Summary
observing that the factors for reconsideration and Rule 59(e) are the same
Summary of this case from S.F.M. v. GilmoreOpinion
Case No. 99-4195-DES
September 28, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendant's Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 12). On March 16, 2000, plaintiff filed an unopposed Motion to Supplement the Record (Doc. 8) in this action. In its April 12, 2000, Order (Doc. 11), the court granted plaintiff's motion. Thereafter, on April 24, 2000, defendant filed the instant motion for the court to reconsider its previous ruling. Plaintiff has filed a Response (Doc. 14) to defendant's motion to reconsider, and defendant has filed a Reply (Doc. 18). For the following reasons, defendant's motion shall be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
In these proceedings, plaintiff is seeking review and reversal of defendant's decision denying her disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. The instant motion presents a narrow issue separate and distinct from the overriding issues controlling the action in general.
Plaintiff filed an application for benefits with defendant on February 7, 1995; alleging disability beginning on February 7, 1995. Plaintiff's application received consideration but was denied on November 7, 1995. Plaintiff appealed for reconsideration and was denied again on December 21, 1995. On August 26, 1996, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). In a decision rendered on January 31, 1997, the ALJ found plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. On February 5, 1997, plaintiff sought review by the Social Security Appeals Council, and on December 16, 1999, the Appeals Council denied review.
In the interim between plaintiff's request for review and the Appeals Council ruling, plaintiff's counsel made several submissions of evidence to the council for consideration. These submissions can be organized into three groups. First, on March 27 and April 30, 1997, counsel forwarded a total of four pieces of medical evidence. The evidence was comprised of medical reports from various physicians regarding plaintiff, which were generally dated from late 1996 to early 1997. As to this first group of submissions, the Appeals Council's ruling states:
The Appeals Council identified the submissions as follows:
(1) Representative's letters dated March 27 and April 30, 1997;
(2) Medical report dated December 16, 1997 from William Bailey, M.D.;
(3) Reports from Doctors Hornbaker and Burnett at the Cotton O'Neil Clinic;
(4) Reports from Cotton O'Neil Clinic dated April 24, 1997 to May 10, 1997; and
(5) Report dated March 19, 1997 and progress notes for the period January 1996 to March 1997 from Dr. Bailey.
(R. 7)
The Appeals Council has also considered the contentions raised in your [counsel's] letter dated March 27, 1997 and April 30, 1997, as well as the additional evidence also identified on the attached Order of the Appeals Council, but concluded that neither the contentions nor the additional evidence provides a basis for changing the [ALJ's] decision.
(R. 5)
The second submission was forwarded to the Appeals Council on January 7, 1998, via facsimile. It appears this submission was merely a second copy of Dr. Bailey's December 16, 1997, report, which had been previously submitted.
The third set of submissions were presented to the Appeals Council on January 27 and November 4, 1999, via certified mail. In his accompanying letters to the Appeals Council, plaintiff's counsel describes the evidence as plaintiff's updated medical records from St. Francis and Lawrence Memorial Hospitals. (Attach. Pl.'s Motion to Supplement Record). The records are generally dated throughout 1998 and 1999. In the Appeals Council's ruling, there is no mention whatsoever of these medical records, and because of this omission, the records do not appear in the administrative record supplied to the court for consideration. Plaintiff's original motion successfully sought to have these records added to the administrative record before the court. Defendant brings the instant motion requesting the court reconsider its decision to allow these records into the administrative record.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standards governing a motion for reconsideration are essentially the same as those governing a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Hilst v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 725, 726 (10th Cir. 1989) "Reconsideration is proper when there has been a manifest error of law or fact, when new evidence is discovered, or when there has been a change in the relevant law." Resolution Trust Corp. v. Greif, 906 F. Supp. 1446, 1456 (D. Kan. 1995) (citing All West Pet Supply Co. v. Hill's Pet Prods. Div., 847 F. Supp. 858, 860 (D. Kan. 1994)). See also D. Kan. Rule 7.3(b) ("A motion to reconsider shall be based on (1) an intervening change in controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence, or (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice."). A motion to reconsider is not a mechanism to raise arguments that should have been raised in the first instance or to rehash arguments previously considered and rejected by the court. Id. at 1456-57. Whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is committed to the sound discretion of the court. Marx v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 895, 897 (D. Kan. 1994) ( citing Hancock v. City of Oklahoma City, 857 F.2d 1394, 1395 (10th Cir. 1988))
