Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC227284, Andria K. Richey, Judge.
Michael L. Challgren for Appellant.
Epport, Richman & Robins, Steven N. Richman and Lawrence A. Abelson for Respondent.
ZELON, J.
Prestige of Beverly Hills, Inc. appeals from a ruling granting First Federal Bank of California an award of attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party. Prestige claims that the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded is unreasonable and that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Prestige’s motion to tax costs. As Prestige did not set forth specific evidence demonstrating the unreasonableness of the fees awarded to First Federal, and did not demonstrate a manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court, this court affirms the judgment below.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant Prestige of Beverly Hills, Inc., a real estate holding and management company, sued respondent First Federal Bank of California, claiming that First Federal improperly paid three casino markers worth $20,000 to Caesars Palace to cover the gambling debts of Prestige’s president, Amir Shokrian, as though they were authorized corporate checks. Shokrian opened the Prestige checking account at First Federal in 1993, and signed an account agreement on behalf of Prestige that authorized First Federal “to act without further inquiry in accordance with any writing bearing the signature(s) of the accountholder(s), as indicated on the face hereof.”
Prestige filed a complaint alleging breach of contract, breach of Uniform Commercial Code section 4401, negligence and conversion on March 22, 2000. The trial court granted First Federal’s motion for summary judgment on June 27, 2001 on the grounds that the markers were properly payable negotiable instruments that First Federal was obliged to honor, and awarded First Federal attorneys’ fees. Prestige appealed, and this court reversed and remanded, finding that triable issues of fact existed regarding whether there were irregularities on the face of the markers and whether Shokrian executed the instruments. (Prestige of Beverly Hills, Inc. v. First Federal Bank of California (May 13, 2002 B152355 [nonpub. opn.].) At trial on March 22, 2004, the jury returned a verdict for First Federal and judgment was entered. Prestige appealed.
First Federal filed a motion for attorneys’ fees of $306,453 for 1903.90 hours of legal services rendered over almost four years, equaling an average hourly rate of $160.96, plus $5,000.00 for preparing and litigating the fee motion, for a total award of $311,453. Prestige opposed the motion, focusing on the issue of entitlement, not reasonableness, arguing that there was no basis in statute or in the relevant documents for attorneys’ fees. Prestige did not challenge the hourly rates of First Federal’s counsel, or the average hourly rate, but did object to the inclusion of attorneys’ fees associated with First Federal’s unsuccessful Motion for Summary Judgment. The court denied First Federal’s motion. First Federal appealed from that order, and the appeals were consolidated on April 13, 2005.
This court ruled in favor of First Federal on both issues on February 6, 2006. (Prestige of Beverly Hills, Inc. v. First Federal Bank of California (Feb. 6, 2006, B175403 [nonpub. opn.].) We held that First Federal was entitled to rely on the indemnity provision in the parties’ account agreement to seek attorneys’ fees; and that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that First Federal was not entitled to attorneys’ fees. We remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings in connection with First Federal’s motion for attorneys’ fees, and awarded First Federal its costs on appeal.
First Federal, as the prevailing party on both appeals, filed a Memorandum of Costs on Appeal, which included attorneys’ fees, totaling $64,724. Prestige responded by filing a motion to Tax Costs on Appeal, objecting only to the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees item in the Memorandum and asserting that First Federal was required to file a motion for attorneys’ fees in addition to the Memorandum of Costs. First Federal filed an affidavit of prejudice pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 directed to the original trial judge; when it was rejected on May 19, 2006, First Federal filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate. We granted the writ, and awarded costs on appeal. (First Federal Bank of California v. Superior Court (2006) 154 Cal.App.4th 310.) After First Federal sought $24,011.50 for the Petition for Writ of Mandate, First Federal and Prestige entered into a Stipulation for Re-Setting of Hearings on First Federal’s initial and second fee motions and Prestige’s Motion to Tax Costs on Appeal. The court granted the First Fee Motion for $311,453 in attorneys’ fees, plus $2,002.70 for costs, and denied Prestige’s Motion to Tax Costs. Prestige timely appealed; this is the only matter currently before the court.
Appellant Prestige argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount of attorneys’ fees because of the absence of competent evidence, a misapplication of the lodestar method, and a misinterpretation of applicable law. Prestige also claims the amount awarded to First Federal must be substantially reduced because respondent failed to meet its burden of proof on claimed fee items and included questionable items of costs. First Federal asserts that Prestige did not raise the issue of the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees in the lower court, and cannot challenge the reasonableness of the fees for the first time on appeal. First Federal also argues that the reasonableness of the fees has not been objected to by Prestige with enough specificity, and that the fees are reasonable because Prestige unnecessarily prolonged and complicated litigation and First Federal prevailed at trial on all claims.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review of an award of attorney fees after trial is abuse of discretion. (Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1175.) The trial judge is considered the best assessor of the value of professional services in his or her court. (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 148.) As a result, the decision will not be disturbed unless it is shown that it is clearly wrong or is inconsistent with applicable legal principles. (Ibid.) When it is unclear from the record whether the trial court's award of attorneys’ fees is consistent with applicable legal principles, we may reverse and remand for further consideration. (Id. at p.149.)
