Opinion
C/A 6:24-cv-00582-JDA-KFM
03-21-2024
Andrea Pruitt, Plaintiff, v. Rebekah Carpenter, Defendant.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge
The plaintiff, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action seeking to have a state court judgment vacated. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on February 5, 2024 (doc. 1). By order filed February 29, 2024, the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring his case into proper form for judicial screening (doc. 10). The plaintiff complied with the court's order, and the case is now in proper form for judicial screening. Upon review of the plaintiff's complaint, the undersigned recommends it be dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff contends that the Greenville County Family Court has violated her rights by illegally terminating her parental rights and giving custody of her three minor children to the defendant (id. at 3). The plaintiff contends that she complied with the requirements for regaining custody of her children, but her rights were terminated anyway (id.). The plaintiff contends that she filed a motion for reconsideration in the family court in December 2021, filed a habeas petition in the state court, as well as filed in the South Carolina Court of Appeals and the South Carolina Supreme Court (id. at 4-6, 7). The plaintiff's first ground for relief is miscarriage of justice based on the violation of her liberties (id. at 8-9). The second ground for relief is that best practice regulations were not followed (id. at 9-10). The plaintiff contends that her appointed attorney during the proceedings was not properly representing the plaintiff's interests and that a lie was presented to the court that the plaintiff wanted to voluntarily give up her rights to her children (id. at 10-11). For relief, the plaintiff seeks the return of her three minor children (id. at 12).
APPLICABLE LAW & ANALYSIS
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a Defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that courts must have the authority to control litigation before them.” Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Since federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, there is no presumption that the court has jurisdiction. Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 337 (1895)). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Bulldog Trucking, 147 F.3d at 352; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
Section 2241
The plaintiff purported to bring this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (see doc. 1). A habeas corpus application allows an individual to challenge the fact, length, or conditions of custody and seek immediate release. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484-85 (1973). However, United States District Courts only have jurisdiction to entertain petitions for writs of habeas corpus from individuals who are “in custody” in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a)). Here, the plaintiff, a non-prisoner, has provided no allegations that she is “in custody” for purposes of the habeas statute; as such, her complaint has been construed as a non-habeas complaint seeking injunctive relief.
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
As noted, the plaintiff may not bring this action pursuant to § 2241 because she is not “in custody”; however, even construing her claim as raising a non-habeas claim against the defendant, her complaint would still be subject to summary dismissal pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional and may be raised by the Court sua sponte. Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003). “[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies . . . when the loser in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself.” Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006). As noted above, the plaintiff contends that her parental rights were wrongfully terminated during Greenville County Family Court proceedings, and seeks an order from this court vacating that termination and returning her minor children to her custody (see generally doc. 1). It is well-settled, however, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to bar the exercise of federal jurisdiction even when a challenge to state court decisions or rulings concerns federal constitutional issues; instead, only the United States Supreme Court may review those state-court decisions. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476-82 (a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can be conducted only by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Davani, 434 F.3d at 719 (explaining how the expansive interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was limited by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)); see also Dukes v. Stone, C/A No. 3:08-cv-505-PMD-JRM, 2009 WL 398079, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2009) (explaining that only the United States Supreme Court is empowered with appellate authority to reverse or modify a state court judgment).
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine gets its name from two cases decided by the United States Supreme Court finding that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments where the district court is requested to review and reject those judgments. See Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
The doctrine applies even if the state court litigation has not reached a state's highest court. See Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 892-93 & nn.3-4 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (providing that a federal court must accord full faith and credit to a state court judgment); Robart Wood & Wire Prods. Corp. v. Namaco Indus., 797 F.2d 176, 178 (4th Cir. 1986). As such, because the plaintiff seeks an order from this court vacating an order entered in the Greenville County Family Court, the instant action is subject to summary dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending the complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 2022 WL 3590436 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2022) (mem.) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).