Opinion
A169185
06-17-2024
Conservatorship of the Person of C.S.. v. C.S., Objector and Appellant. PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF SONOMA COUNTY, Petitioner and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SPR 093433)
Miller, J.
In October 2019 following a court trial, the trial court found appellant C.S. to be gravely disabled and appointed the Sonoma County Public Conservator (public conservator) as his conservator for one year under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act). (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 53505372.) The court also imposed special disabilities denying C.S. (1) the privilege of possessing a license to operate a motor vehicle, (2) the right to possess a firearm or other deadly weapon, and (3) the right to refuse to consent to medical treatment relating to grave disability.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Since then, the public conservator has petitioned for reappointment as conservator each year through 2023, and, for each petition, the trial court has conducted a court trial and then found C.S. remained gravely disabled, reappointed the public conservator as conservator of his person, and imposed the same three disabilities imposed in October 2019.
C.S. appeals from the trial court's most recent order reestablishing conservatorship in 2023. He contends (1) reversal of the order reestablishing conservatorship is required because the trial court failed to obtain a valid waiver of his right to a jury trial and (2), alternatively, remand is required because the record does not permit meaningful review of the special disabilities the trial court imposed. We affirm.
The public conservator did not file a brief in this appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The public conservator filed its most recent petition for reappointment of conservator of C.S.'s person in July 2023. The petition was supported by declarations from two doctors. Dr. Phillip Grob declared that he examined C.S. in April 2023 and diagnosed C.S. as currently suffering from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and delusional disorder. Grob observed that C.S. experienced auditory hallucinations and paranoid delusions, and he found deficits in C.S.'s information processing, thought processes, and ability to modulate mood. He recommended that C.S. be denied the right to refuse to consent to medical treatment related to his grave disability, including psychotropic mediations, because, among other things, C.S. lacked sufficient awareness of the existence and nature of his mental disorder and he was unable to sufficiently understand the risk and benefits of, and alternatives to, the recommended treatment. Grob recommended denying C.S. the right to possess a license to operate a motor vehicle because C.S.'s mental disorder affected his ability to exercise reasonable and ordinary control in operating a motor vehicle and C.S had impaired judgment. He recommended denying C.S. the right to possess a firearm or other deadly weapon because C.S. was unable to understand and knowingly and intelligently evaluate the information required to handle a firearm or other deadly weapon by rational thought process. In a second supporting declaration, Dr. Susan Ahart stated that she reviewed C.S.'s medical records, and she reached similar conclusions regarding C.S.'s condition and recommended the same three special disabilities.
C.S. contested the petition, and a court trial was held on October 4, 2023. The public conservator called Dr. Gary Bravo, and the parties stipulated he was an expert in the field of psychiatry. C.S. testified on his own behalf.
At the time of trial, Dr. Bravo had known C.S. for four years and had evaluated him at least three times for previous conservatorship proceedings. Bravo reviewed C.S.'s medical records and talked with C.S.'s case manager on the day of trial and the previous week. He also tried to meet with C.S. in person, but C.S. did not want to speak with him. After talking with C.S.'s case manager and reviewing his medical records, Bravo did not believe much had changed since Bravo personally interviewed C.S in August 2022. He opined that C.S. has schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and that he was currently gravely disabled because of his mental illness. Bravo testified that C.S. did not have insight into his mental illness. C.S. took antipsychotic medications and medications for mood and anxiety, but he continued to have symptoms of mental illness. C.S. had "persecutory, grandiose and somatic delusions and denial of illness" and a reported history of noncompliance with medication before conservatorship.
In his testimony, C.S. indicated he "likely . . . wouldn't take [his medication]," but he "imagine[d] that nothing is gonna happen." He testified he had a job waiting for him and money from a lawsuit. C.S. thought his "mental illness is: training for psychics," and he did not believe he had schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. He also testified he had "mites in [his] brain."
Following the witnesses' testimony, the trial court granted the petition. In its written order reestablishing conservatorship and reappointing conservator of the person, the court noted it had considered the verified petition, the record in the matter, and the evidence presented and found "good cause appearing" for its findings and orders. The court imposed special disabilities denying C.S. (1) the privilege of possessing a license to operate a motor vehicle, (2) the right to possess a firearm or other deadly weapon, and (3) the right to refuse to consent to medical treatment relating to grave disability.
DISCUSSION
A. Waiver of Jury Trial
1. Background
At a hearing on August 2, 2023, C.S. was present in court with his attorney, deputy public defender Karen Thompson. They had the following discussion with the court regarding the most recent petition to reestablish conservatorship.
"THE COURT: . . . [I]t looks like this matter comes on for petition to re-establish conservatorship.
"Ms. Thompson, have you and [C.S.] talked about the petition, his rights, and what he'd like to do in response to it?
“MS. THOMPSON:· Yes. By phone and then again this afternoon.
"So, [C.S.], my understanding is you want to contest or challenge the petition to reestablish your conservatorship?
"THE CONSERVATEE:- I'd like to.
