Opinion
Docket No. 019145-2013
10-17-2014
Re: Richard K. and Elizabeth A. Purcell v. Borough of Woodcliff Lake Block 2102, Lot 6.03
Brian DeVito, Esq. 154 Union Avenue Suite 35 Rutherford, NJ 07070 Steven Muhlstock, Esq. Gittleman, Muhlstock & Chewcaskie, LLP 2200 Fletcher Avenue 9W Office Center Fort Lee, NJ 07204
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT APPROVAL OF THE TAX COURT COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS JOSEPH M. ANDRESINI JUDGE
Corrected 10/20/14 - pg 2, last paragraph
Brian DeVito, Esq.
154 Union Avenue
Suite 35
Rutherford, NJ 07070
Steven Muhlstock, Esq.
Gittleman, Muhlstock & Chewcaskie, LLP
2200 Fletcher Avenue
9W Office Center
Fort Lee, NJ 07204
Dear Counselors:
This letter serves as the court's opinion with respect to the Borough of Woodcliff Lake's (hereinafter "Defendant") motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs, Richard and Elizabeth Purcell (hereinafter "Plaintiff" or "Plaintiffs") filed a complaint appealing the Bergen County Board of Taxation's Memorandum of Judgment dated December 20, 2013, wherein the Board denied retroactive application of deductions against Plaintiffs' property taxes under N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10 et seq. (hereinafter the "Veteran's Deduction") with respect to Plaintiffs' property located at 9 Lyons Court in Woodcliff Lake for the tax years 1985 to 2012. This opinion follows Defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment, in which it contends there are no material facts in dispute which could form the basis for a retroactive application of the Veteran's Deduction. For each of the individual reasons set forth below, summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant.
Procedural History and Findings of Fact
For the purposes of this motion, all reasonable inferences and disputes of material fact are resolved in favor of the non-moving party. See Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance, 142 N.J. 520 (1995). The relevant facts are as follows:
Richard K. Purcell served in the United States Marine Corps from about 1966-1968. Following his honorable discharge, Mr. Purcell and his wife, Elizabeth Purcell, acquired, in 1972, property located at 25 Amy Court in the Borough of Woodcliff Lake. At that same time, the Purcells applied for the Veteran's Property Tax Deduction, N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10 et seq., on the basis of Mr. Purcell's service in the Marine Corps. The Borough granted the Purcells' application for the Veteran's Deduction, which they continued to receive pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.16 from Tax Year 1972 through Tax Year 1984. When the Purcells moved to their new residence in 1984, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Purcell submitted a written application to receive he deduction on the new property. Woodcliff Lake did not apply the deduction to the new property for Tax Year 1985 or the years thereafter, until Tax Year 2013. Neither party disputes these facts.
In the early 1980s, the Purcells began the aforementioned move to 9 Lyons Court, which is also in Woodcliff Lake. Prior to the move, Mr. Purcell attended numerous municipal meetings in order to ensure that he remained informed of the process concerning his new home. In his May 6, 2014 deposition, Mr. Purcell stated that he only recalled having one conversation regarding his property taxes with the Borough tax assessor, probably between 1981 and 1983. The person Mr. Purcell recalled as the Borough's tax assessor was Paul Dattoli. Though there is some question as to Mr. Purcell's certainty as to the identity of the person he spoke with, he stated at several points during the deposition and during a prior hearing, that he specifically met with the Borough assessor and that that person was Mr. Dattoli. The only record of this conversation presently before the court originates from Mr. Purcell's memory, and Mr. Purcell's uncertainty as to the accuracy of the statements made during the deposition stems from the fact that the conversation took place about thirty years ago.
During the one conversation relevant to this matter, which took place sometime between 1981 and 1983, Mr. Purcell stated he and Mr. Dattoli discussed the effect that an increase in the size of the 9 Lyons Court lot would have on his property taxes. He further stated that he could not remember speaking with anyone other than Mr. Dattoli about any aspect of his property taxes, that he did not have any other specific conversation with the tax assessor or with the tax collector, and that he did not have any other relevant conversations regarding "tax matters." Mr. Purcell "wasn't too concerned at that point with [his] tax condition on any of the property that [he] owned, namely [his] prior home." Other than the conversation with Mr. Dattoli, Mr. Purcell did not have any conversations with any Borough official regarding his taxes. Likewise, there were no letters or other written communications to any municipal official regarding same.
In his deposition, Mr. Purcell also stated that he personally knew several of the municipal official and administrators, they communicated regularly, and that he made several appearances before them at hearings, all regarding his move to 9 Lyons Court generally. No documentation for these conversations or appearances, or what specifically was discussed in any of them has been produced by Plaintiffs. No writings have been brought to the attention of this court and there is no record of any writings by Plaintiffs to the Borough regarding the status of their property taxes generally, or the Veteran's Deduction specifically, until 2012. Mr. Purcell believed making a written submission was not necessary as he was familiar with "multiple administrator-agents of Defendant, including the tax assessor." Because those administrators knew he was a veteran, receiving the Veteran's Deduction, and moving residences within Woodcliff Lake, he assumed he would continue receiving the deduction. However, as stated, the record does not contain any other references to any appearances, conversations, or writings which may have been exchanged during the period between 1981 and 1985. All the court has to rely on is Mr. Purcell's assertion that conversations of an unspecified nature took place between 1981 and 1984, but prior to his move. Therefore, the only reasonable inference the court can draw from those facts is that Mr. Purcell did not have a conversation between 1981 and 1985 with any municipal official in which they specifically spoke about his Veteran's Deduction.
There were no relevant conversations between the Purcells and the Borough tax collector or tax assessor between 1984 and 2012. Notwithstanding the fact that the deduction did not appear on his tax bills, a fact he would have realized had they been properly reviewed, Mr. Purcell assumed he was continuing to receive the Veteran's Deduction. Notably, during his term as councilman between 1989 and 1991, Mr. Purcell did not speak with anyone regarding the deduction.
In October 2012, finally having realized that he was not receiving the deduction, Mr. Purcell did contact the Borough by going to the tax collector's office, but was told that he was required to petition the Bergen County Board of Taxation because the deduction could not be applied retroactively. On November 19, 2012, the Purcells filed a Petition of Appeal to recover the unapplied deductions for tax years 1985-2012 and seek recovery from this court on that basis. Alternatively, they seek recovery under the Correction of Errors statute, N.J.S.A. 54:51A-7 on the basis that that the denial of the deduction did not involve any exercise of judgment or leave anything to the discretion of the municipality. The Purcells have received the deduction from tax years 2013 through the present.
