Opinion
C. A. 21-2878-MGL-SVH
10-21-2021
Quantae Priest, Petitioner, v. Bryan Stirling, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections, and Kenneth Nelson, Warden Lee Correctional Institution, Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges, United States Magistrate Judge
Quantae Priest (“Petitioner”) is an inmate at the Lee Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections who filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [ECF No. 1]. This matter comes before the court on Petitioner's motion to stay proceedings pending exhaustion of state remedies. [ECF No. 2]. Respondents have filed a response in opposition [ECF No. 7], and Petitioner has filed a reply [ECF No. 12]. Thus, this motion is ripe for this court's review.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.). Because the motion is potentially dispositive, this report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends Petitioner's motion to stay be denied.
Because rulings on motions to stay in habeas cases involving potentially unexhausted claims sometimes have a dispositive effect, see Mitchell v. Valenzuela, 791 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2015), the undersigned is addressing Petitioner's motion through a report and recommendation, rather than through an order. See, e.g., Jeter v. Tucker, C/A No. 2:19-1945-MGL-MGB, 2020 WL 1102231, at *7 n.2 (D.S.C. Jan. 14, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 2:19-1945-MGL, 2020 WL 1082239 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2020).
I. Background
Petitioner was indicted in October 2013 by the Georgetown County Grand Jury for various charges, including kidnapping (2013-GS-22-00972), armed robbery (2013-GS-22-00973), and first-degree burglary (2013-GS-22-00975). [ECF No. 7-1 at 276-291]. Ronald W. Hazzard, Esq., represented Petitioner, and Alicia A. Richardson, Esq., of the Fifteenth Circuit Solicitor's Office, prosecuted the case. On July 27, 2015, Petitioner proceeded to jury trial before the Honorable Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court Judge.
Petitioner was also indicted on other charges that were dismissed as part of his guilty plea.
Multiple people testified, including the victim, Dan Gasque, who testified that on July 17 or 18, 2013, three men broke into his house, stole money, stole his car, kidnapped him, hurt him, and took him to multiple locations, after which he was able to escape and call 911. Id. at 69:20-84:2.
On July 29, 2015, the third day of trial, Petitioner pled guilty as indicted for kidnapping and armed robbery, and to the lesser-included offense of burglary, second degree, violent. Id. at 162. Upon recommendation by the State that Petitioner be sentenced to a cap of 20 years' incarceration concurrent, Judge Culbertson sentenced Petitioner to imprisonment for concurrent terms of 18 years for kidnapping, 18 years for armed robbery, and 15 years for second-degree burglary, violent, after Petitioner pled guilty to his role in the crimes at issue, which included conduct with Marcus Lambert (“Lambert”) and DaQuarius Holmes (“Holmes”). Id. at 162, 169-70, 175, 180-81, 181. Petitioner filed no direct appeal.
Lambert and Holmes also pled guilty and received custodial sentences.
Petitioner filed a post-conviction relief (“PCR”) application on January 7, 2016, in the Georgetown County Court of Common Pleas, alleging the following grounds: (a) alibi witnesses not allowed to testify; (b) ineffective assistance of counsel; (c) invalid guilty plea; (d) trial counsel ineffective for failing to suppress evidence; (e) trial counsel ineffective for failing to challenge applicant's illegal arrest; (f) trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate all lines of defense, failing to investigate, and failing to call all favorable witnesses; (g) trial counsel ineffective for coercing applicant to plead guilty; (h) trial counsel ineffective for coercing applicant to fabricate on allocution; and (i) trial counsel ineffectiveness for failing to quash insufficient arrest warrants before jury was sworn. Id. at 189, 194. On July 10, 2017, Petitioner amended his application to include the following additional claims:
(j) Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by coercing Applicant into allocuting to his charges as opposed to recommending that he plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford
(k) Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to secure the presence of Applicant's alibi witnesses;
(l) Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the probable cause determination that led to Applicant's arrest; and
(m) Applicant's guilty plea was involuntary because it was the direct result of trial counsel's inaccurate advice and ineffective trial preparation.Id. at 196.
A PCR hearing was held on November 29, 2018, before the Honorable Kristi C. Curtis, Circuit Court Judge. Id. at 203. Petitioner was represented by James K. Falk, Esq., and Johnny E. James, Jr., Esq., represented the State. Id. Testimony was received from Petitioner, trial counsel, and Lambert-the only alibi witness presented. See id. at 204. Trial counsel testified that Petitioner
made the decision and he chose to go forward with trial [despite] the fact that we knew that Marcus Lambert and most likely Daquaris Holmes, his codefendant, were both really, willing, and eager to testify against him to try to help themselves with their charges....