B. Amount and Reasonableness of the Attorneys’ Fees
Prestige acknowledges that First Federal, as the prevailing party, is entitled to costs. As this court previously held, the attorneys’ fees requested by First Federal are authorized by contract and allowed as costs. The only issue remaining on appeal is the amount and reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees.
The issue of the amount and reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees is not forfeited as First Federal alleges, because the issue was raised at the trial level, although briefly. Prestige’s opposition to First Federal’s motion for attorneys’ fees on July 12, 2004 presents 10 theories dealing with the issue of entitlement to fees, but not reasonableness. However, Prestige does assert, in its motion to tax costs on appeal on June 16, 2006, that the amount of fees is unreasonable, without giving any reasons.
An appellate court will reverse an award of attorneys’ fees as excessive only where there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. (EnPalm, LCC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774.) Reasonable attorneys’ fees authorized by contract shall be awarded to the prevailing party as “fixed by the court,” giving the trial court broad discretion to determine the amount considered reasonable, governed by equitable principles. (Ibid.) The pleadings, depositions, and other evidence of actual work performed by defense counsel are before the court, and upon this evidence, the court alone has the discretion to set the fee award. (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 624.)
The first step in determining the amount of fees is using the lodestar figure, a calculation based on the number of hours reasonably expended by the attorney multiplied by the attorney’s hourly rate. (EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) After determining the lodestar figure, the court considers whether the total award calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount, and if it is, the court can reduce the award. (Id. at p. 775) Some factors considered to assess reasonableness are the necessity and nature of the litigation, skill required, experience of counsel, attention given, and the success or failure of the case. (Ibid.) An award of attorneys’ fees may be made in some instances solely on the basis of the experience and knowledge of the trial judge without the need to consider any evidence. (Fed-Mart Corp. v. Pell Enterprises, Inc (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 215, 226.)
Here, the trial court found that the hourly rates of First Federal were entirely reasonable, and did not find that the amount of time spent on the original motion or the reply was unreasonable or challenged. While Prestige did challenge the fees incurred in relation to the summary judgment motion and the appeals, the court found First Federal was entitled to all fees reasonably incurred as the prevailing party.
C. Objecting to Fee Items with Specificity
Generalized and unsubstantiated objections to a fee award that do not address specific costs are inadequate to rebut the presumption that defendant’s fees are reasonably and necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 684.) In Hadley v. Krepel, the plaintiff claimed that certain attorneys’ fees were unreasonable because they were for duplicative services incurred as a result of his adversary’s need to hire a new attorney. (Id. at p. 683) Plaintiff’s challenge failed because the court was unable to determine from the record precisely what portion of defendant’s total fees was attributable to repetitive work. (Ibid.) The plaintiff also objected to other items it believed were unreasonable by setting forth a string of dates and fees corresponding to those contained in defendant’s cost bill instead of explaining the basis for their generalized objections, which the court also found to be an inadequate challenge. (Id. at 684)
Here, Prestige has generally objected to First Federal’s fee award by arguing that the trial court misapplied the lodestar method and that the litigation was routine and did not justify $400,000 in fees. Prestige, however, fails to specify how the trial court misapplied the lodestar method, only including a general discussion of the application of the method. Appellant also does not object to any particular item of fees that First Federal lists, but objects to the reasonableness of the fees as a whole. Prestige has not alleged its objections with enough specificity to rebut the presumption that defendant’s fees are reasonably incurred.
Prestige claims, under Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc ., (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328 that the trial court abused its discretion by stating that all fees can be recovered by the prevailing party, because Mann holds that fees for some unsuccessful activities are unrecoverable. Mann held that the prevailing party generally may not recover attorneys’ fees for work on causes of action on which the party was unsuccessful on unrelated claims. (Id. at p. 342). Even when work on successful and unsuccessful claims overlaps, however, the court must consider the significance of the overall relief obtained by the prevailing party in relation to the hours reasonably expended on litigation and whether time expended was reasonable in relation to success achieved. (Id. at p. 344) While the defendant in Mann was considered the prevailing party in the case as a whole, it prevailed on only one out of four causes of action at the trial level, and the court awarded 50 percent of the attorney fees to reflect that defendants were only partially successful on the motion. (Id. at p. 334). Here, in contrast, First Federal prevailed on all causes of action, twice at trial, and twice on appeal, and is entitled to attorney’s fees as the prevailing party on all accounts.
Considering this case is on appeal for the third time and has been litigated over eight years, with two jury trials, a multitude of unsuccessful motions, requests filed, and numerous substitutions of counsel by Appellant, this court finds that the fee amount totaling almost $400,000 is not unreasonable. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The Judgment is affirmed. Respondent is to recover its costs on appeal.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J., JACKSON, J.