On that basis, on March 13, 2014, Defendant made a motion for summary judgment, arguing that when they moved, Plaintiffs were required to file a new application, in writing, with the Woodcliff Lake tax assessor for the Veteran's Deduction for 9 Lyons Court and the failure to do so precludes a judgment, as a matter of law, in favor of the Plaintiffs. Defendant further argues that because the relevant facts allegedly took place about thirty years ago, and the failure to apply was completely due to Plaintiffs' error, their complaint should be dismissed on equitable grounds. Plaintiffs argue that the statute required Defendant to carry Plaintiffs' deduction when they moved to their new residence and Defendant's failure to do so was erroneous, that discovery was not completed, and that the complaint should not be dismissed on equitable grounds because there is no prejudice to Defendant in allowing the case to go forward. The court denied the motion without prejudice on April 11, 2014, so as to allow discovery to continue on the issue of whether Mr. Purcell informed the assessor as required by the statute.
The court notes here that Defendant does not dispute the facts which support Plaintiffs' eligibility to take the deduction on 9 Lyons Court. Rather, Defendant's position is that eligibility alone does not establish that Defendant was required to apply the deduction to that property, as there were other statutory requirements which Plaintiffs did not satisfy.
On June 9, 2014, after taking the above-referenced deposition on May 6, 2014, Defendant renewed its motion for summary judgment. At that time, Defendant revealed that Division of Taxation records show Mr. Dattoli was only the Woodcliff Lake assessor until 1979, and at no time thereafter. The assessors for the Borough between 1981 and 1985, the time of the Purcells' move, were Wilbur Heinmeyer and John P. Cambell. Robert Layton, the Bergen County Tax Administrator for the past twenty-two years, provided a certification stating that information came from the "State of New Jersey Annual Report of the Division of Taxation." Notably, now having been informed as to who the true assessors were, Plaintiffs have not submitted a certification or attempted to amend deposition answers in a way that would indicate the person Mr. Purcell really spoke with was Mr. Heinmeyer or Mr. Cambell; instead all the court has received is their counsel's argument that it is possible Mr. Purcell misremembered the individual he spoke with and that he really spoke with the assessor. For whatever reason, the parties have been unable to contact Mr. Dattoli, Mr. Heinmeyer, or Mr. Campbell, and it is presumed that they are unavailable, as it is unknown where they are employed, whether they continue to be residents of New Jersey, or whether they are still living.
At oral argument and in his brief, the Purcells' attorney raised doubts as to the reliability of these records, but the court is satisfied that it can take judicial notice of those facts, discussed at greater length below. Moreover, the Purcells have not offered a scintilla of evidence to support their doubts about the accuracy of the records, nor have they offered any proof as to who they believe the true assessor was, other than Mr. Purcell's admittedly uncertain memory.
Following the hearing on August 1, 2014, this court held its opinion so that the parties could brief the jurisdictional question raised by the court. After hearing final arguments on October 3, 2014, the court now renders its opinion on that motion and grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant.
Conclusions of Law
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Current New Jersey Court Rules allow either party to move for summary judgment before the case is tried. The court should grant the motion if, from the pleadings, depositions, answers, admissions, and affidavits, it appears that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged." R. 4:46-2. This court, when presented with a motion for summary judgment, will grant the same where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact . . . and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment or order as a matter of law." Id. It is the movant who bears the "burden to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact" regarding the claims asserted. Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954) (citations omitted). A genuine issue of material fact exists "only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties, on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact." R. 4:46-2(c).
In making a determination as to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, for summary judgment purposes, the trial court must ascertain "what reasonable conclusions a rational jury can draw from the evidence[.]" Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 535.
[T]he court must accept as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and must accord that party the benefit of all legitimate inferences which can be deduced therefrom. Thus, if reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied.
[Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1 on R. 4:40-2 (2014).]
"[T]he essence of the inquiry. . . [is] 'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 536 (citation omitted). The trial court is required to consider "whether the competent evidential materials presented, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Id. at 540. Accordingly, "a non-moving party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by pointing to any fact in dispute." Ibid. Instead, the non-moving party has the burden "to make an affirmative demonstration, where the means are at hand to do so, that the facts are not as the movant alleges." Spiotta v. William H. Wilson, Inc., 72 N.J. Super. 572, 581 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 37 N.J. 229 (1962).
Even though the allegations of the pleadings may raise an issue of fact, if other papers show that, in fact, there is no real material issue, then summary judgment can be granted. Ibid. Thus, "bare conclusions in the pleadings, without factual support in tendered affidavits, will not defeat a meritorious application for summary judgment." U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 67 N.J. Super. 384, 399-400 (App. Div. 1961) (citation omitted). Furthermore, disputed issues, which are of an insubstantial nature, cannot overcome a motion for summary judgment. See Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 529. Therefore, "when the evidence 'is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,' the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment." Id. at 540 (citation omitted).
To survive summary judgment, the non-moving party must provide more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of its position. There must exist evidence from which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. See Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 532-534. Accordingly, the opposing party may offer facts which are substantial or material in opposing the motion, in order to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Judson, supra, 17 N.J. at 75. The non-movant may defeat the motion by demonstrating that the evidential material relied upon by the moving party, considered in light of the applicable burden of proof, raises sufficient credibility issues to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." D'Amato v. D'Amato, 305 N.J. Super. 109, 114 (App. Div. 1997).
The court will first dispense with a brief preliminary issue. Summary judgment motions require the moving party to be served with briefs and a statement of material facts. R. 4:46-2(a). The statement of facts should be set forth in separately numbered paragraphs, each containing a concise statement of fact and a citation to the record. Ibid. In his brief, counsel for Plaintiffs argues that the motion should be denied because Defendant's counsel failed to set forth a statement of material facts in numbered paragraphs when he made his renewed motion for summary judgment.
Though the rules are not optional and they are designed to conserve judicial resources and focus the parties, see Lyons v. Township of Wayne, 185 N.J. 426, 435-36 (2005), the complete procedural history of this case leads this court to the finding that Defendant complied with the rule. Here, the present motion is renewed, in that Defendant is bringing the same motion before the court which it previously denied without prejudice solely for the purpose of allowing the parties to continue discovery. The present motion relies on the same facts as Defendant's initial motion for summary judgment, which did contain a statement of material facts in numbered paragraphs. Defendant's renewed motion and the parties' briefs contain numerous references to the facts which formed the basis of the prior motion.
Furthermore, the failure to use numbered paragraphs when stating the material facts is not a material deviation from the rule, and therefore is not fatal. See Hancock v. Borough of Oaklyn, 347 N.J. Super. 350, 362 (App. Div. 2002), app. dism'd, 177 N.J. 217 (2003). Here, Defendant's brief on the renewed motion contains numerous statements of material fact, albeit not in numbered paragraphs, with numerous citations to the record. The court is satisfied that Defendant has complied with the requirements of R. 4:46-2(a).
II. Tax Years 1985-2011
A. Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs did not appeal Defendant's failure to apply the Veteran's Deduction for tax years 1985-2012 until November 2012. The relevant statute states, "an aggrieved taxpayer may appeal from the disposition of a claim for a veteran's deduction under this act in the same manner as is provided for appeals from assessment generally." N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21. Thus, a taxpayer who wishes to appeal from a municipality's denial of the Veteran's Deduction must do so in the same manner as a general property tax appeal. Thus, the appeal must conform to and meet the requirements of the statutes creating the right to take a general property tax appeal.