[Lambert's testimony] went back and forth. Initially, Mr. Lambert gave a statement inculpating all three defendants. Then he subsequently wrote a letter saying that he alone was culpable and that Daquaris and Mr. Priest had nothing to do with it. Then, he subsequently apparently changed course and was all on board with testifying and trying to seek some assistance from the state on his charges. It was my understanding at the time the case went to trial that both Mr. Lambert and Mr. Holmes were very eager in fact to testify.Id. at 209:10-18, 211:3-14. Trial counsel further testified that he had spoken with all alibi witnesses Petitioner identified, but none would “provide him with the alibi that he sought.” Id. at 213:11-21, see also id. at 221:15-224:23.
Trial counsel testified that on the morning of the third day of trial, Petitioner decided to plead guilty. Id. at 209:4-6. Regarding the morning before Petitioner pled guilty, trial counsel testified as follows:
And you had asked me about, you know, what occurred on that day. My notes are very clear . . . . Informed by detention center officer that Defendant wanted to speak with me prior to continuation of trial. Talked with defendant in courtroom lockup, discussed the case status, previous day's testimony, expected testimony from Codefendant Marcus Lambert and potential problems with Defendant's request that Codefendant Daquaris Holmes testify. In parenthesis, Holmes was scheduled to be brought back from SCDC to testify in the defense case, discussed the fact that if Holmes were to testify, that he and the defendant were friends. If he were to testify that he and the defendant were friends and the defendant had nothing to do with the incident, why would-I'm sorry-why would friend wait two years before providing that information to the authorities? Additional issue of who Holmes would identify as being the third passenger in car in place of defendant.Id. at 256:5-25.
Petitioner testified at the PCR hearing that he pled guilty because his trial attorney told him that his alibi witnesses did not show up to trial and it would be best for him to plead guilty. Id. at 229:22-4. Petitioner stated he “got in the car after the fact” and was not involved in the crimes. Id. at 230:13-15. Petitioner also testified Lambert and Holmes would have testified that Petitioner was not involved in the crimes. Id. at 234:16-25.
Lambert testified he committed the offenses against the victim, but Petitioner and Holmes were not involved, and they were only picked up after the crimes occurred. Id. at 246:24-248:13. Lambert admitted he had said otherwise previously, that Petitioner was involved in the crimes at issue, “because basically my lawyer gave me some type of idea and trying to say that the state was gonna give me a deal but they didn't follow through.” Id. at 250:13-16.
At the end of the PCR hearing, Petitioner indicated he was not prepared to go forward on that day because he had witnesses he needed to have subpoenaed who were not present at the hearing. Id. at 261:6-17. Petitioner identified the witnesses as the same witnesses he had identified to his trial counsel who his trial counsel had contacted, listing their names, but not listing Holmes. See id. PCR counsel testified as to this issue as follows:
I did not get a chance to review this with Mr. Priest because it was sort rushed up here. I had made the decision to rely solely on Mr. Lambert's testimony. I thought that was gonna be the most
believable, that based on Mr. Hazzard's talking with these alibi witnesses in his notes, I was concerned that-I-it was my opinion that our case was gonna rely solely on Mr. Lambert.See id.
Regarding Petitioner's allegation that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to secure or call alibi witnesses, the PCR court found as follows:
The court finds no deficiency on the part of Counsel, nor any prejudice to Applicant from the deficiency alleged. The Court finds Counsel's testimony broadly credible. The Court finds little credible in the testimony of either Applicant or Lambert. The Court finds Counsel exhaustively investigated the alibi witnesses proposed by Applicant and found that they either contradicted Applicant's version of events or otherwise failed to provide information necessary to establish or support an alibi defense. The Court finds Counsel was aware of Lambert's letter exonerating Applicant, but that Lambert subsequently cooperated with the State to Applicant's detriment. The Court finds Counsel reasonably believed Lambert intended to cooperate with the State at the time of Applicant's trial, and puts no value in Lambert's assertion to the contrary after Applicant's trial. The Court accepts Counsel's testimony that he would have called witnesses as demanded by Applicant, but for Applicant's choice to enter a plea of guilty on the third day of trial . . . .Id. at 273-74.
