Opinion
No. 4:23-cv-00858-P
2023-12-22
Nelton PRITCHARD, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.
Ali Crocker Russell, Crocker Russell & Associates, Mansfield, TX, for Plaintiff. Russell D. Cawyer, Lanie Nichole Bennett, Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant.
Ali Crocker Russell, Crocker Russell & Associates, Mansfield, TX, for Plaintiff.
Russell D. Cawyer, Lanie Nichole Bennett, Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant.
ORDER
Mark T. Pittman, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 6. Having considered the Motion and applicable law, the Court
determines the Motion should be and hereby is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Nelton Pritchard worked for American Airlines as a "Reservation Home-Based Representative" from 2013 to 2023. In that role, Pritchard worked a call line for American customers who needed assistance with bookings and reservations. To meet customer demand for phone-based representatives, American lists mandatory overtime as an essential function for all Reservation Home-Based Specialists. Pritchard, who has cerebral palsy, requested workplace accommodations for his disability in August 2019 and June 2020. American accommodated him both times by capping his daily and weekly hours and exempting him from otherwise-mandatory overtime.
During this timeframe, American negotiated a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with CWA-IBT (the "Union") regarding the terms and conditions of employment for those among American's 120,000+ employees who are affiliated with the Union. Three things happened in these negotiations that implicated Pritchard's employment. First, American and the Union executed a joint CBA in December 2015 (the "JCBA"). Among other things, the JCBA implemented a bona fide seniority system that structures how scheduling and overtime decisions are made for American employees. Second, the Union filed a grievance against American in December 2019 for violating the JCBA's seniority system when making certain overtime decisions—for instance, when accommodating disabled employees by excusing them from mandatory overtime without considering seniority. Third, American executed a settlement agreement in September 2021 to resolve the Union's grievance. Relevant here, American pledged in the settlement agreement to begin accommodating disabled employees in a way that didn't violate the JCBA's seniority system.
After executing the settlement agreement, American told Pritchard his accommodation would end in sixty days. American gave Pritchard three options: (1) work a schedule as assigned with no exemption from mandatory overtime, (2) request an alternative accommodation that doesn't require a reduction in hours or an exemption from mandatory overtime, or (3) go on medical leave. With his physician's greenlight, Pritchard opted to work an unmodified schedule as assigned with no overtime exemption.
Pritchard resigned in August 2023 and sued American for discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). American now moves to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For its jurisdictional challenge, American argues that Pritchard's claim is a "minor dispute" precluded by the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"). For its pleadings challenge, American argues that Pritchard fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted because the ADA doesn't require American to violate its seniority system to accommodate Pritchard's disability.
LEGAL STANDARD
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction" that "possess only that power authorized by the Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). "A court must have the power to decide the claim before it (subject-matter jurisdiction) and power of the parties before it (personal jurisdiction) before it can resolve a case." Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp.,
580 U.S. 82, 95, 137 S.Ct. 553, 196 L.Ed.2d 493 (2017). Where the former is absent, defendants may move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). "When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed with other Rule 12 motions, the court first considers its jurisdiction." McLin v. Twenty-First Jud. Dist., 79 F.4th 411, 415 (5th Cir. 2023).
When evaluating subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court may consider "(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). In doing so, the Court "accept[s] all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and view[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Abdullah v. Paxton, 65 F.4th 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2023). Still, "the burden of proof [is] on the party asserting jurisdiction." McLin, 79 F.4th at 415 (citing Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161).
ANALYSIS
American says dismissal is proper because (1) Pritchard's claims fall beyond this Court's subject-matter jurisdiction and (2) if not, Pritchard nevertheless fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. See ECF No. 6 at 15, 18. The Court must address American's jurisdictional challenge first. See McLin, 79 F.4th at 415. Having done so, the Court is persuaded that Pritchard's claim falls beyond the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. As such, the Court must GRANT American's Motion without analyzing the pleadings challenge.