“MS. THOMPSON:· Okay. And we've discussed both your right to have a trial by jury or a court trial, and my understanding is you'd like to have this set for a court trial?
“THE CONSERVATEE:· That would be correct." 2. Analysis
We review the trial court's implicit conclusion that C.S. knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial for substantial evidence. (Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894, 915 (C.O.).)
C.S. acknowledges that the Court of Appeal in C.O., supra, found a valid waiver of jury trial "on facts very similar to the facts [of this case]." In C.O., the attorney for conservatee C.O. told the court that his client waived his right to a jury trial while C.O. was not yet present in court. C.O. then entered the courtroom, and "his attorney stated (in C.O.'s presence): 'Your Honor, I've had a chance to speak with [C.O.] a couple of times before today's court hearing. And at this time [C.O.] is requesting a court trial....' . . . [¶] The trial court did not advise C.O. on the record of his right to a jury trial or elicit a personal waiver of that right from him. Neither C.O. nor his attorney requested a jury trial." (C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 902.)
On that record, the Court of Appeal concluded, "[S]ubstantial evidence supports the trial court's implicit conclusion that C.O. knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. C.O. was present at both the April 25, 2019 hearing and the court trial in May 2019, and there is no indication in the record that he disagreed with the decision to have his conservatorship decided by court trial or that he demanded a jury trial instead of a court trial. There is also no evidence or suggestion in the record that C.O. did not comprehend what his appointed counsel was representing to the trial court on his behalf at the April 25, 2019 trial setting hearing. To the contrary, the record reflects that counsel had spoken with C.O. several times and he consented to a court trial, and there is no evidence C.O. lacked an understanding of those communications. Indeed, C.O. was present with his counsel and had greeted the court when his counsel informed the trial court C.O. wanted a 'court trial.'" (C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 915.)
Here, the record shows C.S. was present when his attorney Thompson told the court that she had talked with C.S. about his rights related to the petition. Addressing C.S., Thompson stated, as a question, that she understood he wanted to contest the petition, and C.S. responded that he did want to contest the petition. Thompson next told the court that she and C.S. had discussed his "right to have a trial by jury or a court trial" and stated, again as a question to C.S., that she understood C.S.'s preference was a court trial. C.S. responded that that was correct. Subsequently, C.S. participated in the court trial and did not object, or otherwise indicate, that he wanted a jury trial. In addition, this was the fifth time in about four years that C.S. contested a petition for conservatorship, and nothing in the record suggests he did not understand he had a right to a jury trial. This record provides substantial evidence supporting a finding that C.S. knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial.
The appellate record also shows that, at least with the first three petitions, C.S. was personally served a "Citation for Conservatorship" providing him notice that, among other things, "You have the right to a jury trial if you wish."
C.S. argues we should not follow C.O. because it conflicts with cases describing the standard for waiver of a jury trial in criminal cases. However, "the laws of civil [not criminal] procedure apply in LPS conservatorship proceedings" (Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 147), and" 'not all of the safeguards required in [criminal proceedings] are appropriate to [LPS commitment proceedings]'" (id. at p. 151). We find the court's analysis in C.O. appropriate, and we reach the same conclusion here-that substantial evidence supports a finding the conservatee knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial-under similar facts.
Further, the C.O. court correctly noted that "the language of the LPS Act does not reflect a preference for jury trials over court trials. Rather than making a jury trial the default procedure, section 5350 states a proposed conservatee has the right to demand 'a court or jury trial on the issue of whether he or she is gravely disabled.' (§ 5350, subd. (d)(1), italics added.) Section 5362, subdivision (b), which addresses petitions to reestablish a conservatorship, requires a 'court hearing or jury trial' to be the subject of a 'request.' (§ 5362, subd. (b).) . . . This provision further highlights that jury trial is not the default mechanism for reestablishment of a conservatorship." (C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 912.)
B. The Trial Court's Decision to Impose Special Disabilities
Next, C.S. asserts, "The record does not disclose that the trial court was aware of the findings it had to make before imposing the special disabilities, that it considered the proffered evidence, and that it made the requisite findings." (Capitalization omitted.) He argues remand is required because the record does not permit meaningful review of the special disabilities the trial court imposed.
This argument fails because nothing in the record suggests the trial court was unaware of the law, and the trial court was not required to make a "specific, on-the-record statement of the reasons for each order" (Conservatorship of George H. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 157, 165). On appeal, we do not require affirmative evidence establishing that the trial court understood the law; to the contrary, "[w]e presume the trial court knew and properly applied the law absent evidence to the contrary." (McDermott Will &Emery LLP v. Superior Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1103.) And "we follow the usual rules on appeal [citation] and 'presume in favor of the judgment every finding of fact necessary to support it warranted by the evidence.'" (Conservatorship of George H., supra, at p. 165 [rejecting argument that reversal was required because the trial court did not state a reason for imposing each special disability].) Since the trial court was not required to state specific findings to support the imposition of special disabilities and C.S. has not shown trial court error, we see no reason to remand the matter in this case.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Richman, Acting P.J., Desautels, J.