Summary
In Powers v Motor Wheel Corp, 252 Mich. 639; 234 N.W. 122; 73 ALR 702 (1931) plaintiff incurred an injury resulting in the removal of the lens from an eye.
Summary of this case from Hilton v. Oldsmobile DivisionOpinion
Docket No. 16, Calendar No. 34,743.
Submitted June 3, 1930.
Decided January 7, 1931.
Certiorari to Department of Labor and Industry. Submitted June 3, 1930. (Docket No. 16, Calendar No. 34,743.) Decided January 7, 1931.
Richard P. Powers presented his claim against Motor Wheel Corporation for compensation for loss of an eye. On petition to stop payment of compensation. Award in defendant's favor is reviewed by certiorari. Affirmed.
Charles A. Libby and Joseph H. Dunnebacke, for plaintiff.
Shields, Silsbee, Ballard Jennings, for defendant.
In Liimatta v. Calumet Hecla Mining Co., 229 Mich. 41, the plaintiff therein, by a previous accident, had lost the direct vision of his left eye, but, like plaintiff in the instant case, he had side vision left. Another accident took away his side vision, and this court held that the loss of the side vision was a loss of the eye for industrial purposes. An eye, or vision of an eye, useful for industrial purposes, can be lost but once.
Under the holding in the Liimatta Case, if plaintiff later on, and by another industrial accident, loses the remaining side vision of his eye, then he will be entitled, at such time, to an award for loss of the eye for industrial purposes, and the award, under my Brother's opinion, will not operate in bar because the loss will be of vision he retained and could use and later lose. If the eye in the Liimatta Case was not lost by reason of retention of side vision only, then plaintiff herein, by retention of side vision, has not lost his eye. If granted compensation now for loss of his eye and he later loses the remaining vision in an industrial accident and is awarded compensation for the loss of the eye, then we will have an instance of a man losing one eye twice. See, also, Hayes v. Motor Wheel Corp., 233 Mich. 538; Crane v. Ætna Portland Cement Co., 234 Mich. 110.
The question here involved is whether, in an accidental injury, the plaintiff has lost an eye within the meaning of the workmen's compensation law (2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8407 et seq.). At the time of the accident, he was working as a machinist. A piece of metal struck his left eye, lodged there, and caused an injury from which a traumatic cataract developed. In the university hospital at Ann Arbor, the metal and the cataract were removed at the same operation. Another cataract developed, and a second operation was necessary. An agreement to pay compensation at $18 a week was entered into by the parties and approved by the commission. This was paid during actual disability, a period of 16 weeks. The plaintiff returned to work, performed the same labor at which he was engaged when injured, and received the same wages. The defendant filed a petition to stop compensation. The plaintiff countered with a petition claiming compensation for the loss of an eye. The deputy commissioner granted the compensation asked for by the plaintiff. On appeal to the board, his award was vacated, and an order entered stopping compensation. The action of the board is here reviewed on certiorari.
It is conceded that in the surgical operations necessarily performed on the injured eye the lens was entirely destroyed, resulting in the loss of direct vision to the extent of from 90 to 98 per cent., and that because of the loss of the lens, the injured eye cannot co-ordinate with the direct vision of the good eye. If the plaintiff had no other useful vision, these facts would constitute the loss of an eye within the meaning of the compensation act. Stammers v. Banner Coal Co., 214 Mich. 215; Suggs v. Ternstedt Manfg. Co., 232 Mich. 599. But the defendant contends that, notwithstanding the loss of direct vision and the failure of the two eyes to co-ordinate, the plaintiff still has a considerable useful vision in the injured eye because of what is known, as peripheral or protective vision, and, because he admittedly has this vision, he has not lost an eye within the meaning of the statute.
It is undisputed that the plaintiff has no useful direct or central vision from the injured eye. He has peripheral or protective vision. The function of the eye in that respect has not been disturbed. Peripheral or protective vision is a side vision. It enables one to see moving shadows and objects appearing from the side of the eye. In his testimony, Dr. Slocum illustrated it as follows:
"If you look at your finger here, if I look at my finger here steadily, I see you men over here at the side, but you are all out of focus, yet if you were receding or coming towards me, I would know it. That would protect me from injury if my vision was reduced to that amount, so the protective vision is vision for objects without regard to their form or shape, that you can tell something about by the rapid increase or diminution of size, whether they are approaching or going away from you. A very valuable thing to possess with a poor eye, when you are crossing streets, and you are liable to be run into by an automobile, to see an approaching automobile from the side of the injured eye."
Dr. Owen testified:
" Q. When you speak of useful vision you refer only to protective vision, that is, noting objects from the side?
" A. Yes.
" Q. If a man is working at a machine, he can't see to put certain parts into the machine with that eye?
" A. No. * * *
" Q. And it would practically amount to this that he would have to use his good eye?
" A. Yes.
" Q. And do without the injured eye or he would have to use the injured eye corrected and do without the good eye?
" A. Yes. * * *
" Q. At all times when Mr. Powers is using his right eye he has also protective vision in the left eye when uncorrected?
" A. Yes, just the same at work as he would be on the street. He has ability to determine shadows and objects."
Dr. Wetzel testified:
"All he has in the left eye is capacity to see moving shadows."
