Opinion
XXXXXX.
Decided February 9, 2011.
Comerford Dougherty, LLP, Esq., Attorney for Plaintiff, Garden City, NY.
Ragano Ragano, Esqs., Attorney for Defendant, Ozone Park, NY.
DECISION AFTER HEARING
This matter was set down for a hearing to determine maintenance and legal fees. The parties have previously entered into a stipulation regarding equitable distribution and since the parties children are all emancipated, there are no custody, visitation or child support issues.
On November 8, 2010 an inquest was conducted regarding the grounds portion of this action.
The grounds for divorce that are alleged in the Complaint pursuant to DRL § 170(2) were proved as follows: that commencing in or about January, 2007, and continuing for a period of more than one (1) year immediately prior to commencement of this action, the defendant refused to have sexual relations with the plaintiff despite plaintiff's repeated requests to resume such relations. Defendant does not suffer from any disability which would prevent him from engaging in such sexual relations with plaintiff. The refusal to engage in sexual relations was without good cause or justification and occurred at the martial residence. The conduct of the defendant constitutes an abandonment of the plaintiff by the defendant, for a period of one (1) or more years prior to the commencement of the action. Defendant was personally served with the Summons with Notice. The Verified Complaint was served upon John J. Lawless, Esq., and no answer was interposed. On or about September 30, 2010, defendant appeared by John J. Lawless, Esq., and at trial, on November 8, 2010, neither admitted nor denied plaintiff's allegations, and consented to the entry of judgment on the grounds of constructive abandonment of the plaintiff by the defendant (DRL § 170).
In accordance with Domestic Relations Law § 170, "[a]n action for divorce may be maintained by a husband or wife to procure a judgment divorcing the parties and dissolving the marriage on any of the following grounds: (2) The abandonment of the plaintiff by the defendant for a period of one or more years."."[C]onstructive abandonment," . . . has been routinely defined as the refusal by a defendant spouse to engage in sexual relations with the plaintiff spouse for one or more years prior to the commencement of the action, when such refusal is unjustified, willful, and continual, and despite repeated requests for the resumption of sexual relations ( see Chellappan v. Murugan , 62 AD3d 929 , 882 NYS2d 122; Gulati v. Gulati , 50 AD3d 1095 , 1097, 857 NYS2d 643; Meccariello v. Meccariello , 46 AD3d 640 , 641, 847 NYS2d 618; Hathaway v. Hathaway , 16 AD3d 458 , 459, 791 NYS2d 631). Davis v. Davis, 71 AD3d 889 NYS2d 611 [2 Dept., 2009]). The Second Department, has also held that "[t]he defendant's conduct in refusing to engage in sexual relations must have been unjustified and without the consent of the plaintiff in order for the plaintiff to have a cause of action pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170(2) (see Schine v. Schine, 31 NY2d 113, 119, 335 NYS2d 58, 286 NE2d 449; Gulati v. Gulati , 60 AD3d 810 , 876 NYS2d 430). " Gianis v. Gianis , 67 AD3d 963 , 890 NYS2d 568 [2 Dept., 2009])."
In consideration of the plaintiff's testimony and that the defendant remained silent, neither admitting nor denying the testimony, the plaintiff is awarded a judgment of divorce on the grounds of constructive abandonment pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170(2).
FACTS
The parties were married on January 13, 1986 and have been married for approximately twenty-four (24) years. The plaintiff is 58 years old and works as a customer service representative with the airlines for the past ten years. Plaintiff also testified she is a Canadian citizen and has paid into the Canadian social security. The defendant is 55 years old and has been an airline mechanic for the past thirty (30) years.
It is undisputed that the plaintiff makes approximately $35,000.00 per year plus another $12,000.00 per year as rental income, from a tenant, for a total income of approximately $47,000.00 per year. On plaintiff's case-in-chief, plaintiff introduced a copy of plaintiff's form W-2 for the year 2009 and a copy of plaintiff's form 1040 for the year ending 2009 (exhibit 1) which lists on line 7, plaintiff's income from wages, salaries, tips, etc. is $31,924.00 which amount is consistent with box No. 1 on plaintiff form W-2 for the year 2009. The only other source of income plaintiff list in her form 1040 is $560.00 as taxable income on line 8a. In addition to the foregoing, counsel for plaintiff prepared a summary of plaintiff's net income which was moved into evidence as exhibit 2. Plaintiff thereafter testified the summary (exhibit 2) was accurate and consistent with exhibit 1. Plaintiff also testified in response to counsel question, that she receives $1,000.00 per month as rental income which is stated as a line item on exhibit 2.