III. DISCUSSION
It is well established in the Tenth Circuit that, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b), "new evidence [submitted to the Appeals Council] becomes a part of the administrative record to be considered when evaluating the Secretary's decision for substantial evidence." O'Dell v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 855, 859 (10th Cir. 1994) The regulations, however, do not mandate that the Appeals Council consider all evidence submitted during the pendency of a request for review. Instead, the Appeals Council is required to consider proffered evidence only "if the additional evidence is (a) new, (b) material, and (c) relate[d] to the period on or before the date of the ALJ's decision." Box v. Shalala, 52 F.3d 168, 171 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b). If the Appeals Council fails to properly consider such "qualifying" evidence, then the case should be remanded for further proceedings. Wilson v. Apfel, No. 99-3310, 2000 WL 719457, at *1 (10th Cir. June 5, 2000)
In the present case, it is clear from the Appeals Council's ruling that the council accepted as qualified, and properly considered, the evidence plaintiff's counsel submitted on March 27 and April 30, 1997. As noted above, this consideration also covered the January 7, 1998 submission. Defendant, therefore, properly included this evidence in the original administrative record compiled for this action.
The Tenth Circuit has clearly enunciated that "[a]dditional evidence submitted to the Appeals Council becomes part of the administrative record only where the evidence meets the qualifications of 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b)." Wilson, 2000 WL 719457 at *2.
On the other hand, the Appeals Council's ruling is completely devoid of any mention of the final 1999 submissions. Such omission was erroneous only if the evidence satisfies the three qualifying elements. Defendant submits that while the evidence was new and adequately submitted to the Appeals Council, the evidence is not chronologically relevant. The court must agree. The records do not reflect plaintiff's condition prior to the ALJ's ruling. It is insufficient that the records discuss ailments plaintiff may have suffered from since prior to the ALJ's January 31, 1997, ruling. Id. ("While there is some indication in the [submitted evidence] that the arthritis treatment was ongoing, there is nothing in the [submitted evidence] indicative of appellant's condition on or before the [ALJ's ruling].") (emphasis added). See also Lawson v. Chater, No. 95-5155, 1996 WL 195124, at *2 (10th Cir. Apr. 23, 1996) (noting submitted evidence was chronologically relevant because it was dated prior to the ALJ's decision). All of plaintiff's 1999 submitted evidence is dated well after the ALJ's decision. Plaintiff's counsel's own description of the evidence as "updates" alludes to the fact that this evidence, while topical to plaintiff's on-going ailments, fails to address her condition as it existed prior to the ALJ's determination. For these reasons, it would be inappropriate for the court to now consider the evidence within its evaluation of defendant's decision denying plaintiff disability status. Wilson, 2000 WL 719457 at *2 ("Since the evidence here is not relevant to the appropriate time period, it does not qualify as record evidence. Consequently, we do not consider it in evaluating whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision.")
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the above analysis, the court's previous order allowing the supplemental evidence to be added to the record for consideration was clearly erroneous as a matter of law. Defendant's motion to reconsider shall be granted. To clarify, this ruling only impacts the supplemental record offered by plaintiff in her motion to supplement. All evidence contained within the original administrative record supplied by defendant shall be considered by the court in evaluating defendant's ultimate decision.
The parties mention throughout their filings the possible availability of remand pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Under this authority, if new evidence is presented directly to the reviewing court, the court may remand to the Commissioner only if the evidence is material and the plaintiff shows "good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Contrary to the parties' indication, this procedure is inapplicable in this case because it is uncontroverted that the Appeals Council was originally provided the disputed evidence. The evidence, therefore, could not be considered "new" by this court. Wilson, 2000 WL 719457 at *1 n. 2.
IT IS THEREFORE BY THIS COURT ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 12) is granted. The court's April 12, 2000, Order (Doc. 11) is hereby vacated. The records attached to plaintiff's Motion to Supplement the Record (Doc. 8) shall NOT constitute a supplemental record in this case.