A. Pritchard's claim is precluded by the RLA.
In the decades following the American Civil War, railways exploded as the most viable means of transporting large-scale commercial freight across our expansive nation. With major metropolitan areas on the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards—and hubs like Dallas, Fort Worth, Denver, and Salt Lake City in between—river-based freight offered limited promise for the transcontinental movement of goods. And sans the Panama Canal until 1914, merchants had no economically sensible maritime alternative when transporting goods from sea to shining sea. Enter the railroads—a logistical technology that offered unparalleled efficiency for the nation's nascent industrial economy.
See J, Macy, M. Mclnroy, & R. McCown, The Golden Age of American Railroading, U. IOWA LIBRARY EXHIBITIONS (last visited Dec. 21, 2023), https://www.lib.uiowa.edu/exhibits/previous/railroad/#:~:text=Aided%20by%20federal%20land%20grants,entry%20into%20World%20War%20I ("Aided by federal land grants, there was a great deal of railroad construction after the Civil War, especially in the West. Trackage increased from 35,000 miles in 1865 to 254,000 miles in 1916, the eve of America's entry into World War I.").
For the most readable (yet thorough) account of the American rail system's expansion during this era, see Stephen E. Ambrose, Nothing Like it in the World: The Men Who Built the Transcontinental Railroad 1863-1869 (2000).
Id.
The story of the men and women who bridged our nation's coastlines by laying the tracks of the first transcontinental railroad is, as Ambrose observes, "the greatest achievement of the American people in the nineteenth century." The railroad's impact on America's cultural geography cannot be overstated, as the new nation become connected in ways previously unimaginable.
Id. at 17.
Indeed, so formative were the railroads for America as it entered the twentieth century that Congress adopted "railroad times" in 1918, assigning modern "time zones" in lieu of previous municipalset time designations. In this way, we owe our very hours and minutes to the railway system developed between the Civil War and the Great Depression.
Id.; see also Union Pacific Railroad, Surprising Railroad Inventions: U.S. Time Zones (last visited Dec. 21, 2023), https://www.up.com/customers/track-record/tr031020-timezones.htm.
But tension is never far away when a nation's economy is dependent upon a single technological innovation. Starting with the Great Railroad Strike of 1877 (which at its height halted more than half of all freight on the nation's railways), the next half-decade saw some of the nastiest breakdowns in labor relations our country has ever known. This was the era of railroad tycoons, industry magnates, unions, strikes, and yellow-dog contracts. While the nation's railways promised efficient locomotion of goods, a well-timed strike by railway employees could threaten the entire national (and global) economy. Throughout this time, Congress tried (and failed) to ameliorate the industry's labor woes with a litany of doomed legislation and a brief nationalization of the nation's railroads. Congress finally got it right in 1926, enacting the RLA "to promote stability in labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes." Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994); see generally 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. As trains eventually ceded market share to planes, the Act was amended in 1936 to cover airlines as well.
See Joseph Adamczyk, Great Railroad Strike of 1877, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (15th ed. 2014); see also Jack Kelly, The Edge of Anarchy: The Railroad Barons, the Gilded Age, and the Greatest Labor Uprising in America, 87, 235-78 (2018).
See id.
Id.; see also 45 U.S.C. § 160 (outlining procedures if a labor dispute could "threaten substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation services").
See, e.g., Erdman Act, ch. 370, § 30, Stat. 424 (1898) (declared unconstitutional by Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 277, 52 L.Ed. 436 (1908)); Elkins Act, ch. 708, § 32, Stat. 847 (same); Newlands Labor Act, ch. 6, § 38, Stat. 103 (1913) (codified as amended by 45 U.S.C. § 151); Adamson Act, ch. 436, § 39, Stat. 721 (1916) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 65-66).
See JIMMY BALSER, JON SHIMABUKURO, & MADELINE DONLEY, CONG. RES. SERV., LSB10861, THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 1 (2023).
To realize its dispute-resolution goals, "the RLA establishes a mandatory arbitral mechanism for 'the prompt and orderly settlement' of two classes of disputes." Norris, 512 U.S. at 252, 114 S.Ct. 2239 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 151a). Under the Act's dispute dichotomy, "major disputes" are those concerning "rates of pay, rules or working decisions" and usually "relate to 'the formation of [CBAs] or efforts to secure them.'" Id. (quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Lab. Exec. Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 302, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 105 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989)). "Minor disputes," on the other hand, "gro[w] out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. § 151a); see also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & In. R. R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 33, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957) (noting minor disputes
involve "controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation"); Consol. Rail Corp., 491 U.S. at 302, 109 S.Ct. 2477 ("Major disputes seek to create contractual rights, minor disputes to enforce them.").