Plaintiff next moved her amended statement of net worth, sworn to November 4, 2010, into evidence, as exhibit 3. Plaintiff's amended statement of net worth on page 7, under the heading "Gross Income" states: "See 2009 W-2 annexed hereto". However, as indicated by plaintiff and exhibit 2, plaintiff's income also includes an additional $12,000.00 per year from rent which is omitted from plaintiff's amended statement of net worth. Plaintiff never addressed or reconciled this inconsistency in plaintiff's sworn testimony.
On cross-examination, the testimony of plaintiff was as follows:
Q:and just so that we're clear, you receive rent of $1,000.00 a month, which is approximately $12,000.00 a year, ok that's in addition.
A:yes
Q:to your income
A:yes
Q:and that's net to you, you don't pay any taxes on that
A:no I don't
This Court finds it troubling that plaintiff's sworn amended statement of net worth does not include the $12,000.00 additional income plaintiff testified she receives as rent, rendering her sworn testimony and sworn amended statement of net worth inconsistent.
However, more troubling to this Court is plaintiff's admission that the $12,000.00 rent she receives annually is net and same does not appear reported in plaintiff's 2009 1040 tax return. Furthermore, on cross examination plaintiff testified she did not pay any tax on her rental income. In addition to the foregoing, plaintiff does not allege she is exempt from paying taxes or has any exclusion or other justification for failing to report this income. Faced with these candid admissions, this Court believes it appropriate to forward a copy of this decision and order to the United States Internal Revenue Service for their review. (See, Hashimoto v. DeLaRosa, 4 Misc 3d 1027(A), 798 NYS2d 344 (Sup. Ct. NY. Co. 2004) (Silbermann, J.); Beth M. v. Joseph M., 12 Misc 3d 1188(A), 824 NYS2d 760 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 2006) (Balkin, J.).
The defendant earns approximately $100,795.00 per year according to his testimony and W-2 form and lives rent free in a two (2) family apartment which has a store on the first floor. He estimates his rent would have a fair market rental value of approximately $1,000.00 — $1,500.00 per month or $12,000.00 — $18,000.00 per year (see, Baffi v. Baffi , 24 AD3d 578 [2nd Dept. 2005]). Therefore based upon the foregoing, this Court has taken defendant's rent-free lifestyle into consideration and has imputed additional income to the defendant in the amount of $1,250.00 per month or $15,000.00 per year. The defendant also testified he has additional rental income of $500.00 per month, giving the defendant a total annual income of $121,795.00.
Once again, this Court is troubled by the testimony of a witness, this time the defendant, who admits the $500.00 per month rent he has been collecting for the past six or seven years, is not included in his sworn net worth statement (exhibit 7). The defendant never addressed or reconciled this inconsistency in the defendant's sworn testimony.
In examining defendant's Form 1040 for the year ending 2009 it appears the defendant did not include the monthly $500.00 rent he receives as income and for the reasons set forth above, this matter is also being forwarded to the United States Internal Revenue Service for their review. The defendant does not claim he is exempt from paying taxes nor does he allege any exclusion or justification for failing to report this income.
The defendant admits he currently pays $1,200.00 per month to the plaintiff towards the carrying charges on the plaintiff's residence, but plans on stopping these payments once his emancipated children are completed with college. The plaintiff testified her son, age 22 goes to school two (2) days a week and her daughter, age 23, goes to school three (3) days a week, but they are too busy to contribute towards plaintiff's support.
Maintenance
The plaintiff testified at length that her current monthly expenses are $6,931.73, although plaintiff did not introduce any documentation to substantiate same and her current net income is $3,605.80 per month, leaving a net monthly shortfall of $3,325.93 (see exhibits 1, 2 and 3). Notwithstanding plaintiff's current lifestyle and living expenses, the plaintiff offered no testimony or other credible evidence regarding her pre-commencement standard of living, except that she testified the parties lived rent free and took several vacations.