As far as the court can tell, application of N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 is an issue of first impression, in that there is no clear precedent from any trial or appellate court establishing its applicability. However, based on its reading of N.J.A.C. 18:27-2.25, the court is satisfied that the phrase "appeals from assessment generally" is a reference to N.J.S.A. 54:3-21. The parties have not suggested, nor can the court identify, a statute with a better application here.
Before moving onto the identification and application of the statutory requirements for filing an appeal in this case, the court must address an argument raised by Plaintiffs' counsel. Here, Plaintiffs are in the unique position of arguing against application of the appropriate jurisdictional statute. They argue that N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 does not apply to their case at bar because Defendant could never have made a disposition of Plaintiffs' application for the Veterans' deduction because same was never submitted (in 1984-85). Plaintiffs ask the court to adopt a narrow interpretation of the statute, and to hold that a disposition only occurs when the relevant authority takes an affirmative step to grant or deny an application; here, because Defendant did neither, there was no disposition. Withholding a taxpayer's deduction where there is no application made that year, Plaintiffs argue, does not constitute a "disposition" or "a final settlement or determination." See Black's Law Dictionary 539 (9th ed. 2009).
The reason for this is that application of N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 ultimately results in dismissal for lack of jurisdiction due to untimely filing.
This argument is not as helpful as Plaintiffs think. Even if they are correct, there must be another statute (not a court rule) which gives this court jurisdiction, or else the court still lacks the ability to hear their claims. However further, if they are correct, it would also logically follow from their argument that there would be no controversy for the county board or this court to decide in the first place. In reaching the logical conclusion of Plaintiffs' argument, under their interpretation, the municipality could not have made a decision on the application (there being no application to decide) and there would be no municipal action—the lack of a "disposition" would mean there is no basis for the controversy. There is an obvious disconnect in reaching this end because, clearly, there is a concrete and actual conflict or controversy between the parties. Since agreeing with Plaintiffs' logic here would ultimately lead the court to make such a finding, which would clearly contradict the undisputed facts which show there is an actual controversy, the court rejects Plaintiff's argument on this issue.
The Plaintiffs not having made a suggestion, the Court also contemplates as to which statute Plaintiffs believe would serve as the jurisdictional basis for this case. The court is unable to identify one other than N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21. The Tax Court is one of limited jurisdiction. See McMahon v. City of Newark, 195 N.J. 526, 546 (2008). "[The Tax Court] can constitutionally exercise only that jurisdiction which the Legislature has seen fit to confer upon it." Alid, Inc. v. Township of North Bergen, 180 N.J. Super. 592, 601 (App. Div.), app. dismissed as moot, 89 N.J. 388 (1981). The Tax Court only has jurisdiction to grant equitable relief on matters which are already within its statutory jurisdiction. See id. at 602. Plaintiffs' counsel did suggest the court has jurisdiction based on New Jersey Court Rule 8:2. However, that rule "does not enlarge the jurisdiction of the Tax Court," id. at 604, i.e. it does not create jurisdiction in the court where it would not otherwise exist. Even if this court were willing to give Plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt and accept R. 8:2 as establishing jurisdiction, using Plaintiffs' definition of the term "disposition" the court doubts it would have jurisdiction here. The rule gives the Tax Court the power to review "final decisions," but since, according to Plaintiffs there was no "final settlement or determination," their own logic would seem to discount the possibility that R. 8:2 could serve as a jurisdictional basis for the present action. This court finds that "disposition" as used in N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 and "final decision" as used in R. 8:2 must be interpreted in essentially the same way; therefore the court cannot fathom a scenario where, using Plaintiffs' definition of "disposition," N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 would not be the appropriate jurisdictional hook, while R. 8:2 would still create jurisdiction in the Tax Court. Given the generally accepted parameters for the Tax Court's jurisdiction, it appears that this court would not have jurisdiction if it agreed with Plaintiffs' ultimate conclusion on this issue. Since Plaintiffs have not provided the court with an alternative basis for jurisdiction and the court cannot identify one, the court would still have to dismiss Plaintiffs claims for a lack of jurisdiction, even if it agreed with Plaintiffs' conclusions with respect to N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21.
Furthermore, despite Plaintiffs' argument to the contrary, it is they that suggest the more contorted definition of the term "disposition." Plaintiffs' definition limiting the term to only a grant or denial when there is an actual application before the appropriate authority is unnaturally constrictive. They point out that applications can be required in future years if requested by the assessor and that an application must otherwise be carried forward indefinitely, see N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.16; N.J.A.C. 18:27-3.9, in support of the argument that there is no disposition in a year when there is no application, because "there is no pending issue to dispose of." This position is the better one, Plaintiffs argue, because it maintains the ordinary meaning of the term "disposition."
The court does not agree. When determining legislative intent, statutes in the same statutory scheme are to be read together in order to avoid inconsistency. See I/M/O Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 115 (1997). Looking at the entire statutory scheme, the court reads it as providing for a disposition of an application each year, even if there is no formal application pending before the assessor, tax collector, or appropriate governing body. Though the municipality may be restricted in its decision by the terms of the various statutes, it ultimately must make a decision each year as to whether it will apply the deduction to each applicant's property taxes. This municipal discretion is implicit in the statute—the municipality can stop applying the deduction if there is a change in the claimant's status, for example, if the claimant moves. See N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.16 (imposing a duty on the taxpayer to inform the assessor of a change in status); N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.15. To limit the court's jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 only to cases where there was a grant or denial of an actual application would be to deny the availability of a remedy to a taxpayer for some years but not for others. Under Plaintiffs' definition of "disposition," if a municipality wrongfully refuses to apply the deduction in a later year (where the application was not filed that year), the court would not have jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 to hear that taxpayer's appeal. This analytical fallacy is evident when considering some examples. Plaintiffs seem to be suggesting that a claimant should file an application every year, as a precaution, so the court would have jurisdiction to hear an appeal on the minor possibility that the municipality would wrongfully refuse to apply the deduction. Furthermore, it seems that in the event that a municipality would be required to stop applying the deductions due to a change in the taxpayer's status, Plaintiffs would have the assessor require the taxpayer to file a new application so that there would be a pending application to deny. Those two examples suggest requirements that contradict the terms and the purpose of the statutes when read together. Plaintiffs' interpretation treats different tax years differently because it would only allow for an appeal in an application year, and in no subsequent year. It is unlikely that the Legislature intended to treat different tax years regarding the same veteran and the same application so disparately so as to give this court jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 for some years but not for others. Moreover, that interpretation misses the thrust of the statutory scheme, which is to make it easier for veterans to obtain the deduction while also allowing the municipality to stop the deductions where there is a change in status. The court treats N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.16 as requiring the municipality to make a final determination each year as to whether to apply the deduction, even though there is no new application and it's choice in whether to apply the deduction may be limited by the statute.