The PCR court denied Petitioner's application. Id. at 275. Petitioner appealed the denial, and the South Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari on March 8, 2021. [See ECF No. 2 at 2].
Petitioner filed this federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on September 7, 2021, as well as a motion to stay and hold these proceedings in abeyance pending exhaustion of his state court remedies. [ECF Nos. 1, 2; ECF No. 14 (indicating Petitioner filed on September 13, 2021, in the Georgetown County Court of Common Pleas, a motion for a new trial based on afterdiscovered evidence, arguing a new trial is warranted given an affidavit now in Petitioner's possession from Holmes attesting Petitioner did not commit the crimes)]. Petitioner has also submitted two affidavits completed by Lambert and Holmes, both attesting that Petitioner was not with them during the commission of the crimes and, instead, a man identified as Tory Thomas, now deceased, was with Lambert and Holmes. [ECF No.1-1 (affidavit of Lambert), ECF No. 1-2 (affidavit of Holmes)].
In his habeas petition, Petitioner identifies two grounds for relief:
Ground One: Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to call Petitioner's alibi witnesses to testify at his trial resulting in Petitioner's guilty plea mid-trial.
Ground Two: Petitioner maintains his innocence of the crimes to which he pleaded guilty.[ECF No. 1 at 13, 16].
II. Discussion
Petitioner asks this court to stay the case pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), while he “seeks to return to state court to allow it to consider the testimony of Daquarius Holmes, Petitioner's second alibi witness who neither trial counsel nor PCR counsel called to testify in state court” [ECF No. 2 at 2]. Respondents oppose the stay. Pursuant to Rhines, a federal habeas case may be stayed and held in abeyance “where such a stay would be a proper exercise of discretion.” Id. at 276. The Supreme Court further stated that in certain instances where a petitioner files a mixed petition (i.e., containing exhausted and unexhausted claims), an exercise of such discretion would be proper. Id. at 272-73, 276.
Prior to Rhines and the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), total exhaustion of state remedies was required prior to the filing of a federal habeas petition, requiring all mixed petitions be dismissed without prejudice. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Rhines, 544 U.S. at 273-74. The AEDPA included a one-year statute of limitations for the filing of federal habeas petitions under § 2254. After AEDPA's enactment, the Supreme Court modified the rule regarding mixed petitions in certain limited circumstances, such as situations where a mixed petition is timely filed in federal court, but dismissal of the federal habeas petition may result in time-barring the petition from returning to federal court after a petitioner completes his obligation to exhaust all issues in state court. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275. Therefore, the Rhines Court held that a district court may, in limited circumstances, stay a habeas proceeding; however, a stay is “only appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims first in state court.” Id. at 277. Additionally, “even if a petitioner had good cause for that failure, the district court would abuse its discretion if it were to grant him a stay when his unexhausted claims are plainly meritless.” Id. Accordingly, a stay should be granted where a petitioner demonstrates “good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Id. at 278.
While the Supreme Court has yet to precisely define “good cause” as that term is used in Rhines, it has suggested that the requirement is not a particularly demanding one. See Pace v DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416-17 (2005) (acknowledging that “[a] petitioner's reasonable confusion about whether a state filing would be timely will ordinarily constitute ‘good cause' for him to file in federal court”).
Petitioner argues his petition constitutes a mixed petition that satisfies the requirements of Rhines. Petitioner asserts that good cause exists for his failure to exhaust, presumably, his claim of actual innocence,
because, as an indigent defendant, he has been uniquely reliant on the actions of his trial counsel and PCR counsel. Neither prior counsel secured the attendance of witnesses who were readily available to testify on Petitioner's behalf. Petitioner now merely seeks to have the South Carolina state courts adjudicate his claim in light of the affidavits and testimonies of these two alibi witnesses.[ECF No. 2 at 4].
In his petition for habeas corpus, Petitioner argues his claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to secure testimony from Lambert, not Holmes, is exhausted, and that his claim for actual innocence, based on Lambert and Holmes' affidavits, is not exhausted, citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 304 (1995). [See ECF No. 1]. As stated by the Fourth Circuit, “[w]hen a petitioner raises a Schlup gateway actual innocence claim, it must be supported by ‘new reliable evidence,'” in order for the district court “to review the petitioner's procedurally defaulted claims.” Teleguz v. Pearson, 689 F.3d 322, 328 (4th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
Respondents argue Petitioner has already exhausted his state court remedies, rendering them procedurally defaulted, and any subsequent PCR action Petitioner files will be improperly successive and time-barred under state law. Respondents further argue Petitioner has failed to show “due diligence where he has known of this witness [Holmes] since before his trial and did not obtain or present an affidavit from him at his 1st PCR.” [ECF No. 7 at 6]. Respondents further argue the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim has been adjudicated, and the same claim, even with an additional affidavit, would be barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and judicial estoppel. Id. at 8. Finally, Respondents argue Petitioner's motion is premature, and it is unnecessary to stay this action until the state court allows Petitioner to proceed on the merits of that claim.