This Court also notes in reviewing plaintiff's amended statement of net worth (exhibit 3) that a portion of plaintiff's monthly expenses; (i) groceries — $480.00; (ii) clothing for children — $180.00; (iii) gas, oil, repairs, car wash and registration — $545.00 for three (3) cars; and (iv) school transportation, school supplies and books, school events — $165.00 are for the benefit of her two (2) emancipated children. While it is admirable that the plaintiff continues to support her emancipated children, this additional voluntary expense should not be the obligation of the defendant. In addition to the foregoing, the plaintiff lists on her amended statement of net worth that she pays for a housekeeper, maid at the rate of $70.00 per month and spends about $3,800.00 annually on vacations. The plaintiff also testified during cross-examination that she took vacations: (i) in the Bahamas in 2010; (ii) a cruise from Rome for approximately fourteen (14) days in 2009; (iii) went to Cypress also in 2009; (iv) took her daughter on a cruise in 2008 and (v) took her son on a cruise in 2008. On cross-examination plaintiff also testified she purchased a 2009 Lexus for $24,000.00 in October 2010 after the commencement of this action and these vacations and 2009 Lexus were paid for from plaintiff's separate inheritance. Plaintiff's Statement of Proposed Disposition (exhibit 4) states that plaintiff has separate property valued at $508,557.58 (including a mortgage of $120,000.00 on her current home) plus an interest in real estate in Quebec with an unknown value. Plaintiff also claims that the defendant's separate property consists of (i) 1/3 of a residence in Greece for an unknown value; (ii) jewelry in the amount of $3,500.00 and (iii) an interest in a restaurant called The Inn worth $375,000.00. However, when plaintiff was asked on cross-examination the basis for arriving at the value of The Inn she stated that she did not know where the amount came from.
The defendant testified and his Statement of Net Worth indicates his monthly expenses are $3,467.17 per month. Assuming the defendant would have to pay rent at the imputed amount of $1,250.00 then the defendant's total expenses would be $4,717.27. Therefore, based upon the parties testimony it appears the plaintiff's lifestyle causes her to spend ($6,931.73) approximately $2,214.46 a month more than the defendant, after giving effect to imputing income to the defendant.
The defendant also took vacations to: (i) Poland in 2009 and 2008; (ii) Mexico and (iii) took his son John on vacation in 2010 to upstate New York. The defendant also testified he is trying to sell his restaurant, The Inn, as it is losing money and he continues to put approximately $3,000.00 per month into The Inn to make up The Inn's shortfall but he failed to produce any documentation to substantiate same. The defendant further testified that his interest in The Inn was approximately $55,000.00 and he has never taken a salary from The Inn.
It is well settled that "[t]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and every case must be determined on its unique facts" (Monroe v. Monroe , 71 AD3d 647 , 895 NYS2d 827 [2 Dept., 2010]; citing DeVries v. DeVries , 35 AD3d 794 , 796, 828 NYS2d 142 [2 Dept., 2006]; Raynor v. Raynor , 68 AD3d 835 , 890 NYS2d 601 [2 Dept., 2009]; Zaretsky v. Zaretsky , 66 AD3d 885 , 888, 888 NYS2d 84 [2 Dept., 2009]; Wasserman v. Wasserman , 66 AD3d 880 , 888 NYS2d 90 [2 Dept., 2009; Brooks v. Brooks , 55 AD3d 520 , 521, 867 NYS2d 451 [2 Dept., 2008]). The amount and duration of maintenance is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court ( see e.g. Schultz v. Schultz, 309 AD2d 849, 766 NYS2d 76 [2 Dept., 2003]; Wilson v. Wilson, 308 AD2d 583, 764 NYS2d 828 [2 Dept., 2003]; Buchsbaum v. Buchsbaum, 292 AD2d 553, 740 NYS2d 359 [2 Dept., 2002]; Murray v. Murray, 269 AD2d 433, 703 NYS2d 402 [2 Dept., 2000], and that every case must be determined on its own unique facts ( see e.g. Wortman v. Wortman , 11 AD3d 604 , 606, supra; Mazzone v. Mazzone, 290 AD2d 495, supra).