Much hinges on the appropriate taxonomy assigned for Pritchard's claim. Because minor disputes are "exclusively within the jurisdiction of RLA adjustment boards," the Court lacks jurisdiction if Pritchard's claim is a "minor dispute." See Carmona v. Southwest Airlines Co., 536 F.3d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see generally Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 32 L.Ed.2d 95 (1972) ("Thus, the notion that the grievance and arbitration procedures provided for minor disputes in the [RLA] are optional, to be availed of as the employee or the carrier chooses, was never good history and is no longer good law."). American argues that "Pritchard's ADA claim is a 'minor dispute' under the RLA, which triggers claim preclusion and [ ] deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction." ECF No. 6 at 15. The Court agrees.
To determine the RLA's preclusive effect vis-à-vis Pritchard's claim, the Court must ask two questions. First, is an interpretation of the JCBA dispositive of Pritchard's claim? Second, does anything in the ADA indicate Congress's intent for the statute to override the RLA's dispute-resolution provisions?
1. An interpretation of JCBA provisions is dispositive of Pritchard's claim.
So American thinks Pritchard's claim is a "minor dispute" under the RLA. Id. Pritchard disagrees, averring "the U.S. Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have repeatedly held that an aggrieved employee may pursue his Title VII causes of action independently of any collective bargaining agreement." ECF No. 12 at 6. Fair enough, but that's not the relevant inquiry. To support his argument, Pritchard leans on two inapposite cases: a 1974 Supreme Court case (Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974)) and a 1990 Fifth Circuit case (Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990)). See ECF No. 12 at 6-7. But these cases stand for the uncontroversial proposition that arbitration agreements don't preempt federal statutory rights. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60, 94 S.Ct. 1011; Alford, 905 F.2d at 107; Cf. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Alford, 500 U.S. 930, 111 S.Ct. 2050, 114 L.Ed.2d 456 (1991) (overturning the Fifth Circuit's decision in Alford and remanding for consideration in light of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991)); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (finding Plaintiff's ADEA claims subject to CBA's arbitration provision because the Court "d[id] not perceive any inherent inconsistency between [the ADEA's] policies [ ] and enforcing agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims").
The Alexander/Gilmer/Alford line of precedent establishes that courts must examine a statute's text and purpose in determining whether a federal statutory right must give way to a CBA's arbitration provisions. See id. But American doesn't argue the JCBA preempts the ADA. Rather, American argues the RLA precludes Pritchard's instant ADA claim because it arises from facts "inextricably intertwined" with specific JCBA provisions. ECF No. 15 at 3. Importantly, "[t]he distinguishing feature of a minor dispute is that the dispute may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the existing [CBA]." Carmona, 536 F.3d at 348 (cleaned up). And "to
state a claim that can be 'conclusively resolved' by interpreting a CBA 'is another way of saying that the dispute does not involve rights that exist independent of the CBA.'" Id. (quoting Norris, 512 U.S. at 265, 114 S.Ct. 2239). Such claims are inappropriately before a federal court because they would require the court to meddle in the interpretation of private contractual rights reserved exclusively for RLA adjustment boards. See Norris, 512 U.S. at 252, 114 S.Ct. 2239.
Pritchard's right to overtime exemptions doesn't "exist independent" of the JCBA. See Carmona, 536 F.3d at 348. The ADA doesn't mandate overtime exemptions; it mandates "reasonable accommodations." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). And whether a modified schedule is a "reasonable accommodation" requires interpreting the JCBA's provisions governing hours of service, overtime, and the filling of vacancies. See ECF No. 6 at 7-10. Absent extraordinary circumstances, it is unreasonable to require companies to violate binding CBAs to accommodate disabled employees. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 404-06, 122 S.Ct. 1516, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002); Smith v. United Parcel Serv., 50 F. Supp. 2d 649, 653 (S.D. Tex. 1999). While Fifth Circuit case law is admittedly weak on this issue in the context of CBAs, it has long been recognized that companies are "not required to fundamentally alter [their] program[s]" to accommodate disabled employees. Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995). That proposition applies with equal force to violations of a CBA. Thus, the Court can't get to the merits of Pritchard's claim—i.e., the reasonableness of American's accommodations—without first interpreting various JCBA provisions requiring a seniority-based determination for modified schedules. And those provisions would prove dispositive for Pritchard's claim.
American rightly analogizes this case to Brown v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 254 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2001). In that case, Mr. Brown worked as a trainman pursuant to a CBA. Id. at 655. When Brown sought a modified work schedule to accommodate his disability, the railroad denied his request because the CBA required the railroad to consider seniority when making such decisions. See id. at 655-56. The court found the RLA precluded Brown's ADA claim and affirmed his claim's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. Mr. Pritchard's claim is materially identical: Pritchard worked for American pursuant to the JCBA, American withdrew his accommodation, and the JCBA requires American to consider seniority when making modified-schedule determinations. See ECF No. 6 at 6-13.
Pritchard beats around the bush in addressing Brown, arguing "Defendant relies heavily on Brown ... but cannot demonstrate how that [ ] accommodation would impose an 'undue hardship' on the operation of their business." ECF No. 12 at 8. But the only time Brown discussed "undue hardship" was in its recitation of ADA requirements. See Brown, 254 F.3d at 659. The court in Brown never asked if Brown's requested accommodation would be an "undue hardship" for the railroad. See id. Rather, the court noted "the relevant inquiry is whether the claim at issue 'depends for its resolution on the interpretation of a CBA.'" ECF No. 15 at 3 (citing Brown, 254 F.3d at 668). Here, Pritchard's sole federal claim relates to American's withdrawal of his disability accommodations. See ECF No. 1. But American withdrew Pritchard's accommodation (and the accommodations of other similarly situated employees) to comply with the JCBA. See ECF No. 15 at 5. Thus, American
is correct in noting "Pritchard's challenge to American's actions is to the propriety of the bona fide seniority provisions themselves, and American's allegedly discriminatory actions cannot be determined absent an interpretation of ... the JCBA's seniority provisions." Id. at 4.
The court's analysis in Brown was distinctly fact-intensive. The railroad threw the kitchen sink at Mr. Brown, arguing his requested accommodation violated the CBA in myriad respects. See Brown, 254 F.3d at 660. The court rejected this approach, noting that "[w]hile we do not accept all of [Defendant's] arguments, we agree that the resolution of Brown's ADA claim depends in one crucial respect upon interpretation of the CBA." Id. at 660-61. The same is true here. Without diving into the weeds of American's briefing vis-à-vis the JCBA, its evident no determination can be made regarding Pritchard's claim without first interpreting requirements enumerated in at least Articles 4-8. See ECF No. 6 at 6-9. The JCBA requires American to first consider seniority when making an array of scheduling determinations. See id.; see also ECF No. 7. While Pritchard could have sought alternative accommodations that don't require a modified schedule, any accommodation requiring such modification must factor seniority into the equation.
There's a collision between Pritchard's rights under the ADA and American's obligations under the JCBA. Modified or time-reduced schedules are commonly accepted ADA accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). But the JCBA prohibits schedule modifications without considering seniority. See ECF No. 7. Because the Court cannot address one without the other—and because interpreting the JCBA would be dispositive of Pritchard's claim—Pritchard's claim is a "minor dispute" under the RLA. Carmona, 536 F.3d at 348.
Notably, Pritchard's briefing relies on cases analyzing RLA preemption (of rights created by state law), rather than RLA preclusion (of claims arising under other federal laws). See, e.g., ECF No. 12 at 8 (citing Parker v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 2d 632 (N.D. Tex. 2007)). One federal law can't preempt another, but one federal statute can preclude claims brought under another. Such is the case here—the question isn't whether the RLA eliminates Pritchard's rights under the ADA (it doesn't), but whether its dispute-resolution provisions cover the specific facts underpinning Pritchard's ADA claim (they do).