Here, the undersigned finds granting Petitioner's motion to stay is not appropriate. Although “numerous courts have concluded the recent discovery of new evidence to support a claim constitutes good cause,” see, e.g., Dick v. Fahey, C/A No. 3:10-505, 2011 WL 2443898, at *3 (E.D. Va. June 14, 2011), Petitioner has not alleged or shown that Holmes' affidavit was unavailable at trial in 2015 or before the PCR court in 2018. Although it appears both Holmes and Lambert may have had a change of heart as to their potential testimony about Petitioner's involvement in the crimes at issue, Petitioner has offered no argument or evidence as to when Holmes' change of heart occurred. This case stands in contrast to, for example, Fernandez v. Artuz, C/A No. 00-7601-KMW-AJP, 2006 WL 121943, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2006), where petitioner offered a chronology of events identifying how and when he was able to obtain the sworn affidavits of two identification witnesses recanting their trial testimony, as well as an affidavit from one of the victims attesting that petitioner was not the shooter, providing “good cause” for a Rhines stay. See also, e.g., Serrano v. Royce, C/A No. 20-6660-PMH-JCM, 2021 WL 1564759, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2021) (denying Rhines motion to stay, explaining “Petitioner has not informed the Court which witness allegedly recanted their testimony, the nature of that witness's testimony at trial, or crucially, when Petitioner received notice of the purported recantation and why he was unable to ascertain this information at an earlier time.”) (emphasis in original)).
Petitioner also appears to argue he has shown good cause by arguing his trial and PCR counsel were ineffective by failing to present exculpatory testimony from Holmes and Lambert, citing Ninth Circuit precedent in support. See, e.g., Dxon v. Baker, 847 F.3d 714, 721 (9th Cir. 2017) (“In Blake, we concluded that the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel could constitute good cause for a Rhines stay, provided that the petitioner's assertion of good cause ‘was not a bare allegation of state postconviction [ineffective assistance of counsel], but a concrete and reasonable excuse, supported by evidence.'”) (citing Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 983 (9th Cir. 2014)).
This argument fails, even assuming this Circuit recognizes an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as constituting good cause for the purposes of a Rhines stay. See Clement v. Ballard, C/A No. 2:15-02320, 2015 WL 6690158, at *10 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 22, 2015) (collecting cases as to the different applications of the Rhines “good cause” standard, including split authority on whether ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute “good cause”), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 2:15-02320, 2015 WL 6680893 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 2, 2015).
Here, the only evidence in record as to Holmes is that the trial attorney believed Holmes planned to testify against, not for, Petitioner at trial, that even if Holmes would have testified for Petitioner, there were many problems with the testimony, and, at some point after Petitioner's PCR hearing, Holmes indicated a willingness to testify on Petitioner's behalf, as evidenced by his affidavit executed June 7, 2021. [ECF No. 1-2]. The undersigned declines, in this context, to presume trial and PCR counsel were ineffective for failing to secure problematic and adverse testimony at trial, and what would have been cumulative testimony to Lambert's at the PCR hearing, particularly where affidavits Petitioner submitted in support do not appear reliable. See, e.g., United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 375 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Post-trial recantations of testimony are looked upon with the utmost suspicion.”) (citations omitted); Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (emphasizing that new reliable evidence of innocence is a “rarity”); see also Carter v. Virginia, C/A No. 3:09-121-HEH, 2010 WL 331758, at *8 (E.D. Va. Jan. 26, 2010) (“‘It is not unusual for one of two convicted accomplices to assume the entire fault and thus exculpate his codefendant by the filing of a recanting affidavit or other statement.'") (citing Drew v. State, 743 S.W.2d 207, 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)); Gibson v. Vaughn, C/A No. 3:08-181, 2009 WL 577467, at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 5, 2009) (“recantation testimony, particularly by a codefendant who now has nothing to lose by recanting, is not reliable evidence of innocence”); see also State v. Porter, 239 S.E.2d 641, 643 (S.C. 1977) (“Recantation of testimony ordinarily is unreliable and should be subjected to the closest of scrutiny when offered as ground for a new trial.” (citation omitted)).