The court is to consider ". . . the relevant factors, including the long duration of the marriage, the plaintiff's role as a stay-at-home mother during most of the marriage, her extended absence from the workforce, her lack of formal advanced education and employment skills, the substantial disparity in the parties' income, and their pre-divorce standard of living . . . ( see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][6][a]; see also Raynor v. Raynor , 68 AD3d 835 , 890 NYS2d 601 [2 Dept., 2009]; Zaretsky v. Zaretsky , 66 AD3d 885 , 888, 888 NYS2d 84 [2 Dept., 2009]; 66 AD3d, 880; 888 NYS2d 90 [2 Dept., 2009]; Bogannam v. Bogannam , 60 AD3d 985 , 986, 877 NYS2d 336 [2 Dept. 2009])." ( Monroe v. Monroe , 71 AD3d 647 , supra). [T]he court must consider the payor spouse's reasonable needs and the reasonable needs of the recipient spouse and the pre-separation standard of living in the context of the other factors enumerated in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(6)(a), and then, in [its] discretion, fashion a fair and equitable maintenance award accordingly' ( Hartog v. Hartog, 85 NYS2d at 52, 623 NYS2d 537, 647 NE2d 749 {85 NYS2d 36}; see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][6][a]; Chalif v. Chalif, 298 AD2d at 348, 751 NYS2d 197 [2 Dept., 2002]). " (Griggs v. Griggs , 44 AD3d 710 , 844 NYS2d 351 [2 Dept. 2007]; see Appel v. Appel , 54 AD3d 786 , 864 NYS2d 92 [2 Dept., 2008])." The factors include . . . the standard of living of the parties during the marriage, the income and property of the parties, the distribution of marital property, the duration of the marriage, the health of the parties, the present and future earning capacity of both parties, the ability of the party seeking maintenance to become self-supporting, and the reduced or lost lifetime earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance". ( Kret v. Kret, 222 AD2d 412, 634 NYS2d 719 [2 Dept., 1995] citing Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][6][a]). [O]ne of the purposes of an award of maintenance is to encourage economic independence." ( Ventimiglia v. Ventimiglia, 307 AD2d 993, 763 NYS2d 486 [2 Dept. 2003] citing Chalif v. Chalif, 298 AD2d 348, supra; Unterreiner v. Unterreiner, 288 AD2d 463, 733 NYS2d 239 [2 Dept., 2001]).
These factors must be evaluated along with the fact that "the overriding purpose of a maintenance award is to give the spouse economic independence". ( See, Bains v. Bains, 308 AD2d 557, 76f4 NYS2d 721 [2 Dept. 2003]; see also O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 NY2d 576; Abrams v. Abrams , 57 AD3d 809 , 870 NYS2d 401 [2 Dept., 2008]). In Bains, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the Supreme Court "providently exercised its discretion in awarding the plaintiff maintenance in the sum of $3,000.00 per month for a period of five (5) years." Moreover, the court in Bains noted that "[s]pousal support should be awarded for a duration that would provide the recipient with enough time to become self-supporting". ( id.; see also Schenfeld v. Schenfeld, 289, AD2d 219, 734 NYS2d 465 [2 Dept., 2001]; Granade-Bastuck v. Bastuck, 249 AD2d 444). Similarly, in Comstock v. Comstock , ( 1 AD3d 307 , 766 NYS2d 220 [2 Dept., 2003]), the Second Department affirmed an award of maintenance even though the movant had a Masters Degree in Education and Social Work and there was a substantial distributive award of cash. The Appellate Division, Second Department, has held that "[i]n light of the defendant's history of low earnings, her age and her health, as well as the length of the marriage, the Supreme Court properly found that it was not likely that she would become self-supporting, and consequently properly awarded her nondurational maintenance." ( Marino v. Marino , 52 AD3d 585 , 860 NYS2d 180 [2 Dept., 2008]; see also Brooks v. Brooks , 55 AD3d 520 , 867 NYS2d 451 [2 Dept., 2008] ["Considering all the relevant factors, including the plaintiff's total disability, the improbability of her being able to find gainful employment due to that disability, as well as the parties' pre-divorce standard of living, their disparity in income and the plaintiff's lack of future earning potential, in this instance an award of $1,500.00 as monthly nondurational maintenance is appropriate"]). Recently, the Second Department decided on March 16, 2010, in Baron v. Baron , ( 71 AD3d 807 , 897 NYS2d 456 [2 Dept., 2010] that, "[T]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and every case must be determined on its own unique facts". ( Wortman v. Wortman , 11 AD3d 604 , 606; see Grumet v. Grumet , 37 AD3d 534 , 535). The court must consider the factors enumerated in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(6)(a), which include the pre-divorce standard of living of the parties, the income and property of the parties, the distribution of property, the duration of the marriage, the present and future earning capacity of the parties, the ability of the party seeking maintenance to be self-supporting, and the reduced or lost earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance ( see Meccariello v. Meccariello , 46 AD3d 640, 641-642; Griggs v. Griggs, 44 AD3d at 711-712).
