After the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review, Benson petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court relied on our decision in Promotor v. Pollard, 628 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2010), to conclude that Benson had procedurally defaulted on his due process claim. Specifically, it held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' holding that Benson had forfeited his claim by failing to object was an adequate and independent state law ground precluding relief.

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under AEDPA, when a state court decides a case on the merits, a federal court can grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, involved an unreasonable application of such precedent, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court. Promoter v. Pollard, 628 F.3d 878, 888 (7th Cir. 2010); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In this case, Benson raises two grounds for habeas relief: (1) his sentence violates due process because it was based on inaccurate information; and (2) his sentence violates the Sixth Amendment because he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has observed that Wisconsin's contemporaneous-objection rules are regularly followed. See Promotor v. Pollard, 628 F.3d 878, 886 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Wisconsin courts have regularly followed the rule that information that is not contested at trial cannot be objected to later."). Accordingly, Lellie has procedurally defaulted his claim that he was sentenced based on inaccurate information and his claim that the state breached the plea agreement.

A defendant has a constitutional right to be sentenced based on accurate information. Promotor v. Pollard, 628 F.3d 878, 888 (7th Cir. 2010). A defendant who requests resentencing due to the use of inaccurate information at the original sentencing must show both that the information before the sentencing court was inaccurate and that the sentencing court relied on the inaccurate information in the sentencing.

Malone v. Walls, 538 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019, 1026 (7th Cir. 2004)). Federal review also is precluded when the state court's decision rests on an adequate and independent state law ground, see Promotor v. Pollard, 628 F.3d 878, 885 (7th Cir. 2010), because where an independent state ground supports the judgment, a ruling on the federal claims would be advisory. See Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787; Woods v. Schwartz, 589 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 2009) ("[W]hen a state refuses to adjudicate a petitioner's federal claims because they were not raised in accord with the state's procedural rules, that will normally qualify as an independent and adequate state ground for denying federal review.") (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can establish cause for procedural default. See Promotor v. Pollard, 628 F.3d 878, 887-88 (7th Cir. 2010). Because Lockhart procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim and petitioners do not have a constitutional right to counsel in collateral proceedings, the Court turns to whether Lockhart's trial counsel's ineffectiveness caused his procedurally default.

A procedurally defaulted claim can still be considered by a district court "if a petitioner can show cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Hardy, 628 F.3d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Kaczmarek v. Rednour, 627 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that "[a] federal court on collateral review will not entertain a procedurally defaulted constitutional claim unless the petitioner can establish cause and prejudice for the default or that the failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice"); Holmes v. Hardy, 608 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that a "way to avoid procedural default is to show actual innocence, that is, to show that in light of new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt") (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)); Promotor v. Pollard, 628 F.3d 878, 887 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that "default could be excused if [the petitioner] can establish cause and prejudice, or establish that the failure to consider the defaulted claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice"). 1. Cause and Prejudice

A procedurally defaulted claim can still be considered by a district court "if a petitioner can show cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Hardy, 628 F.3d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Kaczmarek v. Rednour, 627 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that "[a] federal court on collateral review will not entertain a procedurally defaulted constitutional claim unless the petitioner can establish cause and prejudice for the default or that the failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice"); Holmes v. Hardy, 608 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that a "way to avoid procedural default is to show actual innocence, that is, to show that in light of new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt") (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)); Promotor v. Pollard, 628 F.3d 878, 887 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that "default could be excused if he can establish cause and prejudice, or establish that the failure to consider the defaulted claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice"). 1. Cause and Prejudice

He has a steep hill to climb: Although the Illinois Supreme Court has suggested that noncompliance with the affidavit rule might be forgiven in certain circumstances, People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555, 107 N.E.2d 861, 864 (1952), that does not mean that the rule is not regularly followed and is therefore inadequate, Promotor v. Pollard, 628 F.3d 878, 886–87 (7th Cir.2010). Discretionary state procedural rules may still constitute independent and adequate state grounds.

He has a steep hill to climb: Although the Illinois Supreme Court has suggested that noncompliance with the affidavit rule might be forgiven in certain circumstances, People v. Reeves, 107 N.E.2d 861, 864 (Ill. 1952), that does not mean that the rule is not regularly followed and is therefore inadequate, Promotor v. Pollard, 628 F.3d 878, 886-87 (7th Cir. 2010). Discretionary state procedural rules may still constitute independent and adequate state grounds.