Summary
In Pumphrey v. Dep't of Children and Families, 292 So.3d 1264, 1266 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), for example, the prior case involved a previous Medicaid application, while the current case involved a new Medicaid application.
Summary of this case from Howard Ave. Station v. Kane (In re Howard Ave. Station)Opinion
No. 1D19-1361
04-07-2020
James E. PUMPHREY, Sr., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
Mary L. Wakeman and Max J. Solomon of Heuler-Wakeman Law Group, P.L., Tallahassee, for Appellant. Camille Larson, Assistant Regional Counsel, Department of Children and Families, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Mary L. Wakeman and Max J. Solomon of Heuler-Wakeman Law Group, P.L., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Camille Larson, Assistant Regional Counsel, Department of Children and Families, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
B.L. Thomas, J.
In this administrative appeal, Appellant challenges the Hearing Officer’s final order granting the Department of Children and Families’ "Motion to Dismiss." Appellant applied for Institutional Care Program Medicaid benefits. The Department denied the application and Appellant requested a hearing. Before conducting the hearing, the Department filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the matter was previously litigated in a prior application.
Appellant failed to respond to the Department’s motion to dismiss. Without conducting a hearing, the Hearing Officer entered a final order granting the Department’s order and dismissing the case. Appellant then filed a "Motion for Rehearing, or, in the alternative, Motion to Set Aside Final Order to Dismiss," arguing the Hearing Officer misrepresented the primary issue in the prior application and improperly applied the doctrines of administrative finality, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
Only Appellant’s argument concerning the doctrines of administrative finality, res judicata, and collateral estoppel was properly preserved for appellate review. However, we also address whether Appellant’s due process rights were violated, because a denial of due process constitutes fundamental error. See Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 988 So. 2d 1148, 1150–51 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).
First, Appellant argues that the doctrines of administrative finality, res judicata, and collateral estoppel do not preclude the filing of his current Medicaid application. Appellant’s argument is incorrect. "A trial court’s ruling that relief is barred on the grounds of res judicata or collateral estoppel is reviewed de novo." Felder v. Dep’t of Mgmt. Servs. , 993 So. 2d 1031, 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). The doctrine of administrative finality is based on principles similar to those supporting res judicata and collateral estoppel. Id. at 1035.
The doctrine of res judicata applies and bars Appellant from filing his current petition. "The proper rule in a case where a previous permit application has been denied is that res judicata will apply only if the second application is not supported by new facts, changed conditions, or additional submissions by the applicant." Thomson v. DEP , 511 So. 2d 989, 991 (Fla. 1987). Although Appellant provided additional information in his motion for rehearing, the Hearing Officer was not able to consider that information. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 65-2.507(10); Sys. Mgmt. Assocs., Inc. v. HRS , 391 So. 2d 688, 689–90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (holding that a motion for rehearing does not suspend rendition of an administrative order because rehearing is not authorized in administrative proceedings). As a result, the Hearing Officer did not err in applying the doctrine of res judicata based on the information provided in the Department’s motion to dismiss.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel also applies. Collateral estoppel bars subsequent causes of action when the following five factors are met:
(1) an identical issue must have been presented in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue must have been a critical and necessary part of the prior determination; (3) there must have been a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue; (4) the parties in the two proceedings must be identical; and (5) the issue[ ]must have been actually litigated.
Felder , 993 So. 2d at 1034–35. Appellant’s application meets all five factors. The issue presented in both proceedings was Appellant’s eligibility for Medicaid benefits. The inability to verify Appellant’s assets was critical and necessary in determining whether he could receive benefits. The parties in both proceedings were identical. Finally, Appellant was afforded an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate this issue through the administrative appeals process, and the issue was fully litigated with the issuance of a final order by a Hearing Officer.
Finally, because res judicata and collateral estoppel apply, the doctrine of administrative finality also applies. "Florida courts do not apply the doctrine of administrative finality when there has been a significant change in circumstances or there is a demonstrated public interest." Delray Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Ag. for Healthcare Admin. , 5 So. 3d 26, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). As previously discussed, both the prior final order and Appellant’s current application denial were based on Appellant’s failure to verify his assets. As a result, there was no significant change in Appellant’s circumstances.
The Hearing Officer did not err in finding the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and administrative finality apply to bar Appellant’s present application for Medicaid benefits. Neither were Appellant’s due process rights violated. "Procedural due process requires both fair notice and a real opportunity to be heard." Keys Citizens for Responsible Gov’t, Inc. v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth. , 795 So. 2d 940, 948 (Fla. 2001) ; Henderson v. Dep’t of Health, Bd. of Nursing , 954 So. 2d 77, 80 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). Although conducting a hearing is favored, dismissing a petition is permitted. § 120.569(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2018) ; see also City of Winter Park v. Metro. Planning Org. for Orlando Urban Area , 765 So. 2d 797, 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
Appellant was given notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Department properly filed its motion to dismiss under Fla. Admin. Code R. 65-2.057(7). Appellant does not contend that he was not on notice of the motion. Appellant could have filed a response to the Department’s motion to dismiss within seven days. See id . Appellant chose not to respond, waiving his right to be heard on the motion. Because Appellant’s due process rights were not violated, the Hearing Officer did not commit fundamental error in granting the Department’s motion to dismiss.
AFFIRMED .
Wolf and Makar, JJ., concur.