The parties separated in 2007 and this action was commenced in 2009. The defendant moved back to the family home in Astoria where the children were raised. Since there was no testimony regarding the plaintiff's pre-commencement standard of living, it is difficult for this Court to evaluate same.
In considering the distribution of property pursuant to subdivision 5 of the § 236(B) of the DRL, it appears both parties split the proceeds of property they owned and the defendant purchased, The Inn, which, based upon the defendant's testimony, was not a wise investment and the plaintiff purchased a house which it appears has contributed to her expenses exceeding the defendant's by approximately $2,200.00 per month. It is unclear to this Court whether the plaintiff's desire to support her two (2) emancipated children or live in a house beyond her means, or both, is the reason for her monthly shortfall, but this Court finds it would be inappropriate to compel the defendant to pay the entire shortfall, especially where the plaintiff has chosen to support her two (2) adult children which is not the responsibility of the defendant.
There was simply insufficient testimony regarding the plaintiff's pre-separation standard of living to justify her monthly expenses of almost $7,000.00 and assuming arguendo that the record would support such expenses, there is no guarantee that the plaintiff would be entitled to an award of lifetime maintenance to sustain such a lifestyle. "Although the court is required to consider the parties' pre-separation standard of living in determining the appropriate amount and duration of maintenance, a pre-separation high-life' standard of living does not guarantee a per se entitlement to an award of lifetime maintenance" ( Chalif v. Chalif, 298 AD2d at 348, 751 NYS2d 197 [2 Dept., 2002]; see Hartog v. Hartog, 85 NYS2d 36, 50-51, 623 NYS2d 537, 647 NE2d 749). Rather, the court must consider the payor spouse's reasonable needs and the reasonable needs of the recipient spouse and the pre-separation standard of living in the context of the other factors enumerated in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(6)(a), "and then, in [its] discretion, fashion a fair and equitable maintenance award accordingly" ( Hartog v. Hartog, 85 NYS2d 36, 50-51, 623 NYS2d 537, 647 NE2d 749); see Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(6)(a); Chalif v. Chalif, 298 AD2d at 348, 751 NYS2d 197)." Griggs v. Griggs , 44 AD3d 710 , 712, 844 NYS2d 351, 354 (2 Dept., 2007).
Presumably, when the plaintiff's two emancipated children move out of her house and plaintiff stops paying for their food, clothes, gas, books, etc., or they begin contributing to her support, her monthly expense should decline.
DRL § 236 (B)(6)(a) provides that "the court may order . . . maintenance in such amount as justice requires, having regard for the standard of living of the parties established during the marriage, whether the party in whose favor maintenance is granted lacks sufficient property and income to provide for his or her reasonable needs and whether the other party has sufficient property or income to provide for the reasonable needs of the other and the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties." After directing that the application shall be effective as of the date of the application, the statute continues:
In determining the amount and duration of maintenance, the court shall consider:
(1)the income and property of the respective parties including marital property distributed pursuant to subdivision five of this part;
(2)the duration of the marriage and the age and health of the parties;
(3)the present and future earning capacity of both parties;
(4)the ability of the party seeking maintenance to become self-supporting and, if applicable, the period of time and training necessary therefor;
(5)reduced or lost lifetime earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance as a result of having forgone or delayed education, training, employment or career opportunities during the marriage;
(6)the presence of children of the marriage in the respective homes of the parties;
(7)the tax consequences to each party;
(8)contributions and services to of the party seeking maintenance as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other party;
(9)the wasteful dissipation of martial property by either spouse;
(10)any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration; and
(11)any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.
