Opinion
No. 01 Civ. 10751 (RJH)(MHD).
March 29, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On April 1, 2004, Magistrate Judge Michael H. Dolinger issued a Report and Recommendation ("Report") recommending that this Court deny petitioner's writ for habeas corpus, thereby dismissing the petition. Upon letter submission dated April 5, 2004 by petitioner, the Court granted petitioner a sixty-day extension to file any objections to the Report. On June 23, 2004, petitioner filed his objections.
The district court adopts a Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation when no clear error appears on the face of the record. See Nelson v. Smith, 618 F. Supp. 1186, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). If a party submits objections to the report and recommendation, the district court must undertake a de novo determination of those portions of a report to which objection is made, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), by reviewing "the Report, the record, applicable legal authorities, along with Plaintiff's and Defendant's objections and replies." Badhan v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 234 F. Supp. 2d 313, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In that situation, the court may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. See Nelson, 618 F.Supp. at 1189. If, however, the party "makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the Court reviews the Report and Recommendation only for clear error." Sanchez v. Dankert, 2004 WL 439502, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. March 9, 2004); accord Johnson v. City Univ. of New York, 2003 WL 21435469, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2003); Greene v. WCI Holdings Corp., 956 F.Supp. 509, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Prado appears to assert that Magistrate Judge Dolinger erred in failing to apply the standard set forth by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. AEDPA provides that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with respect to any claim that has been "adjudicated on the merits" in the state courts, unless that determination "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Moreover, state court determinations of a factual issue shall be presumed to be correct, such that the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 2254(e)(1).
Petitioner argues that "[t]he Magistrate erroneously interpreted the facts and erroneously analyzed the law" insofar as the it is not clear "whether the Magistrate applied the `contrary to or unreasonable' standard for state prisoners coming to the federal courts. The Magistrate should have found whether the state findings was [sic] contrary or involved an unreasonable application of federal law established by the Supreme Court in Mason v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977), and not attempt to re-assess the historical facts without consideration for this standard of review." AEDPA provides that a writ of habeas corpus may not issue "with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Because petitioner's argument so closely tracks the language of AEDPA, the Court construes his argument as faulting Magistrate Judge Dolinger for failing to follow AEDPA.
In effect, AEDPA altered the landscape for federal habeas review of petitions filed after April 24, 1996, see Brown v. Artuz, 283 F.3d 492, 498 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2002), by restricting a federal court to determining first, what the correct interpretation of Supreme Court precedent is, and second, whether a state court's application of that precedent, if deemed to be erroneous, was nevertheless reasonable. Kruelski v. Connecticut Superior Court for the Judicial District of Danbury, 316 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 2003). Indeed, pre-AEDPA standard of review required a federal court to review de novo "pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact" and afford a presumption of correctness to factual findings, historical facts and any consequent inferences adopted by both state trial courts and state appellate courts, absent any special circumstances listed in the statute. Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 55 (2d Cir. 2001).
While the Report fails to set forth the standard of review under AEDPA even though Prado filed his habeas petition after April 24, 1996, it is nevertheless clear that Magistrate Judge Dolinger applied AEDPA in rejecting Prado's claim that the trial court's admission of certain eyewitness identification testimony violated his due process rights. Specifically, the Report set forth the appropriate Supreme Court authority on due process challenges to the admission of eyewitness identification testimony, laid out the state trial court's findings, cited Section 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1) and subsequently concluded that the state court's decision to admit such testimony was "unassailable." (Report at 20.)
Second, with respect to petitioner's due process claims regarding the missing lineup photos and sufficiency of the evidence, Magistrate Judge Dolinger implicitly concluded that those claims failed under the less deferential pre-AEDPA standard. See Washington, 255 F.3d at 55. Conceivably, where those claims could not survive a standard more favorable to petitioner, there was "no need to conduct the AEDPA's more intricate analysis." Ramirez v. Miller, 2005 WL 659144, at *4 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. March 11, 2005); Kruelski, 316 F.3d at 107 n. 3 (noting that "[w]hile this two-step approach is appropriate in the federal district courts no less than in the federal courts of appeal, it is not mandatory in either" to the extent that a court may skip ahead to the unreasonableness determination.) Accordingly, the Court perceives no error in Magistrate Judge Dolinger's process in evaluating petitioner's claims.
To the extent that Prado separately argues that Magistrate Judge Dolinger "erroneously found that petitioner's claims of missing evidence (photo array and line-up photo) did not deprive him of adequate appellate review of his conviction," these objections are general and conclusory attempts to rehash petitioner's original arguments and therefore subject to the clear error standard. Barratt v. Joie, 2002 WL 335014, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2002) ("When a party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the Court reviews the Report and Recommendation only for clear error.") (citation omitted); Sanchez, 2004 WL 439502, at *1 ("clear error" review applied where objections to magistrate judge's report and recommendation were conclusory); Renelique v. Doe, 2003 WL 23023771, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2003) ("clear error" review applied where objections merely reiterated merits of claim without responding specifically to analysis set forth in magistrate judge's report and recommendation). The Court does not discern any clear error with respect to Magistrate Judge Dolinger's findings with respect to these issues.
Accordingly, this Court hereby adopts the Report and directs the Clerk of the Court to close the case.
SO ORDERED.