Likewise, Lambert testified at Petitioner's PCR hearing, admitted that he had said Petitioner was involved in the crimes at issue, but now asserts that neither Holmes nor Petitioner were involved, an assertion found incredible by the PCR judge. [See also ECF No. 1-2 (Holmes admitting that he and Lambert were present for the crimes at issue)].
Petitioner additionally argues his claim is not “plainly meritless” in that “numerous courts have found the failure to call alibi witnesses renders trial counsel's performance deficient and Petitioner is entitled to relief.” [ECF No. 2 at 5]. However, cases Petitioner cited in support are distinguishable, where, in those cases, counsel “did not interview any of the additional alibi witnesses . . . identified” and the alibi witnesses at issue were not codefendants. See, e.g., Blackmon v. Williams, 823 F.3d 1088, 1104 (7th Cir. 2016).
Petitioner further argues his claim is not plainly meritless in that he is entitled to a new trial, citing South Carolina Supreme Court in Clark v. State, 434 S.E.2d 266, 267 (S.C. 1993), wherein the court held that
To obtain a new trial based on after discovered evidence, the party must show that the evidence:
(1) would probably change the result if a new trial is had;
(2) has been discovered since the trial;
(3) could not have been discovered before trial;
(4) is material to the issue of guilt or innocence; and
(5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching.[ECF No. 12 at 2-3].
However, based on the record before the court, applicable case law, and reasons already stated, it does not appear Holmes' affidavit would probably change the result if a new trial occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 22 Fed.Appx. 91, 94 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Our review of this witness' testimony, which appears both inconsistent and equivocal, leads us to agree with the district court's determination that any materiality was ‘substantially outweighed by the incredible story . . . recited,' and that the testimony was therefore unlikely to change the outcome of Coleman's trial.”); see also Johnson v. Catoe, 548 S.E.2d 587, 592-93 (S.C. 2001) (“We find petitioner has failed to meet the requirement for a new trial that the evidence is ‘such that it would probably change the result if a new trial were granted.' We do not believe it is probable a jury would find Hess credible given her prior inconsistent statements.”); cf United States v. Griffin, 489 Fed.Appx. 679, 681 (4th Cir. 2012) (“the overwhelming majority of our sister circuits that have considered the issue agree that when a defendant is aware of the substance of exculpatory testimony that a codefendant could provide during the defendant's trial, the codefendant refuses to testify at the defendant's trial by invoking the Fifth Amendment, and, post-trial, the codefendant expresses a willingness to testify, the codefendant's potential testimony is not newly discovered evidence within the meaning of Rule 33.”).
Although it may be difficult to discern at this stage whether there is potential merit to Petitioner's motion for new trial, the undersigned agrees with Respondents that a motion for a stay is at best premature given the procedural and substantive hurdles Petitioner faces, as previously outlined. Therefore, the undersigned cannot conclude Petitioner has made a showing of potential merit.
AEDPA was promulgated, in-part, “to ‘reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases.'” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276 (quoting Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2002)). However, the statutory scheme was also designed to ensure that petitioners first seek review of their federal claims in state courts. Id. The Rhines Court specifically cautioned:
Stay and abeyance, if employed too frequently, has the potential to undermine these twin purposes. Staying a federal habeas petition frustrates AEDPA's objective of encouraging finality by allowing a petitioner to delay the resolution of the federal proceedings. It also undermines AEDPA's goal of streamlining federal habeas proceedings by decreasing a petitioner's incentive to exhaust all his claims in state court prior to filing his federal petition. Cf Duncan[ v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 180 (2001)] (“[Diminution of statutory incentives to proceed first in state court would . . . increase the risk of the very piecemeal litigation that the exhaustion requirement is designed to reduce”).Id. at 277. The undersigned is not convinced either that there was good cause for Petitioner's failure to exhaust the claim he now seeks to raise in his state motion for a new trial or of the potential merit of that claim. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends denying Petitioner's motion to stay. The parties are instructed to continue with the briefing schedule set forth by the court [see ECF No. 5], or file an appropriate motion to extend deadlines set, to the extent one is needed.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge deny Petitioner's motion to stay. [ECF No. 2].
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).