None of the specialists who testified claims that, independently of the good eye, the plaintiff has any greater vision than to discern moving shadows and objects to the side of the injured eye. There is no doubt that, without the aid of the good eye, it would be impossible for the plaintiff to do the work at which he was engaged when injured. Has he lost an eye within the meaning of the compensation act? Of course he has some useful vision left in the injured eye, but the test is whether such vision is adequate for industrial pursuits. Liimatta v. Calumet Hecla Mining Co., 229 Mich. 41. Applying this test to the undisputed facts, we find that while the plaintiff has useful vision for some purposes it is not sufficient for use in industrial pursuits, and therefore it must be held that he has lost an eye within the meaning of the statute. In Collins v. Albrecht Co., 212 Mich. 147, the plaintiff was a carpenter. He was injured in the right eye by a nail. He was left with 25 per cent. vision. He could go about the city streets, read signs, and locate offices in office buildings, but was not able to work on a ladder or scaffold. As a carpenter, he was not able to do his work. The court held that he had lost an eye within the meaning of the compensation law. In that case, the plaintiff had much more useful vision than the plaintiff has here. In holding that he has lost an eye within the meaning of the act, we do not disturb the finding of the board on the facts. We agree that he has some useful vision, but it is so slight that, for industrial purposes, it is practically useless. Any kind of vision is of some use, but peripheral vision as defined by the doctors is not a useful industrial vision.
The order should be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. The plaintiff should have costs.
POTTER, J., concurred with McDONALD, J.
Under the statute, loss of an eye means loss of the sight or vision of the eye. Rye v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 229 Mich. 39. No specific award is allowable for partial loss of an eye, but such an injury is compensable only under the general provisions of the law and if it reduces earning capacity. Hirschkorn v. Fiege Desk Co., 184 Mich. 239. However, loss of an eye does not require total loss of sight. Where sight is destroyed to the extent that no vision useful in industry remains, the eye is lost, even though some sight continues. But if any vision useful in industry remains, the eye is not lost. Purchase v. Grand Rapids Refrigerator Co., 194 Mich. 103; Stammers v. Banner Coal Co., 214 Mich. 215; Liimatta v. Calumet Hecla Mining Co., 229 Mich. 41; Hayes v. Motor Wheel Corp., 233 Mich. 538; Crane v. Ætna Portland Cement Co., 234 Mich. 110; Banker v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 244 Mich. 1. If, by the aid of glasses, the vision may be increased to industrial usefulness, the eye is not lost ( Cline v. Studebaker Corp., 189 Mich. 514 [L.R.A. 1916C, 1139]), unless the glasses will prevent useful co-ordination of the eyes ( Suggs v. Ternstedt Manfg. Co., 232 Mich. 599).
A variation of the rule occurs where one eye has been previously destroyed, and compensation is sought for loss of the remaining eye. Although, as a matter of fact, loss of the remaining eye results in total disability, it is held to be only partial disability arising from the accident and compensable specifically as for loss of an eye and not generally as for disability. Weaver v. Maxwell Motor Co., 186 Mich. 588 (L.R.A. 1916B, 1276, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 238). And where injury to the remaining eye, causing less than blindness, incapacitates the employee from following his trade, it is compensable as for loss of an eye, even though considerable vision remains which would have been useful in industry were the other eye functioning. Collins v. Albrecht Co., 212 Mich. 147 . This variation seems to be one of necessity, arising out of the situation that such injury to the eye is clearly compensable because it results in decreased earning capacity, but, as held in the Weaver Case, it is not considered a total disability, and, because of the prior destruction of the other eye, no basis remains upon which an award of general compensation for partial disability may be computed, where total incapacity to follow the trade follows the injury. See Winn v. Adjustable Table Co., 193 Mich. 127. The Collins Case is not applicable to the situation at bar.
The cases display considerable variety and divergency, but we are not called upon to reconcile them. It may be noted that, except in the Collins Case, where the board had held that the injury to the remaining eye had caused total disability and was compensable as such under the general provisions of the statute, the decisions of the compensation board on loss of an eye have been uniformly affirmed by this court. The application of the test to a specific case is very largely a question of fact upon which the finding of the board is conclusive, if supported by evidence. Liimatta v. Calumet Hecla Mining Co., supra; Hayes v. Motor Wheel Corp., supra; Banker v. Chevrolet Motor Co., supra.
In the instant case, there was testimony that plaintiff's eyes, without corrective glasses, co-ordinate so that he has the simultaneous benefit of the whole sight of the right eye and the protective vision of the left eye. Corrective glasses would increase the sight of the injured eye to from 66 2/3 to 80 per cent. of normal, but would cause want of co-ordination with the other. However, the possibility of such increase is valuable because, if the good eye be later destroyed, the injured one could then be brought back to a considerable proportion of normal vision.
Plaintiff can see objects and count his fingers with the left eye. One doctor testified that his protective sight is useful in industry, that it enables him to see objects at the side and may protect him from being struck, and another said his peripheral vision is of a decided benefit to him in a factory or industry. As a matter of fact, he has been earning more wages than before the accident and at the same machine.
The case presents an issue of fact upon which the decision of the board is final, and it is affirmed, with costs.
BUTZEL, C.J., and CLARK, SHARPE, and NORTH, JJ., concurred with FEAD, J.