The court notes that this is essentially Plaintiffs' argument on their underlying claim in this matter. This is where the court derives its basis for stating that if N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 does not apply, there would be no basis for Plaintiffs' claim because there was no application filed in the years 1984-2012, inclusive.
In relevant part, that statute states that a claim shall "continue in force from year to year thereafter without the necessity for further claim so long as the claimant shall be entitled to a veteran's deduction hereunder. . ."
The logical fallacy in Plaintiffs' argument is now quite evident, but one more step is required: consideration of the result which would occur were the court to accept it. With respect to the underlying claim in this matter, Plaintiffs' argument is essentially as follows: (1) the filing of the first application on their first property in Woodcliff Lake was sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements to receive the deduction on their second property, also in Woodcliff Lake, and (2) that a second application was not required to receive the deduction—they simply needed to notify Defendant that they were moving. The basis of the claim, therefore is that the municipality wrongfully denied the deduction after receiving the first application in 1972 and receiving further notice that Plaintiffs were moving in 1984. However their N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 argument, in which they argue the statute does not apply, is in direct conflict with Plaintiffs' underlying claim. It would be inconsistent for the court to accept Plaintiff's argument that a second application was not necessary, but then refrain from applying N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 because there was no second application on which the municipality could take action.
It is not inconsistent, however, for the court to accept both of Defendant's arguments with respect to jurisdiction and the underlying claim, as it ultimately does. Defendant's argument on the underlying claim is essentially that the Veteran's Deduction is applied to the property and not to the applicant, thus when the applicant moves to a new property, a second application for the deduction must be made. It is not inconsistent for the court to accept Defendant's argument on the applicability of N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21, that the decision not to apply the deduction was precipitated by Plaintiffs' non-filing of a second application, because the ultimate underlying action which forms the basis of the present controversy is the municipality's determination that the first application on 25 Amy Court was insufficient to support a deduction with respect to 9 Lyons Court and subsequent action in stopping the deductions when Plaintiffs moved to their new home.
Rather, the court adopts a broader interpretation of "disposition." The court cannot ignore that in this case, the non-filing of the application in the proper form to the proper municipal authority by the Plaintiffs was the proximate cause of the non-"disposition" of the application. Here, the municipal action, or inaction, is the Defendant's failure to apply the deduction to 9 Lyons Court after Plaintiffs moved in 1984. The court finds that this constitutes a "disposition" contemplated by the Legislature in adopting N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 and satisfies the most natural reading of same. Further, this interpretation gives veterans who lose their deductions in violation of N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.16 in a later year a forum in which they can bring a claim appealing a municipal decision, even though they did not actually file an application that year. The court finds that this is the proper treatment of these claims, and avoids excluding claims which are properly within the court's jurisdiction.
Having determined that N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 applies in this case, the court must now determine the meaning of the statute's reference to "appeals from assessment generally." Under N.J.S.A. 54:3-21(a), in order for an appeal to be timely, it must be filed by April 1 of the tax year, or within 45 days of the notice of assessment, whichever is greater. As our Supreme Court recently reiterated, the "Tax Court is vested with limited jurisdiction" defined by statute. McMahon v. City of Newark, 195 N.J. 526, 546 (2008) (citing N.J.S.A. 2B:13-2 and Union City Assocs. v. City of Union City, 115 N.J. 17, 23 (1989)). Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 18:27-2.25, the court will apply the requirements of N.J.S.A. 54:3-21. Because appeals from municipal decisions with respect to the deduction are taken in the same manner as assessments generally, under N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21, appeals from municipal decisions must be filed for each year which is appealed. They must be filed by April 1 of the tax year, or if the disallowance of a claim occurs too late for a timely filing, the taxpayer has until April 1 of the following year to file an appeal. N.J.A.C. 18:27-2.25.
"Compliance with statutory filing requirements is an unqualified jurisdictional imperative, long sanctioned by our courts." Macleod v. City of Hoboken, 330 N.J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, 195 N.J. Super. 373, 381 (App. Div. 1984), aff'd, 100 N.J. 418 (1985)). Statutes of limitation for timely filing are to be strictly construed, see M.J. Ocean, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 23 N.J. Tax 646 (Tax 2009), therefore, the failure to timely file an appeal constitutes a fatal jurisdictional defect. See F.M.C. Stores, supra, 100 N.J. at 425 (1985). Strict adherence to statutory filing deadlines is of particular concern in tax matters, given "the exigencies of taxation and the administration of local government." Id. at 424 (citing Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 N.J. 209, 214 (1961)). It is also necessary to "provide finality and predictability of revenue to state and local government." Bonnano v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 12 N.J. Tax 552, 556 (Tax 1992) (citing Pantasote, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 8 N.J. Tax 10, 164-166 (Tax 1985). "[S]tatutory tax deadlines are 'substantive' or 'jurisdictional' statutes of limitation, and that the courts are without authority to extend such deadlines established by the Legislature." Regent Care Center v. City of Hackensack, 24 N.J. Tax 390, 401 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Horrobin v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 1 N.J. Tax 213, 216 (Tax 1979). Thus, a failure to file a timely complaint divests this court of jurisdiction even in the absence of harm to the defendant municipality. Lawrenceville Garden Apartments v. Township of Lawrence, 14 N.J. Tax 285 (App. Div. 1994).
Had Plaintiffs properly inspected their tax bills each year, they would have learned they were not receiving the Veteran's Deduction. Plaintiffs were therefore on notice of the disallowance when they received their tax bills. Even assuming, for the purpose of this motion, that Plaintiff's received their tax bill too late to make the April 1 filing deadline for that tax year, they still did not file their appeals by April 1 of each of the ensuing tax years for 1985-2011. Plaintiffs should have filed an appeal for each year in which they did not receive the deduction. Here, Plaintiff stated that he filed a petition with the Bergen County Board of Taxation on November 19, 2012 following his visit to the tax collector the prior month. Thus, the filing of Plaintiffs' appeals was too late for tax years 1985-2011, and their claims are barred as untimely, the court lacking jurisdiction to hear them.
B. The Veteran's Deduction
Though the court is satisfied that it does not have jurisdiction to hear he aforementioned appeals, there are other reasons why the court cannot grant Plaintiffs the relief they seek.
The Veteran's Deduction, N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10 et seq., is available for veterans who have served in any branch of the Armed Forces of the United States, or their surviving spouses "upon proper claim being made therefore," for a deduction against real or personal property taxes. N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.11. In order to obtain the deduction, the taxpayer must complete a written application, "on a form prescribed by the Director of the Division of Taxation." N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.12. If a claim for the deduction is made in the pretax year, it must be filed with the municipal assessor, with the tax collector if made in the tax year before all taxes are paid, and with the governing body after that year's taxes are paid. N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.13. It is not necessary to file a new claim each year once a claim for the first year is filed and allowed by the assessor. N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.16. Furthermore, the assessor can require the filing of a new application to determine the right of a taxpayer to continue receiving the deduction. N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.12; -8.16. No application is allowed for any previous tax year. N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.13. If the claim is not filed, it is lost for that year. N.J.A.C. 18:27-2.23.
