Prentis v. Yale

8 Citing cases

  1. Prentis v. Yale Manufacturing Co.

    421 Mich. 670 (Mich. 1984)   Cited 217 times
    Holding that a negligence theory and warranty theory require the same showing, except that negligence focuses on the defendant's conduct and warranty focuses on the fitness of the product

    A judgment for the defendant, upon a jury verdict of no cause of action, was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which held that the trial court's failure to charge the jury as requested was reversible error, mandating a new trial. Prentis v Yale Mfg Co, 116 Mich. App. 466; 323 N.W.2d 444 (1982). The first took place in 1976, the second in 1980.

  2. Clute v. General Accident Assurance Co. of Canada

    177 Mich. App. 411 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 7 times

    It is well recognized that statutes and court rules in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. Tibor v Dep't of State Highways, 126 Mich. App. 159, 162; 337 N.W.2d 44 (1983); Prentis v Yale Mfg Co, 116 Mich. App. 466, 469-470; 323 N.W.2d 444 (1982). The statute which the lower court relied upon to award the plaintiff $169,069.24 in attorney fees is MCL 500.3148(1); MSA 24.13148(1), which provides:

  3. Mehelas v. Wayne County Community College

    176 Mich. App. 809 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 6 times

    A broad or liberal construction of MCR 2.403 is also contrary to the general rule of construction which holds that statutes and court rules in deregation of the common law must be strictly construed. Tibor v Dep't of State Highways, 126 Mich. App. 159, 162; 337 N.W.2d 44 (1983); Prentis v Yale Mfg Co, 116 Mich. App. 466, 469-470; 323 N.W.2d 444 (1982). In People v Lange, 105 Mich. App. 263, 266-267; 306 N.W.2d 514 (1981), we stated that doctrines of statutory construction should apply in determining the Supreme Court's intent in promulgating rules of practice and procedure:

  4. Glavin v. Baker Corp.

    373 N.W.2d 272 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 1 times

    132 Mich. App. 325-326. In so holding, we placed some reliance on this Court's decision in Prentis, 116 Mich. App. 466; 323 N.W.2d 444 (1982), a decision subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court. 421 Mich. 670, supra. In Prentis, the Supreme Court held that, in a products liability action against a manufacturer for an alleged design defect, "where the jury was properly instructed on the theory of negligent design, the trial judge's refusal to instruct on breach of warranty was not reversible error".

  5. Citizens Bank v. Mayes

    133 Mich. App. 808 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 9 times

    Where the omitted instruction 1) applies, 2) is accurate, and 3) is requested, this Court will reverse. Socha v Passino, 405 Mich. 458; 275 N.W.2d 243 (1979); Snow v Freeman, 119 Mich. App. 677; 326 N.W.2d 602 (1982); Jackovich v General Adjustment Bureau, Inc, 119 Mich. App. 221; 326 N.W.2d 458 (1982), lv den 417 Mich. 1071 (1983); Prentis v Yale Manufacturing Co, 116 Mich. App. 466; 323 N.W.2d 444 (1982), lv gtd 417 Mich. 1039 (1983). First, SJI 65.02 applied. It deals with a single defendant and a counterclaim.

  6. Glavin v. Baker Material Corp.

    347 N.W.2d 222 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 4 times

    Here, two questions have been raised by appellants: whether a manufacturer was negligent and whether, regardless of the manufacturer's negligence, a product was defective. In Prentis v Yale Manufacturing Co, 116 Mich. App. 466; 323 N.W.2d 444 (1982), this Court found erroneous a trial court's refusal to give a requested instruction on breach of warranty, a refusal based on the mistaken belief that the statute on products liability, MCL 600.2945 et seq.; MSA 27A.2945 et seq., had merged all former products liability theories into one single unified theory and that the jury could, therefore, only be instructed with respect to a negligence theory. The Court in Prentis ruled, however, that the breach of warranty theory had not been abolished by the statute, which essentially governed computation of damages.

  7. Gootee v. Colt Industries, Inc.

    712 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1983)   Cited 22 times
    In Gootee the trial court improperly combined two distinct causes of action, implied warranty of fitness and negligent design into a single special verdict question and thereby, in effect, created a hybrid cause of action of implied warranty.

    While it is true that in certain products liability cases the distinction between implied warranty and negligence theories becomes blurred, Elsasser v. American Motors Corp., 81 Mich.App. at 385, 265 N.W.2d 339, there is no doubt that the two have traditionally been distinct legal theories under Michigan law, requiring unique elements of proof. See e.g. Prentis v. Yale, 116 Mich. App. 466, 323 N.W.2d 444 (1982); Abel v. Eli Lilly Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979); Kosters v. Seven-Up Co., supra. The Michigan statute combining all products liability cases under a single rubric apparently does not alter most traditional distinctions between the legal theories of liability.

  8. Stults v. Bush Boake Allen, Inc.

    No. C11-4077-MWB (N.D. Iowa Feb. 25, 2014)   Cited 3 times

    The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the failure to give the plaintiff's requested instruction was reversible error. See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 323 N.W.2d 444, 446 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Michigan Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment.