The allowed recovery in Wisconsin compensates for the injury to the beneficiaries, within certain statutory recovery limitations discussed infra, and not for the loss of life of the victim. See Prunty v. Schwantes, 40 Wis.2d 418, 162 N.W.2d 34 (1968); In re Arneberg's Estate, 184 Wis. 570, 200 N.W. 557 (1924); Gores v. Graff, 77 Wis. 174, 46 N.W. 48 (1890). Although the personal representative is entitled to bring an action pursuant to Section 895.04(1), allowing the beneficiaries or the representative to file the claim is merely a statutory measure of procedural flexibility.

Plaintiffs' WOCCA claim does not "survive at common law." The original version of Wisconsin's survival statute was enacted in 1849, see Wis. Stat. § 895.01 note (Historical and Statutory Notes); Prunty v. Schwantes, 40 Wis.2d 418, 422 n. 3, 162 N.W.2d 34 (1968), and the "causes of action that survive at common law" appear to have been fixed at that time, see Prunty, 40 Wis.2d at 424, 162 N.W.2d 34 (because personal injury cause of action did not survive death of injured party until legislature acted in 1887, "it is quite obvious that the common law of Wisconsin will not support an award of damages to the deceased's estate" under version of survival statute in effect in 1968). WOCCA became effective in 1982.

Koehler v. Waukesha Milk Co., 190 Wis. 52, 56, 208 N.W. 901 (1926). See also, Prunty v. Schwantes, 40 Wis.2d 418, 162 N.W.2d 34 (1968). This court has pointed out that a cause of action for wrongful death did not exist at common law; it is a purely statutory remedy and is derived from secs.

Similarly, the survival action depends on an underlying tort, since the "action is brought by the representative of the deceased for personal injury damages suffered by the deceased prior to his death." Force ex rel. Welcenbach v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 356 Wis.2d 582, 850 N.W.2d 866, 878 n. 30 (2014) (quoting Prunty v. Schwantes, 40 Wis.2d 418, 162 N.W.2d 34, 37 (1968)). Loss of consortium is also a derivative claim, relying on the existence of an underlying tort—here, negligence.

e earnings were allowed in survival claim); Sacco v. Allred, 845 So.2d 528, 538 (La.Ct.App. 2003) (permitting recovery only for loss of earnings sustained before death); Adelsberger v. Sheehy, 79 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Mo. 1953) (finding that loss of earnings "for the period [decedent] would have lived . . . cannot be considered"); Hindman v. Sulpho Saline Bath Co., NW 806, 808 (Neb. 1922) (finding no loss of earnings may be recovered beyond time of death); Kordonsky v. Andrst, 172 A.D.2d 497, 499 (N.Y. 1991) (limiting damages to "loss of earnings up to the time of death"); Case v. Norfolk Western Ry. Co., 570 N.E.2d 1132, 1137 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (limiting damages for loss of earnings to the time of death); St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co. v. Hutchison, 245 P. 891, 893 (Okla. 1926) (prohibiting damages for loss of earnings that accrue after death); Lopez v. City Towing Assoc., Inc., 754 S.W.2d 254, 260 (Tex.Ct.App. 1989) (holding decedent's estate is not permitted to recover lost future earnings); Prunty v. Schwantes, 162 N.W.2d 34, 38 (Wis. 1968) (finding that loss of future earnings does not survive the death of injured party); see also, Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 26 A.2d 659, 662 (Pa. 1942) (holding that permissible recovery includes future earnings, but recovery may be adjusted to prevent a double recovery). Defendant cites Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, 716 A.2d 285 (1998), as evidence of limited recovery in survival statutes.

The action is an asset of the decedent's estate; any proceeds that result from the action accrue to the estate and are subject to its debts. Koehler, 190 Wis. at 56, 208 N.W. at 903; see also Prunty v. Schwantes, 40 Wis. 2d 418, 422, 162 N.W.2d 34, 37 (1968). Wis. Stat. § 895.04(6) allows the relatives of a decedent to waive the estate's cause of action.

As stated above, damages in such an action are limited to those suffered by the deceased before his death. Prunty v. Schwantes, 40 Wis.2d 418, 162 N.W.2d 34 (1968). It is true, as defendants point out, that no cause of action based solely on the death of the deceased survives.

The damages accrue to the estate of the deceased.” Prunty v. Schwantes, 40 Wis.2d 418, 422, 162 N.W.2d 34 (1968).See alsoWangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis.2d 260, 312, 294 N.W.2d 437, 463 (1980) (quoting Koehler v. Waukesha Milk Co., 190 Wis. 52, 56, 208 N.W. 901 (1926)):

See, e.g., Gandy v. United States, 437 F.Supp.2d 1085, 1088–1089 (D.Ariz.2006) (applying Arizona law); Ellis v. Brown, 77 So.2d 845, 846–849 (Fla.1955), rev'd on other grounds, Garner v. Ward, 251 So.2d 252 (Fla.1971); Greene v. Texeira, 54 Haw. 231, 234–236, 505 P.2d 1169 (1973); Flowers v. Marshall, 208 Kan. 900, 904–908, 494 P.2d 1184 (1972); Hindmarsh v. Sulpho Saline Bath Co., 108 Neb. 168, 172–175, 187 N.W. 806 (1922); Kordonsky v. Andrst, 172 A.D.2d 497, 499, 568 N.Y.S.2d 117 (N.Y.1991), rev'd on other grounds, Lucido v. Mancuso, 49 A.D.3d 220, 851 N.Y.S.2d 238 (N.Y.2008); Allen v. Burdette, 139 Ohio St. 208, 210–211, 39 N.E.2d 153 (1942); St. Louis–S.F. Ry. Co.v. Hutchison, 117 Okla. 190, 192, 245 P. 891 (1926); Prunty v. Schwantes, 40 Wis.2d 418, 423–425, 162 N.W.2d 34 (1968). Contrary to the view we adopt here, some jurisdictions have concluded that an estate may recover damages representing a decedent's future earnings pursuant to the survival statute.

. Bradford, 720 A.2d 586 (Md. 1998) (Maryland); Brereton v. U.S., 973 F. Supp. 752, 757 (E.D.Mich. 1997) (Michigan); Anderson/Couvillon v. Nebraska Dep't of Soc. Servs., 538 N.W.2d 732, 739 (Neb. 1995) (Nebraska); Smith v. Whitaker, 734 A.2d 243, 246 (N.J. 1999) (New Jersey); Nussbaum v. Gibstein, 536 N.E.2d 618, 619 (N Y 1989) (New York); Pitman v. Thorndike, 762 F. Supp. 870, 872 (D.Nev. 1991) (citing Wells, Inc. v. Shoemake, 177 P.2d 451 (Nev. 1947))(Nevada); Livingston v. U.S., 817 F. Supp. 601 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (North Carolina); First Trust Co. of North Dakota v.Scheels Hardware Sports Shop, Inc., 429 N.W.2d 5, 13 (N.D. 1988) (North Dakota); Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center of S.E.Pennsylvania, Fitzgerald Mercy Division, 393 A.2d 1188, 1190-91 (Pa. 1978) (Pennsylvania); Spencer v. A-1 Crane Serv., Inc., 880 S.W.2d 938, 943 (Tenn. 1994) (Tennessee); Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670, 677 (Va. 1990) (Virginia); Tait v. Wahl, 987 P.2d 127, 131 (Wash.Ct.App. 1999) (Washington); Prunty v. Schwantes, 162 N.W.2d 34, 38 (Wis. 1968) (Wisconsin). ¶ 84.