Opinion
No. SC14–1864.
07-08-2015
Carl PUIATTI, Appellant(s) v. STATE of Florida, Appellee(s).
Opinion
Carl Puiatti, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the circuit court's order summarily denying his fourth successive motion for postconviction relief, which was filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Because the circuit court's order concerns the denial of postconviction relief from a sentence of death, this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), of the Florida Constitution. The focus of Puiatti's appeal is a 1987 letter created in connection with co-defendant Robert dock's clemency proceedings.
Puiatti and dock, who has since been executed, were jointly tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the 1983 first-degree murder, kidnapping, and robbery of victim Sharilyn Ritchie. Puiatti v. State, 495 So.2d 128, 129 (Fla.1986). In a joint confession, each agreed that dock initially suggested shooting the victim, that Puiatti fired the first shots, and that dock fired the final shots. Id. After this Court affirmed their convictions and death sentences, the United States Supreme Court remanded Puiatti's case for reconsideration of whether a retrial was required in light of Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987), concerning the changed law of joint trials and confessions. Puiatti v. Florida, 107 S.Ct. 1950 (1987). On reconsideration, this Court reaffirmed Puiatti's conviction and death sentence. Puiatti v. State, 521 So.2d 1106, 1106 (Fla.1988). The United States Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari. Puiatti v. Florida, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).
Thereafter, Puiatti has extensively litigated in state and federal court the issue of the joint trial, as well as claims of ineffective assistance of penalty-phase counsel. Those proceedings are set forth in detail in Puiatti v. McNeil, 626 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir.2010), and Puiatti v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 732 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir.2013). In his most recent petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, Puiatti continued to assert that the joint penalty phase implicates the right to an “individualized sentencing.” That petition was denied on October 6, 2014. Puiatti v. Crews, 135 S.Ct. 68 (2014).
In Puiatti's fourth successive postconviction motion filed in the circuit court, he asserted three claims based on various documents received from the State's files in 2012 during the course of federal habeas corpus proceedings. He argued that (1) his rights were violated under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ; (2) the documents constituted newly discovered evidence under Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512, 521 (Fla.1998) ; and (3) the documents further demonstrated that his joint sentencing proceeding violated his right to an individualized sentencing determination. The circuit court, in an extensive order, denied the first two claims as failing to meet the requirements of Brady and Jones, and found that the third claim was procedurally barred from review.
On appeal of the circuit court's denial of his motion, Puiatti narrows his claims to a letter that was generated in connection with his co-defendant Robert Glock's Executive Clemency proceedings following the conclusion of the joint trial. The letter, which was written by a psychologist, quotes Glock as stating that he was not influenced or led by Puiatti in the murder and that Glock “was the one who understood the [victim] could identify” them, and therefore they “would have to shoot her.”
We affirm the circuit court's order. Even assuming that the claim was not time-barred, and that the letter was not otherwise privileged or inadmissible, we determine as a matter of law that the claim fails to meet the requirements for relief under either Brady or Jones. The claim does not satisfy the test for materiality under the Brady standard because the letter does not undermine confidence in the outcome of Puiatti's conviction or death sentence. It also does not satisfy the second prong of the Jones newly discovered evidence standard because it cannot be said that the letter would probably yield a less severe sentence.
The statement in the letter that Glock acknowledged that he was the one who understood that the victim could have identified them, which was the reason they would have to shoot her, is essentially no different than the joint confession that was introduced at trial. Further, this is not a case in which Puiatti was sentenced to death while Glock, if ultimately considered more culpable, received a life sentence. Cf. Ray v. State, 755 So.2d 604, 611 (Fla.2000) (vacating the defendant's death sentence and remanding for resentencing because the evidence reflected that the co-defendant was the dominant player in the crimes and “[w]here a more culpable codefendant receives a life sentence, a sentence of death should not be imposed on the less culpable defendant”). In this case, both defendants, Puiatti and Glock, received death sentences.
For all these reasons, we affirm the circuit court's order denying Puiatti's fourth successive motion for postconviction relief.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., recused.