In addition to the filing requirements, the applicant must satisfy other requirements. As of October 1 of the pretax year, the applicant must be a veteran who was honorably discharged after having served actively during a time of war, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10; -8.15. The veteran must also be the owner of the legal title to the property on which the deduction is claimed and be a citizen and resident of New Jersey. Ibid. A claim will not be allowed unless the claimant submits sufficient documentation to support the application, N.J.A.C. 18:27-3.2, including documentation that the applicant owns legal title to the property which is the subject of the application, according to N.J.A.C. 18:27-3.7. It is the claimant's duty to inform the assessor as to any change in his or her status or property which affects the claimant's right to continuance of the deduction. N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.16. Specifically, the assessor should examine, each year, the claimant's residency, property ownership, and marital status (in cases of claims by a surviving spouse), to ensure the deduction should be continued.
The claimant is not required to be the sole legal owner of the property in fee simple in order to receive the deduction. See N.J.A.C. 18:27-2.9. Other qualified interests in property include vested life estates, N.J.A.C. 18:27-2.10, interests under executory contracts, N.J.A.C. 18:27-2.11, shareholders in cooperatives, N.J.A.C. 18:27-2.12, and partnership interests, N.J.A.C. 18:27-2.13, each allowing the veteran to take all or part of the deduction. The deduction can be applied in any proportion to different properties, N.J.A.C. 18:27-2.16, but only one deduction is allowed per veteran, unless the claimant is also the surviving spouse of a veteran. N.J.A.C. 18:27-2.20.
The central issue to this case is whether N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10 et seq. requires an existing claimant of the Veteran's Deduction to file a new application when the claimant wants it applied to a different property. Though, this too is an issue of first impression for this court, it is prudent to start with the principle that "real property taxes are a lien against the real estate, not a personal obligation against the landowner." Alpha-Bella IV, Inc. by United Jersey Bank v. Township of Clinton, 14 N.J. Tax 597, 621 (Tax 1995) (citing City of Newark v. Central & Lafayette Realty Co., Inc., 150 N.J. Super. 18, 21 (App. Div.), certif. denied 75 N.J. 528 (1977)). Thus, it follows that the Veteran's Deduction against a claimant's real property taxes, notwithstanding that it is individual specific in that it is only allowed to certain individuals who meet the statutory requirements, is meant to relieve the lien against real estate, and cannot be used the by the claimant in the absence of such a lien. Using this principle and in reading all portions of the statutory scheme together, see J.W.D., supra, 149 N.J. at 115, the court answers the question in the affirmative and finds that a grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant is warranted on that basis.
A change in ownership, like the one which occurred in this case, is a change in status contemplated by N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.16. In order to obtain the deduction, the claimant must establish that (a) he or she is a veteran as defined by the statute, (b) he or she owns the property for which the deduction is claimed, and (c) that he or she is a citizen and a resident of New Jersey. N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.15. A change which would negate one of those statutory requirements must, this court finds, constitute a change in status, or else the duty imposed by N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.16 is meaningless. Therefore, in this case, a claimant has a duty to inform the assessor that he no longer owns the original property. It necessarily follows that a claimant is also required to take further action to ensure continued receipt of the Veterans' Deduction on some other property.
Such action would require the claimant to further inform the assessor that the deduction was to be claimed on the new property. Though the essential facts must only be demonstrated when the application is actually filed, the facts establishing eligibility must remain true for each year. See ibid. The statute, however, allows the assessor to take further steps to stop applying the deduction if he or she learns one of the essential facts may no longer be true, for example, by requiring the filing of a new application so that a final determination can be made. See ibid. Reading the statutory scheme in its entirety, it follows that to demonstrate new facts or a change in facts which establish eligibility for a property different from the one on which the deduction is currently being claimed, such facts must also be presented to the assessor. The presentation of those facts is the only way that the assessor can conclusively establish that the applicant is entitled to the deduction on the different property.
Those facts must also be demonstrated in writing. It is undisputed that the initial application must be in writing and the assessor may require additional applications, in writing, in the future. See N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.12. To establish eligibility, the claimant must provide a written application and written documentation showing each of the essential facts to be true, with the documentation attached to the application. See id.; N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.15; N.J.A.C. 18:27-3.1, -3.2, -3.5 (requiring documentation of honorable discharge), -3.7 (requiring documentation of legal ownership of the property), -3.8 (requiring documentation from a surviving spouse). Given the aforementioned principle that property tax deductions apply to the property and not to the person, and where the requirements for receipt of the deduction are the same, it would be incongruous if the Legislature intended such disparate treatment of applications for the same deduction, as Plaintiffs suggest. It is unlikely that the Legislature wanted initial applications establishing eligibility be in writing, but did not intend that same requirement for subsequent applications for the same claimant. Thus, this court finds that the statutory scheme requires that where there is a change in facts showing that a present recipient of the deduction owns new property on which he or she wishes to claim the Veteran's Deduction, such a claim must be made in a written application in the same manner as the initial application on the original property. Given that initial applications and applications required by the assessor must be in writing per N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.12, this will allow for uniform treatment of claims for the deduction on different properties and will avoid confusion as to how the deduction is to be applied when one claimant owns multiple eligible properties. Furthermore given the requirements imposed by the administrative code, requiring a written application is the best way to ensure the municipality receives accurate and complete documentation establishing the claimant's eligibility.
Here, the analysis is quite simple and this court finds that Plaintiffs did not meet the statutory requirements, even giving them the benefit of every doubt. Plaintiffs only spoke with the assessor to inquire as to how land which was added to Plaintiffs' lot would increase their property taxes. Generally, municipal officials knew they were moving. Even assuming the person Plaintiff spoke with was, in fact, the assessor and the conversation took place during the crucial period where the facts must be established for the 1985 tax year deduction to apply, those facts do not create a dispute which would warrant a denial of Defendant's motion because there was no writing.
Prior to 1972, Plaintiffs purchased 25 Amy Court and submitted their application for the Veteran's Deduction with respect to that property. Though the Court does not have the 1972 Application before it, it assumes that because Plaintiffs received the deduction, the 1972 Application showed that (a) Richard Purcell was honorably discharged from the United States Armed Forces, (b) the Purcells were the legal owners of the 25 Amy Court, and (c) that Richard Purcell was a citizen and resident of New Jersey. Plaintiffs continued to receive the deduction through tax year 1984. Plaintiffs then sold their home, thus for Tax Year 1985 fact (b) was no longer established because they were no longer the legal owners of 25 Amy Court. This constituted a change in status implicating their duty under N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.16 to inform the assessor. It is unclear whether that obligation was satisfied, as no evidence was submitted to the court. In any event, as a result, the assessor stopped applying the deduction starting in 1985.
