Where no party objects to venue, the issue is waived. Pund v. Pund, 171 Ind. App. 347, 357 N.E.2d 257 (1976). K. The Waiting Period
Subject matter jurisdiction concerns whether or not the particular court has jurisdiction over the general class of actions to which the particular case belongs. Pund v. Pund, (1976) 171 Ind. App. 347, 357 N.E.2d 257; Brendanwood Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. Common Council, (1975) 167 Ind. App. 253, 338 N.E.2d 695, trans. denied (1976). Subject matter jurisdiction must be derived from the Constitution or a statute and cannot be conferred by the consent or agreement of the parties. Carpenter v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 98, 360 N.E.2d 839; City of Marion v. Antrobus, (1983) Ind. App., 448 N.E.2d 325.
Subject matter jurisdiction concerns whether or not the particular court has jurisdiction over the general class of actions to which the particular case belongs. Pund v. Pund, (1976) 171 Ind. App. 347, 357 N.E.2d 257; Brendanwood Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. Common Council, (1975) 167 Ind. App. 253, 338 N.E.2d 695, trans. denied (1976). Subject matter jurisdiction must be derived from the Constitution or a statute and cannot be conferred by the consent or agreement of the parties. Carpenter v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 98, 360 N.E.2d 839; City of Marion v. Antrobus, (1983) Ind. App., 448 N.E.2d 325.
The State argues that Crowder waived the question of improper venue by not requesting a change or transfer of venue upon discovery that the smoking occurred in Vanderburgh County. The cases cited by the State in support of its contention of waiver of venue are State ex rel. Dean v. Tipton Circuit Court, (1962) 242 Ind. 642, 181 N.E.2d 230; and Pund v. Pund, (1976) Ind. App., 357 N.E.2d 257. However, these are civil cases where there is no obligation to establish venue unless venue be questioned by appropriate motion.