Since the plaintiff is employed full time, in the same position she had during the marriage, received a large distributive award and has assets of approximately $500,000.00, this is a more appropriate case for durational maintenance.
"The overriding purpose of a maintenance award is to give the spouse economic independence, and it should be awarded for a duration that would provide the recipient with enough time to become self-supporting" ( Kilkenny v Kilkenny , 54 AD3d 816 [2nd Dept. 2008; citations omitted]). In Ruane v Ruane , 55 AD3d 586 , 587 (2nd Dept. 2008), quoting DiBlasi v DiBlasi , 48 AD3d 403 , 404), it was noted that "in determining the appropriate amount and duration of maintenance, the court is required to consider, among other factors, the standard of living of the parties during the marriage and the present and future earning capacity of both parties . . . While the Supreme Court properly found that the defendant was capable of returning to work . . . the wife's ability to become self-supporting with respect to some standard of living in no way. . .obviates the need for the court to consider the pre-divorce standard of living".
On the other hand, in fixing the amount of maintenance, the Court must consider the financial circumstances of both parties, including their reasonable needs and means the payor sponsor's present and anticipated income. . . ." Morring v. Morring, 259 AD2d 472, 686 NYS2d 71 (2nd Dept. 1999).
Therefore, based upon the foregoing and having taken into consideration all of the factors enumerated in DRL § 236(B)(6)(a) and the applicable case law, this Court awards the wife taxable maintenance in the sum of $1,200.00 per month for thirty-six (36) months. This award is retroactive to the original date of the commencement of this action. [("A final order of maintenance or child support shall be effective as of the date of the application therefor (Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][6][a]; [7] [a])'" ( Burns v. Burns, 84 NY2d 369, 377, 618 NYS2d 761,643 NE2d 80 [1994]). The services of a summons with notice containing a request for maintenance or child support constitutes an application therefor . King v. Geovanis , 45 AD3d 273 , 844 NYS2d 283 (1st Dept. 2007)]. Retroactive sums due by reason of this award shall be paid at the rate of $1,200.00 per month, until all arrears have been satisfied. The first payment shall be made within thirty (30) days after defendant is served with a copy of the Judgment with Notice of Entry. Although it is uncontroverted that defendant voluntarily paid $1,200.00 to plaintiff towards the carrying charges on plaintiff's residence, since none of these payments were claimed to be for maintenance the defendant is not entitled to a credit for same.
In making this decision to award maintenance the court is also aware of the fact that there will be tax consequences to the wife in that any income payments for tax purposes will be taxable to her and deductible to the husband to the extent permitted by law. Any maintenance shall cease upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the wife.
LEGAL FEES
This Court has carefully reviewed plaintiff's retainer agreement, detailed legal bills for services rendered, specifying the date, amount of time spent, hourly rate and a detailed description of the legal services rendered and a detailed statement of counsel's qualifications and experience the difficulty of the issues presented, the fee customarily charged in the locality and finds plaintiff's legal fees fair and reasonable.
In the instant action, the defendant's income is more than double that of the plaintiff. Domestic Relations Law § 237 authorizes the Court to direct either spouse to pay counsel fees in order to enable the other spouse to carry on or defend the action, as in the Court's discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. See, DeCabrera v. DeCabrera-Rosette, 70 NY2d 879 (1987). Where there is no serious dispute that the husband's financial resources exceed those of the wife, the wife should not be expected to exhaust all of the finite resources available to her in order to pay her attorneys.
Accordingly, defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff's legal fees in the amount of $20,142.50 and disbursements of $695.56 within thirty (30) days after defendant is served with a copy of the Judgment with Notice of Entry.
The parties are directed to submit Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and proposed judgment within sixty (60) days of the date of this decision. See, Uniform rules for Trial Courts, § 202.48(a).