Whether the term "inform the assessor" requires a written information and whether the assessor may unilaterally stop applying the deduction without an information or a new application pending are not at issue in this case. Assuming that the court were to rule in favor of Plaintiffs on those issues, the court still would not be able to award Plaintiffs the relief they seek. Those issues concern the validity of the discontinuance of the deduction with respect to 25 Amy Court, on which Plaintiffs were no longer paying property tax starting in 1985. A ruling on that issue would not concern 9 Lyons Court, on which Plaintiffs seek to retroactively apply the deduction. Thus, those issues are not decided here.
In order to receive the deduction on another property, including 9 Lyons Court, Plaintiffs were required to apply to the assessor. Prior to the submission of the second application in writing, Plaintiffs had not yet established essential fact (b), having not provided documentation that they were the legal owners of 9 Lyons Court, thus they were not entitled to the Veteran's Deduction. To argue that Plaintiffs did not have to establish that essential fact in writing simply because they own or owned other property in the municipality, received the deduction against their property taxes for another property, and orally told a municipal official (even assuming that person was actually the assessor), is a misreading of the statutory scheme (including the relevant statutes and sections of the administrative code). If the Legislature intended to exclude claimants already receiving the deduction and who want to receive the deduction on different property from the requirement that they establish the essential facts under N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.15 with respect to the different property, it would have so stated. In the statutes, as written, there simply is nothing to suggest that an application for the deduction with respect to one property could somehow serve to apply the deduction in a later year to a different property owned by the same applicant. Because it appears from the record that a new application was not submitted in 2013, Plaintiffs cannot succeed on their claims as a matter of law. Since N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.13 precludes granting a deduction for a prior tax year, this court cannot grant the relief Plaintiffs seek and summary judgment is appropriate.
C. Substantial Compliance
The facts of this case which are relevant to this analysis are as follows and are taken from Mr. Purcell's deposition: Plaintiff spoke with Mr. Dattoli in his office in a municipal building. Mr. Dattoli was familiar with Mr. Purcell as they had a social relationship, and he knew the Purcells were moving to a new home in Woodcliff Lake. He also knew that the Purcells were receiving the Veteran's Deduction because everyone in the municipality knew that Mr. Purcell was a veteran. During the conversation, the two men discussed the fact that a piece of land would be added to Mr. Purcell's to be acquired property and its subsequent consequences to his property taxes. The Veteran's Deduction did not come up, whatsoever. Plaintiffs essentially ask the court to find that these facts are sufficient to satisfy the statutes' requirements to receive the deduction on 9 Lyons Court.
Courts can apply the doctrine of substantial compliance to avoid a defeat of a valid claim on a technicality. Zamel v. Port of New York Authority, 56 N.J. 1 (1970). The party seeking relief must show:
(1) the lack of prejudice to the defending party; (2) a series of steps taken to comply with the statute involved; (3) a general compliance with the purpose of the statute; (4) a reasonable notice of petitioner's claim, and (5) a reasonable explanation why there was not a strict compliance with the statute.
[Galik v. Clara Maass Medical Center, 167 N.J. 341 (2001) (quoting Bernstein v. Board of Trustees, 151 N.J. Super. 71 (App. Div. 1977).]
'"[C]arelessness, lack of circumspection, or lack of diligence on the part of counsel are not extraordinary circumstances which will excuse missing a filing deadline.'" Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398, 405 (2001) (quoting Burns v. Belafsky, 326 N.J. Super. 462, 470 (App. Div. 1999)) (discussing the Court's implicit adoption of this standard), overruled on other grounds, 166 N.J. 466, (2001).
An application of the factors does not change the outcome in this case. The court will examine the factors below:
1. Prejudice to Defendant
Here, Defendant would suffer prejudice by being forced to defend claims based on facts which occurred more than thirty years ago, and are asserted in a claim raised well beyond the statutory deadline for filing. Given that Tax Court judges do not have the authority to relax statutory deadlines, see Regent Care Center, supra, 24 N.J. Tax at 401, the court certainly cannot allow Plaintiffs to bring claims which should have been raised in the mid-1980s. To force Defendant to defend against such claims, where there are no written reports, the only available witness is one of the parties, and there are no recordings or correspondence reflecting what may have been discussed is highly prejudicial given the delay and lack of notice and is a reason why courts have barred such stale claims on jurisdictional grounds. Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 181 (2003) (citing Dorchester Manor v. Borough of New Milford, 287 N.J. Super. 163, 172 (Law Div. 1994), aff'd, 287 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 1996)).
Defendant cannot possibly be expected to produce evidence which is pertinent to this case beyond what has already been produced here. None of the former assessors are available, and by Plaintiff's own admission, there is no written documentation of any correspondence that Defendant may have in a file tucked away in an office somewhere in a municipal building. Plaintiffs are essentially relying on unsubstantiated allegations that they satisfied the "inform" requirement of the statute, which Defendant cannot possibly be expected to refute with anything other than a denial. Ordinarily, this would be a question of credibility suitable for a trial, but the court finds here that the unreasonably long delay in bringing the claim, which was caused solely and entirely by Plaintiffs, alone creates substantial and unwarranted prejudice to Defendant, regardless of whether the allegations are true, justifying a holding that Plaintiffs did not substantially comply with the statute.
Separate from its jurisdictional analysis, the court is also cognizant that a timely filing is essential to this statute in particular. N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.13 makes clear that claims for prior tax years may not be made. Every year, each municipality creates a list of claimants in order to receive reimbursement from the State of New Jersey. See N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.24. However, for whatever reason, the state cannot or will not provide reimbursement for deductions granted retroactively. See New Jersey Property Tax Deduction, http://www.state.nj.us/military/veterans/niguide/tax-deduction.html (last visited October 8, 2014). The website clearly states, "Refunds for Deductions - NO RETROACTIVE payment for the deduction for any previous year(s) when an application was not filed with all supporting documentation." Thus it is important for applications to be filed in a timely manner so that the municipality can be reimbursed. Since that did not happen in this case, Defendant would be prejudiced where there is a deduction allowed without the availability of reimbursement.
2. Steps Taken in Attempts to Comply with the Statute
In New Jersey, all taxpayers are charged with knowledge of the law. Mayfair, supra, 4 N.J. Tax at 41 (citing Gibraltar Factors Corp. v. Slapo, 41 N.J. Super. 381, 384 (App. Div. 1956), aff'd, 23 N.J. 459 (1957)). Thus, Plaintiffs are charged with knowledge of the statutory requirements. Though Defendant would have had documentation of Plaintiff's service in the Armed Forces and his residence and citizenship in New Jersey, no documentation was ever submitted demonstrating that Plaintiffs were the legal owners of the property subject to the deduction. Plaintiffs never attempted to submit such information. Nor did they ever attempt to submit a writing of any kind. They did not even check their tax bill to ensure they were receiving the deduction. Plaintiffs can hardly claim to have taken sufficient steps for the court to find this factor in their favor. The court declines to state which steps would be sufficient to constitute substantial compliance, but simply holds that the actions here were insufficient.
