016)   Cited 2 times

    The cumulative error doctrine "'applies in determining whether habeas relief must be granted because of constitutional error of the trial type' and is 'grounded in the federal harmless-error rule 28 U.S.C. § 2111'"Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993). However, "cumulative review is proper under Strickland," only after the petitioner's claims "surmount the first prong of the Strickland analysis." Pursell v. Horn, 187 F. Supp. 2d 260, 363 (W.D. Pa. 2002). Therefore, trial counsel's performance must be found to be deficient on the individual claims of error before errors can be aggregated to demonstrate prejudice.

  9. Tierney v. Ricci

    Civil Action No. 08-1918 (SDW) (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2009)

    Even if none of Petitioner's claims on its own amounts to a constitutional violation, the "cumulative effect of the alleged errors may violate due process." United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 631 F.2d 14, 17 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Pursell v. Horn, 187 F.Supp.2d 260, 374 (W.D. Pa. 2002) ("That the reliability of a state criminal trial can be substantially undermined by a series of events, none of which individually amounts to a constitutional violation, is an idea that has been accepted by nearly every federal court to have addressed the issue."). Neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has established a standard by which a claim of cumulative error must be determined.

  10. Saranchak v. Beard

    538 F. Supp. 2d 847 (M.D. Pa. 2008)   Cited 8 times

    As long as the state court is given the opportunity to address the claim, it is exhausted, even if the state court refuses to hear the claim because it is time-barred or waived. Pursell v. Horn, 187 F. Supp. 2d 260, 288-89 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (citing Bond v. Fulcomer, 864 F.2d 306, 309 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that presentation of an untimely petition to the state's highest court satisfied the exhaustion requirement)); see also Laird v. Horn, 159 F. Supp. 2d 58, 91 (E.D. Pa 2001) (concluding that petitioner had exhausted claim where it was presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on PCRA review and rejected on grounds of waiver). Saranchak has satisfied the exhaustion requirement in this case.