Indeed, it was early held here that failure to record a transfer of real property renders such transfer void only as against subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers in good faith and for value. Section 1214, Civil Code; In re Prow, 4 Cal. 173; Pixley v. Huggins, 15 Cal. 127. Nor does there appear in the complaint the necessary elements of an estoppel, such as would prevent the defendants from asserting title.

It is also good as against an attaching creditor. (Plant v. Smythe , 45 Cal. 161; Rose v. Munie , 4 Cal. 174.)          Schell & Scrivner, for the Appellants.

No act subsequently done by the vendor, or any other person, could affect the title of the vendee. (4 Cal. 173.) There is nothing in the statutes of this State which gives a creditor greater rights in this respect than he would have at the common law.

The deed bears a sufficient certificate of acknowledgment, and subsequent judgment creditors of the vendors cannot, before a sale, object to its operation against their judgment that it was not on record. The Registry Act was not intended to protect them: it was only intended to protect subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith and for a valuable consideration. (Act concerning Conveyances, sec. 26; Rose v. Munie, 4 Cal. 173 .) Had the signature of the wife been necessary, and a sale had taken place, the purchasers at such sale, without notice, actual or constructive, of the conveyance to the plaintiff, would have been in a position to invoke the protection of the act, and to prevent a state of things of this nature from arising, a bill like the one in the present suit might have been filed.          As the property vested by the deed of August, 1852, no interest would have passed to the purchaser under the sale advertised upon the execution issued upon the judgment of Huggins and Hall.

They had no lien previous to the attachment; and if Adams possessed no attachable interest in the property, they acquired none by their attachment. (Rose v. Munie , 4 Cal. 173.)          Inreference to the deed and bond, we find: first, that they were both executed at the same time; second, that they were both witnessed by the same person; third, that they were both acknowledged before the same officer; fourth, that they both describe the same property, making the same mistake in the description in each instrument; fifth, that the bond provides for the payment of $ 22,050, on November 11, 1854, which is the same amount specified as the consideration of the deed, with interest added thereto, at ten per cent.

declared, except as against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees, and if the construction contended for (that the recordation imparted notice to all persons,) be correct, it would be involved in this absurdity,--that such notice was only operative by the terms of the statute, as against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. If, however, the act of recording imparts notice, independent of the consequence, as provided in the statute, and its effects are not limited by the terms thereof, it is at best but constructive notice, and therefore insufficient to charge a party with fraud necessary to set aside the Act in a Court of Equity; as the rule is well established, that it requires actual notice in fact to constitute fraud, or such acts in the premises as some positive statute characterizes as fraudulent.          This same construction was substantially adopted by us in the case of Rose v. Munie , 4 Cal. 173.          Judgment affirmed.

This principle has been repeatedly asserted. (Powers v. Soule-Martin Lumber Co., 209 Cal. 557, 561, 289 P. 809; Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 500, 271 P. 898; Hollywood Lumber Co. v. Love, 155 Cal. 270, 274, 100 P. 698; Williams v. Santa Clara Mining Association, 66 Cal. 193, 201, 5 P. 85; Rose v. Munie, 4 Cal. 173, 174-175; Barr Lumber Co. v. Shaffer, 108 Cal.App.2d 14, 23, 238 P.2d 99; San Pedro Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 4 Cal.App.2d 41, 42, 40 P.2d 605; Hayward Lumber & Investment Co. v. Naslund, 125 Cal.App. 34, 41, 13 P.2d 775; E. K. Wood Lumber Co. v. Mulholland, 118 Cal.App. 475, 477, 5 P.2d 669; American Bldg. Material Service Co. v. Wallin, 116 Cal.App. 527, 530, 2 P.2d 1007; Brush v. E. R. Bohan & Co., 102 Cal.App. 457, 459, 283 P. 126; Beard v. Lancaster Midway Oil Co., 72 Cal.App. 148, 150, 236 P. 970; W. P. Fuller & Co. v. McClure, 48 Cal.App. 185, 191-192, 191 P. 1027; Valley Lumber Co. v. Wright, 2 Cal.App. 288, 290, 291, 84 P. 58.) Civil Code, section 2898 establishes that a purchase money deed of trust has priority over all other liens created against the purchaser, subject to the operation of the recording laws.

Counsel for amicus curiae points out that his research reveals that no courts of California have held a prior recorded encumbrance upon land to be junior in any respect to a mechanic's lien arising from work or materials supplied to an improvement commenced subsequent to the date of recordation. In Rose v. Munie (1854), 4 Cal. 173, the Supreme Court said: "It is useless for us to adduce any argument in support of the proposition that a mortgage of land carries with it all buildings which are or may be attached to the freehold, and that the rights of the mortgagee cannot be defeated by mechanics' liens, or other incumbrances created without his consent."