The court takes particular note of the timing of events and the fact that Plaintiff claims he spoke with Mr. Dattoli at some point between 1981 and 1983. Plaintiff admits that they did not discuss the Veteran's Deduction. Therefore, it cannot possibly said that Plaintiff was attempting to "inform" the assessor as required by the statute. Even if they had discussed the deduction, the conversation took place, at the latest, in 1983, prior to the date on which Plaintiffs acquired 9 Lyons Court by deed on April 23, 1984. At the time of the conversation, Plaintiff could not have provided documentation, in 1983, that he was the legal owner of property he did not acquire until 1984.
The court also cannot find that Plaintiff spoke with the assessor. Defendant has submitted evidence showing that Mr. Dattoli has not been the assessor in Woodcliff Lake since 1979. That evidence was taken from State of New Jersey records and was certified by the Bergen County Tax Administrator. In an unsuccessful attempt to create a dispute of material fact, Plaintiffs first argue that since the Administrator does not work for a party to the action, his certification is not reliable, and second, that he has not actually provided the identity of the assessor during the relevant time period, but rather has certified the contents of a publication which has not been demonstrated as reliable and is unsigned. That, according to Plaintiff, makes the publication's reliability dubious. The court does not agree.
In effect, the Administrator is certifying the contents of records maintained by the State of New Jersey. Defendant correctly points out that this is the most reliable source of information, and the court finds it is certainly more reliable than Plaintiff's memory, which is unsubstantiated. At this point, there is no better evidence available, and Plaintiffs have offered nothing other than allegations that the source is not reliable. The court also finds that this fact is judicially noticeable under New Jersey Rules of Evidence R. 201(b)(3); the accuracy of the state's records cannot reasonably be questioned and can generally be accepted as correct. See Planned Parenthood v. Farmer, 165 N.J. 609, 640 n.10 (2000) (taking judicial notice of a publication of the American Medical Association, noting "[it] is a widely respected 153-year-old society of American physicians and has no direct interest in the outcome of this litigation."); G.D. v. Kenny, 411 N.J. Super. 176, 193 (App. Div. 2009), aff'd, 205 N.J. 275 (2011); Williamson v. Treasurer of State of New Jersey, 350 N.J. Super. 236, 242 (App. Div. 2002). Thus there is no genuine material dispute of fact that Mr. Dattoli was not the assessor during the relevant time period.
The court is also unsure why the fact that Mr. Layton is not an agent of a party to the action makes his certification unreliable. Counsel does not provide any basis for this suggestion. In fact, it would seem the fact that he is not employed by a party would make his certification more reliable, not less, since he does not have a stake in the outcome of this litigation.
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Plaintiffs respond that Mr. Purcell was simply mistaken in his recounting some of the details which gave rise to his claims—that the person he spoke with was actually the assessor, not Mr. Dattoli, and that he misremembered the timing of some events. While it is true that Plaintiff expressed that he was not completely positive of the facts, the court does not find that there is a legitimate reasonable inference which can be drawn in favor of Plaintiffs based on the facts before it. At best, it can only be stated that Mr. Purcell spoke with some other person at some other time, a very vague and undefined assertion, and hardly sufficient to create reasonable inference that Mr. Purcell spoke to the actual assessor during the relevant time period, 1984-85. That would be too much of a leap based on his testimony in his deposition and his basis for remembering certain facts. Overall, Plaintiffs' steps taken in their attempt to comply with the statute were inadequate to justify a finding of substantial compliance.
3. Compliance with the general purpose of the statute
There are several practical concerns which result from allowing oral conversations, which the Court finds persuasive in holding that the Plaintiffs' were required to submit a new written application for 9 Lyons Court and that they did not substantially comply with the statute. The first is that the lack of clarity which results from a lack of written documentation. This case presents a prime example as to why the better interpretation of the statute is to require a writing. Without a writing, parties can raise claims decades after the facts giving rise to the claims occurred. Potential witnesses are unavailable, the only record of the facts is the claimant himself, and he has expressed that he is not completely certain as to any of the facts to which he testified. Memories fade over thirty years and witnesses disappear, leaving the court with little evidence with which to determine the precise course of events. Without the need for written documentation, cases can devolve into "he-said, she-said" disputes. The relatively small burden imposed on claimants by requiring them to file application in writing is far outweighed by the burden imposed by the difficult nature of fact-finding decades later when claimants raise disputes and there is no written documentation. Thus the court finds that it is crucial to complying with the statute that a writing be submitted, which was not done in this case.
The need for written documentation is even more evident when considering even more complex cases. As stated above, there are various interests which qualify for the Veteran's Deduction, including life estates and partnership interests. Claimants also can own multiple residences, as well. Clearly, it is possible for claimants to own multiple properties which qualify for the deduction. Only one deduction is allowed per claimant per year, but the deduction can be applied to several properties. The ultimate conclusion made by the court here is that absent a succinct, direct, and unambiguous request or direction from the claimant, it would be improper for the assessor to attempt to guess or infer how a claimant wishes to apply his or her deduction.
It is possible that Plaintiffs own several properties which qualify. They may have wanted to apply the deduction to a property of which the assessor was not aware. They may have wanted to split the deduction among several properties. It would have been reasonable for the assessor to believe they were keeping 25 Amy Court, on which they were already claiming the deduction. The number of scenarios can go on indefinitely, but Plaintiffs still would only be entitled to one Veteran's Deduction. That deduction can be applied in an infinite number of ways. If the statute did not require a clear and unequivocal instruction as to how to apply a claimant's deduction, assessors would be left guessing.
Plaintiffs reliance on the fact that municipal officials knew them personally, and therefore should have known to apply the Veteran's Deduction is misplaced. If Plaintiffs, instead of remaining in Woodcliff Lake, had moved to a different town with a different assessor who did not know them, the municipality would not have known to apply the deduction, even though Plaintiffs were already receiving it, absent a new written application demonstrating all the essential facts. The court finds that the factual distinctions between that scenario and the present case to be immaterial. There is no basis to find that the statute intended to treat claimants who move to a new home in the same municipality any differently from claimants who move to a new town. Nor is there any basis to find that the statute intended to treat claimants who know municipal officials any differently than those who do not. Since the only way for a claimant to make a succinct, direct, and unambiguous request to an independent, unfamiliar municipal assessor is through a written request, which Plaintiffs in this case did not do, the court holds that they did not comply with the general purpose of the statute.
The court refuses to read the statute in a way that would expect an assessor to know the complete extent of a claimant's property or infer how they wished to apply their deduction. Yet that is what Plaintiffs essentially argue here: they want the court to grant the deductions on the grounds that the assessor should have (or did) know they were moving, and should have known they wanted the deduction applied on the new property. While that would have been a reasonable conclusion for the assessor to make, there are a number of other reasonable conclusions the assessor could have drawn which do not involve applying the deduction to 9 Lyons Court. This court refuses to require the assessor to guess or infer.
