FARRELL, Associate Judge: The Director of the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, reversing a decision of a hearing examiner, denied petitioner workers compensation benefits on the strength of this court's decisions in Franklin v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 709 A.2d 1175 (D.C. 1998), and Powers v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 566 A.2d 1068 (D.C. 1989), both standing for the principle that "there is no right to compensation benefits when an employee resigns, not for reasons related to the injury or disability, but for economic reasons to take a better paying job." Id. at 1069.
Agency precedent holds that where an employee terminates employment for economic reasons, compensation for subsequent wage loss is not the responsibility of that employer. See Powers v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 566 A.2d 1068 (D.C. 1989). . . . Notwithstanding, claimant is entitled to payment of medical expenses causally related to her work injury as set forth in D.C. Code, as amended, § 36-307.
While this assertion may have some merit in the abstract, Ms. Burge's argument overlooks other critical evidence in the record that makes her position ultimately meritless. See, e.g., Powers v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Services, 566 A.2d 1068, 1069 (D.C. 1989) (when an employee leaves work voluntarily, or for reasons unrelated to a workplace injury, compensation for lost wages is not warranted). Under the Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"), once a claimant demonstrates that a disability resulted from a work-related injury, there is a presumption that his or her claim comes within the provisions of the Act.
Larson, supra, at 525. For example, in Powers v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 566 A.2d 1068 (D.C. 1989), the petitioner had injured his back and continued working on lighter duty at the same rate of pay. Id. at 1068.
Even if we could affirm on an alternative legal ground not considered by the agency because the result is "clearly ordained by law," Howard Univ. Hosp. v. Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 881 A.2d 567, 574 (D.C. 2005), Starbucks never raised this defense before ALJ Verma; likewise, on appeal, Starbucks did not cite any authority for the proposition that once Mr. Ngom voluntarily resigned from Starbucks, he was subsequently precluded from obtaining wage loss benefits based on that employment relationship. See, e.g., Powers v. Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 566 A.2d 1068, 1068-69 (D.C. 1989). Nor did Starbucks raise the defense of res judicata in an attempt to prevent relitigation of a matter conclusively decided by ALJ Cameise. See Borger Mgmt. v. Sindram, 886 A.2d 52, 59 (D.C. 2005) ( res judicata is applicable to administrative proceedings); Poulin v. Bowen, 260 U.S.App. D.C. 142, 146, 817 F.2d 865, 869 (1987) ( res judicata must be raised before the reviewing court can apply the doctrine). Because both arguments have been waived by Starbucks, we do not consider them and therefore turn to review the petition on the ground decided by the agency.
Capezzuti v. Glens Falls Hosp., 282 A.D.2d 808, 722 N.Y.S.2d 620 -21 (2001). Powers v. District of Columbia Dept. of Employment Servs., 566 A.2d 1068-69 (D.C.App. 1989). ¶ 13 Authority is split over whether an employee volunteering to be included in an employer-planned reduction in force, as Abbott did here, should be considered as having effectively resigned from employment.
Indeed, we must sustain the agency's interpretation even if a petitioner advances another reasonable interpretation of the statute or if we might have been persuaded by the alternate interpretation had we been construing the statute in the first instance.Powers v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 566 A.2d 1068, 1069 (D.C. 1989) (quoting Smith v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 548 A.2d 95, 97 (D.C. 1988)); see also District of Columbia v. Davis, 685 A.2d 389, 393 (D.C. 1996); cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) ("We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer. . . ."). The purpose of the OEA is to review certain personnel decisions of other District of Columbia agencies, see D.C. Code § 1-606.
In our view, the Director's ruling is not "unreasonable in light of the prevailing law, inconsistent with the statute, or plainly erroneous," Public Employee Relations Bd. v. Washington Teachers' Union Local 6, AFT, 556 A.2d 206, 207 (D.C. 1989), and, therefore, deserves our deference. Powers v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 566 A.2d 1068, 1069 (D.C. 1989); Dyson v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 566 A.2d 1065, 1067 (D.C. 1989). Moreover, the ruling is narrowly tailored to prevent overreaching by employers who would seek to coerce employees into settlement arrangements, thus preserving for employees the protections afforded them under D.C. Code § 36-342.