No. 05-03-01122-CR
Opinion Filed June 15, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 366-80405-01. Affirmed.
Before Justices MOSELEY, FITZGERALD, FRANCIS.
Opinion By Justice MOSELEY.
The trial court convicted Johnnie Ray Propes for the murder of Rodney Wiley. The trial court found Propes used or exhibited a deadly weapon during commission of the murder. The trial court assessed punishment at 18 years' confinement. Propes appeals and brings two points of error complaining of the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment, as well as the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the implicit finding that Propes did not act in self-defense. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Legal and Factual Sufficiency of the Murder Conviction
In his first point of error, Propes contends the evidence presented at trial was not legally or factually sufficient to support the murder conviction. 1. Standards of Review
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, the critical inquiry is whether record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Mason v. State, 905 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). The fact finder is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to give their testimony. We may not substantially intrude on the fact finder's role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility given to witnesses' testimony. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Furthermore, although there may be some conflicting testimony, reconciling those conflicts is within the exclusive province of the fact finder. See Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). In determining the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, considering all the evidence in a neutral light, a jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga v. State, No. 539-02, slip op. at 11, 2004 WL 840227, at *7 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). There are two ways in which the evidence may be insufficient. First, when considered by itself, evidence supporting the verdict may be too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Second, there may be both evidence supporting the verdict and evidence contrary to the verdict. Weighing all the evidence under this balancing scale, the contrary evidence may be strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met, so a guilty verdict should not stand Id. 2. Applicable Law
A person commits murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual, or intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1), (2) (Vernon 2003). A person acts intentionally with respect to the result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result; he acts knowingly when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. §§ 6.03(a), (b). If a deadly weapon is used in a deadly manner, the inference is almost conclusive that the defendant intended to kill. See Godsey v. State, 719 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). 3. Application of Law and Facts
There is evidence in the record that Propes and Wiley had a confrontation at a residence in Plano. The argument began when Wiley asked Propes to borrow $20, to which Propes refused. The owner of the house asked Propes to leave. He did. Thirty minutes later, Propes returned and more heated words began. During the altercation, Propes returned to his car and emerged with a small shotgun. Propes hit Wiley with the butt of the gun, causing Wiley's head to bleed. Wiley's girlfriend, Heather Denson, tried to intervene by pointing Wiley's gun at Propes. Wiley took the gun from Denson and continued to point it at Propes. Both men shot their guns and fell to the ground. Wiley later died at Medical Center Plano. Propes was treated for two gunshot wounds to his arm and thigh. Propes admitted he knew a gun was a deadly weapon. He also stated he knew that a gun, when shot, was capable of killing someone. Propes admitted to shooting Wiley. The attending physician testified the blast from the shotgun hit Wiley in the abdomen, causing his death. Propes argues he did not intend to shoot or kill anyone. The jury heard evidence that Propes argued with Wiley, returned to his van to retrieve the shotgun, and hit Wiley in the head using the butt of the gun. Both men displayed guns, but testimony conflicted as to who shot first. After considering the evidence, including the above evidence, in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have inferred that Propes intentionally or knowingly caused Wiley's death, or that Propes intended to cause Wiley serious bodily injury and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused Wiley's death. Thus, the fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Propes murdered Wiley. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 19; Mason, 905 S.W.2d at 574. Further, reviewing all the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude the trial court was rationally justified in finding Propes guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Zuniga, slip op. at 11, 2004 WL 840227, at *7. We cannot say the evidence of guilt considered by itself is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the contrary evidence is strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. See id. We need not further detail the relevant evidence. See Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex.Crim. App. 2003). Accordingly, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient. We overrule Propes's first point of error. Legal and Factual Sufficiency for Implicit Self-defense
In his second point of error, Propes contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the implicit finding that Propes did not act in self-defense. Although Propes admitted shooting Wiley, he argued he did so in self-defense. A person is justified in using force against another when he reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 9.31(a) (Vernon 2003). A person is justified in using deadly force if he is justified in using force, a reasonable person would not have retreated, and it was immediately necessary to protect himself against another's use or attempted use of deadly force. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 9.32; McCray v. State, 861 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.). The State bears the burden of persuasion in disproving self-defense by proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. See Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex.Crim. App. 1991). The fact finder determines whether the State has met its burden. See id. The trial court implicitly rejects a self-defense claim when it finds the defendant guilty. See id. at 914. The trial court heard evidence from witnesses describing the arguments leading up to the shooting. Several witnesses stated Propes threatened Wiley, then left and returned with a shotgun at his side. Most stated the first gunshot was from a large caliber weapon, probably the shotgun, followed by several smaller "pops." In contrast, according to Propes's version of the events, Wiley was the aggressor. Propes claims Wiley said he was "going to put a seven" into Propes and then spit on him. Wiley displayed a gun and Propes states he responded by retrieving his shotgun. Propes argues he was shot first, at least two times in the arm and leg, and fired his shotgun in self-defense. The trial judge, when sitting as the sole trier of fact, is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Mattias v. State, 731 S.W.2d 936, 940 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987). A rational trier of fact could resolve the inconsistencies in the testimony by rejecting Propes's version of the shooting. Additionally, even if the fact finder believed Propes's version of the shooting, it nevertheless could have concluded a reasonable person in his situation would have retreated. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.32(a)(2). The trial court could have resolved the credibility issues against Propes. Moreover, the trial court may have concluded Propes could have simply left rather than returning to confront Wiley. Accordingly we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court's finding against Propes on the issue of self-defense. Reviewing all the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude the trial court was rationally justified in finding Propes guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Zuniga, slip op. at 11, 2004 WL 840227, at *7. We cannot say the evidence of guilt considered by itself is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the contrary evidence is strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. See id. Thus, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding against Propes on the issue of self-defense. We overrule Propes's second point of error. Having overruled both of Propes's points of error, we affirm the trial court's judgment.