4. Reasonable Notice of Plaintiffs' Claim
Defendant did not have reasonable notice of Plaintiff's claim because no writing was submitted. As indicated above, the permutations and combinations in which Plaintiffs could have applied their deduction are endless. Assuming that the assessor knew that Plaintiffs were eligible to receive the deduction, that knowledge does not establish that the assessor should have also known how the Plaintiffs wanted to apply the deduction. Along those lines, there is nothing in the record on which the court can find a material dispute of fact exists or a reasonable inference can be drawn that would warrant a denial of summary judgment.
5. Explanation for Failure to Strictly Comply
Plaintiffs never attempted to file any kind of appeal, whether in proper or improper form until 2012, nearly thirty years after the first alleged wrongful denial of their claim occurred. It would have been easy for the Plaintiffs to discover they were not receiving the deduction—they simply should have checked their tax bills. Apparently that was not done here. Even assuming that Plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that Defendant erroneously failed to apply the deduction, it is the Plaintiffs' own fault for the delay in bringing the claim, which is caused by their carelessness or lack of diligence, not Defendant's. The court view's such an explanation for the delay to be unreasonable. See Palanque, 168 N.J. at 405.
III. Tax Year 2012
The court writes briefly to address Tax Year 2012 separately. In October 2012, Plaintiff went to Defendant's tax assessor to inquire about his Veteran's Deduction and was told that he would have to file an appeal with the Bergen County Board of Taxation. The court takes that action as the tax collector's constructive denial of Plaintiff's claim for the deduction. Under N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 and 54:3-21, Plaintiffs' appeal for Tax Year 2012 was due by April 1, 2013. As Plaintiffs filed their appeal in November 2012, the claim for that one year cannot be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
However, a timely filing is not enough to save Plaintiff's claim, which can still be dismissed via summary judgment for the reasons outlined above for the prior tax years. Plaintiffs submitted no writing and provided no documentation of legal ownership of the property. There is no reasonable explanation for failing to provide the writing in a timely manner. Though Plaintiffs took more definitive steps for this one tax year, the court does not find those steps rise to the level of "substantial" or that they outweigh the deficiencies that were present in their attempt to receive the deduction in 2012.
IV. Laches
The Tax Court has the ability to grant equitable relief "in all causes within its jurisdiction." N.J.S.A. 2B: 13-3(a). Like the preceding analysis, the equitable considerations in this case do not prevent the court from granting summary judgment.
The doctrine of laches denies a party enforcement of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable and unexplained delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other party. Knorr, supra, 178 N.J. at 173. Laches may only be enforced when the delaying party had sufficient opportunity to assert the right in a proper forum and the prejudiced party acted in good faith believing that the right had been abandoned. Ibid. With respect to tax matters, if a plaintiff is allowed to recover for the years in question, municipalities would suffer prejudice by having to defend tax appeals outside the scope anticipated, i.e., those filed beyond the statutory deadline. F.M.C. Stores, supra, 100 N.J. at 424. That notion of prejudice is apparent in this case, discussed at length above, and is one of the reasons that Tax Court judges are without discretion to grant relief from statutory filing deadlines.
In Lavin v. Board of Education of Hackensack, 90 N.J. 145 (1982), the Supreme Court defined laches as '"such neglect or omission to assert a right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity.'" Id. at 151 (quoting from 2 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence § 419 at 171-72 (5th ed. 1941)). The Court then articulated the following factors as relevant to a claim of laches: "The length of delay, reasons for delay, and changing conditions of either or both parties during the delay are the most important factors that a court considers and weighs. The length of the delay alone or in conjunction with the other elements may result in laches." Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
In order for laches to apply, the party asserting the doctrine must have "a justifiable reason to believe that the alleged rights are meritless or have been abandoned" and, as a result of a change in conditions during the delay in assertion of the rights, "it would be unjust to permit those rights now to be asserted." Dorchester Manor, supra, 287 N.J. Super, at 172 (holding that a twenty-year delay in enforcing a contract invoked the doctrine of laches). A party asserting laches must establish that the other party either knew or, with reasonable diligence and vigilance, could have known of such date of occurrence. Enfield v. FWL, Inc., 256 N.J. Super. 502, 520-21 (Ch. Div. 1991).
Here, Plaintiff knew he was entitled to receive the Veteran's Deduction, and knew he moved residences within the Borough of Woodcliff Lake. The deduction was not granted on 9 Lyons Court and there was no written paperwork regarding the issue. At any point during the intervening 28 years, Plaintiffs could have examined their tax bills to determine whether they were, in fact, receiving the deduction. They did not. Plaintiffs could have brought their claim at any time during the intervening period. They did not. As a matter of law, the court determines that there was a lack of diligence, resulting in the prejudice to Defendant, discussed above and warranting invocation of the doctrine of laches. The lapse of time between the initial discussion and the point at which Plaintiffs raised their claim is an important factor. The court finds that it is justified in respecting the finality of the tax assessments during this 28 year time period and bars relief based on the equitable doctrine of lashes in order to avoid prejudice by forcing Defendant to defend tax appeals outside the scope the Legislature anticipated.
V. Correction of Errors Statute
Plaintiffs argue that the relief they seek can be granted under the Correction of Errors Statute, N.J.S.A. 54:51A-7. The court is unaware of any case in which that statute was found to apply where the municipality mistakenly failed to apply a deduction or an exemption. Even if the statute did apply, the court could not use it to grant relief for any tax years prior to 2009. However, the court holds that it does not apply at all.
Ignoring the fact that there was no error on the part of the municipality here, as discussed above, and that the statute has not been used to correct errors made by the party invoking the statute, the error alleged is not one that can be corrected by N.J.S.A. 54:51A-7. The statute is limited to correcting "typographical errors, errors in transposing, and mistakes in tax assessments." It must be interpreted according to its plain meaning. Hovbilt Inc. v. Township of Howell, 263 N.J. 598, 618-19 (1994). To put it plainly, none of the types of errors which can be remedied are present here. Plaintiffs are not challenging the assessment for their home, rather they are challenging the denial of a deduction to be taken against the taxes owed based on that assessment. There is no allegation of "unquestionable tax assessment mistakes." See 303, Inc. v. City of North Wildwood, 21 N.J. Tax 376, 385 (Tax 2004).
There was no clerical error here, as the municipality's failure to apply the deduction was a result of Plaintiffs' failure to file a written application (or substantially comply). The municipality's failure to simply carry the deduction to the new property, which is not required by the statute as discussed above, does not constitute a clerical error which falls within the scope of N.J.S.A. 54:51A-7. See generally Hovbilt, supra, 263 N.J. 598. The court declines to apply it here.
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and Plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
Very truly yours,
/s/_________
Hon. Joseph M. Andresini, J.T.C.
JMA/JAC