Therefore, the substituted phrase "Norman Whitlock, the owner thereof" "convey[s] the same meaning or include[s] the sense of the statutory word," "another." This conclusion squares with the holding of the Dallas Court of Appeals in Proctor v. State, 767 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1989, no pet.). In Proctor, the Court of Appeals held that the indictment sufficiently alleged the elements of the offense of unauthorized use of a vehicle, even though it did not explicitly allege that the vehicle was "another's," where it alleged that defendant's use was without effective consent of the person described as the "owner thereof."
Appellant alleges that the information lacked the essential elements 1) that he had knowledge of the requirement to file an affidavit before a vote or a decision on a matter involving the business and 2) that he had knowledge of the requirement to abstain from a decision under Local Government Code, Section 171.004 LOC. GOV'T.(a)(1). When reviewing the sufficiency of a charging instrument, the issue is whether the instrument on its face sets forth in plain and intelligible words sufficient information to enable the accused to prepare his defense and to plead any judgment in bar of further prosecution for the same offense. Lewis v. State, 659 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983); Proctor v. State, 767 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1989, pet. ref'd) (citing Wilson v. State, 520 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975)). Ordinarily, a charging instrument is sufficient if it charges an offense in the terms of the applicable statute.
See Baltimore v. State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) ("The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law prohibits a criminal defendant from being convicted of an offense and denied his liberty except upon proof sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the offense."); see also Proctor v. State, 767 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, pet. ref'd) ("An equally fundamental principle of criminal due process provides that the State must carry the burden of proof upon all essential elements of the offense, and that the State's burden upon those elements is proof beyond a reasonable doubt."). It is the State's burden to present admissible evidence to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
To allow an appellate court to review the proof of the elements of an offense on a great weight and preponderance of the evidence standard rather than on the beyond a reasonable doubt standard would actually lessen the State's burden which is impermissible. See Proctor v. State, 767 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1989, pet. ref'd) ("Any statutory scheme which serves to shift the state's burden of proving each essential element beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally suspect."); Robbins v. State, 717 S.W.2d 348 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (Use of instruction that caused state's burden on causation to lessen was reversible error); Robinson v. State, 596 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) (instructions to the jury that authorize any diminution in the state's burden of proof are fundamentally erroneous). Because the great weight and preponderance of the evidence standard does not apply to the instant case, appellant's fourth point of error is overruled.