This is far from a categorical rule, and indeed other circuit have suggested ADA claims are "outside the ambit of disputes classified as minor." Id. at 350 (collecting cases). Rather, the inquiry is fact-intensive, and asks if the specific discriminatory conduct alleged requires interpretation of specific provisions in a controlling CBA. See id. (finding ADA claim wasn't a "minor dispute" because "provisions of the CBA are relevant to, but not dispositive of, the resolution of Carmona's claims"). Here, the JCBA prevents American from granting Pritchard's requested accommodations without first considering seniority. See ECF No. 6 at 8. Thus, unlike in Carmona, the JCBA's provisions are dispositive of Pritchard's claim, rendering the claim a "minor dispute" under the RLA. See Brown, 254 F.3d at 668 ("[T]he determination of whether or not Brown's requested accommodation would violate the seniority provisions of the CBA will potentially be dispositive of Brown's ADA claim, because requested accommodations which interfere with the bona fide seniority rights of other employees are unreasonable as a matter of law, and not mandated by the ADA."). Accordingly, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this case unless textual considerations in the ADA indicate such
a conclusion contravenes Congressional intent for the statute.
2. RLA preclusion of Pritchard's claim doesn't contravene the ADA's statutory purpose or text.
Federal statutory rights don't go out the window any time a private contract mandates otherwise conflicting activity. Rather, relevant here, the RLA only precludes a particular claim if such preclusion doesn't undermine the text and purpose of the statute under which the claim is brought. Congress enacted in the ADA in 1990 to prevent discrimination against "qualified individual[s] with disabilit[ies]." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Under the ADA, "discrimination" includes "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability." Id. § 1212(b)(5)(A). As a practical consideration, RLA preclusion of Pritchard's claim doesn't undermine that purpose, as Pritchard could have engaged the interactive process with American and identified alternative accommodations that didn't violate the JCBA. See ECF No. 11 at 6; see generally Rayha v. United Parcel Serv., 940 F. Supp. 1066, 1069 (S.D. Tex. 1996) ("Furthermore, an employer is not obligated to always provide the employee with the best possible accommodations or to accommodate the employee in the specific manner he requested.").
To classify one hypothetical accommodation under one specific set of facts as a "minor dispute" hardly unravels the ADA's purpose and scheme. Indeed, there may be countless statutory rights (under the ADA or otherwise) that don't require interpretation of the JCBA—but Pritchard's claim does. Nevertheless, the Court's job isn't to pontificate about "practical" considerations, but to apply the law as written. Accordingly, the Court must examine the ADA text to determine if Congress communicated an intent to override the RLA's dispute-resolution architecture.
"[A]n examination of the ADA's language and legislative history reveals no clear congressional intent to override the RLA's requirement that minor disputes be adjudicated exclusively through the RLA's arbitration machinery." Brown, 254 F.3d at 663; see generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The Court's inquiry is easy with some federal statutes like ERISA, which expressly provides that the Act was not intended to "alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States ... or any rule or regulation issued under any such law." See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d). While the ADA has no such provision, the absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence. The Court must only apply what's written, not guess about what is not written.
See A. Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 1175, 1182-83 (1989) ("In the case of court-made law, the 'difficulty of framing general rules' arises not merely from the inherent nature of the subject at issue, but from the imperfect scope of the materials that judges are permitted to consult. Even where a particular area is quite susceptible of clear and definite rules, we judges cannot create them out of whole cloth, but must find some basis for them in the text that Congress or the Constitution has provided.").
This issue was clearly in mind when Congress debated the ADA. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 63 (1990) (noting the terms of a CBA "could be relevant ... in determining whether a given accommodation is reasonable"). But Congress provided no guidance within the ADA text instructing courts to override the RLA's dispute-resolution machinery. Brown, 254 F.3d at 663. The rule of law is a law of rules. Accordingly, without a textual directive mandating such a conclusion, the Court will not reach it here. Accordingly,
the Court must GRANT American's Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 6.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS American's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). ECF No. 6. Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED on this 22nd day of December 2023.